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Abstract 
Iron ore is among the biggest, non-energy extractive industry in the world in terms of 
value, and the biggest in terms of the volumes of cargo it channels in international trade. 
Two key characteristics of the iron ore market are central to its study: firstly, there is only 
a small number of buyers and sellers; and secondly, there is a great degree of 
interdependence among buyers and sellers and both groups are aware of this 
interdependence. For buyers, security of supplies is crucial. For sellers, long-term 
commitment from importers is essential in order to maintain the long-run viability of 
mining projects. Since the 1960s, long-term contracts have been, and still are, the main 
vehicle used in international iron ore trade. 
Under the light of the above peculiarities of the iron market, a non-competitive analytical 
framework is adopted. This thesis proposes an alternative profit maximising behaviour 
different to the solutions offered by oligopoly and bilateral monopoly theorists. In this 
case, the importer enters negotiations with complete knowledge of his own minimum 
acceptable price, a possible idea of his partner's maximum acceptable price and also an 
idea (which can be held with varying degrees of certainty) of what alternative suppliers 
may be able to offer. This will restrict the range of prices over which negotiations take 
place and will mitigate the bargaining power of the seller. A buyer is likely to act in a 
similar manner, knowing that the seller has alternative export outlets, but he can also use 
other bargaining tools to achieve a better deal. A quite common tool is the promise of 
long term commitment through the signing of contracts, acquisition of equity stakes in 
mines or provision of financing facilities. 
The behaviour of the trading partners in such an oligopoly/oligopsony (or bilateral 
oligopoly) environment is also studied empirically with a relatively simple and tried 
econometric technique, borrowed from consumption and investment theory and applied 
for the first time for all top iron ore importers, who collectively have accounted for 
approximately 90% of world trade in the last 35 years. The model performs well in most 
cases and reveals: firstly, different results from previous research in the case of Japan; 
and secondly - and most importantly - substantial differences in the way Far East and 
West European importers behave. 
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I. Background and Characteristics of the Iron 
Ore Industry 
1.1 Introduction 
Of all the non-fuel extractive industries in the world, iron ore is probably the 
biggest, in tenns of volume, and among the most widely traded. In the last 20 
years, iron ore production has fluctuated between 800 million and 1 billion tonnes 
(Bmt), with some 400 million tonnes (Mmt) channelled to international trade. 
With the exception of crude oil, the only other commodity generating such 
volumes of trade is coal. The iron ore trade provides employment to a large part of 
the world fleet of bulk carriers vessels, particularly vessels of the 'Capesize' class, 
with dead-weight capacities of over 100,000 tonnes. Despite the widespread 
movement of iron ore around the world, its study has not attracted a great degree 
of interest from academic sources. Most of the analytical and modelling work in 
the extractive industries has (understandably) concentrated on energy resources 
(particularly oil) and then on copper and other base metals, where the analysis 
focuses on the finished product rather the raw material. 
Iron ore is of course the feedstock of the steel industry and has only negligible 
uses elsewhere. As such, it is driven by the steel industry which, in its turn, is 
driven by the general level of economic activity and industrial production. Steel 
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production is a widely spread manufacturing industry, both in developed and 
developing countries. Among the biggest traditional producers are the United 
States, Japan, and a group of dominant West European producers. However, the 
1980's have witnessed the spectacular growth of new market entrants, including 
South Korea, Taiwan and China, which assumed an important role alongside other 
developing producers such as Brazil and India. Despite this seemingly competitive 
structure of the iron ore industry, its true structure is somewhat more complicated. 
On the supply side there is only a handful of countries that generate the majority 
of exports. Likewise, on the demand side a similar degree of concentration also 
exists, with relatively few importing agencies negotiating on behalf of the steel 
manufacturers they represent. 
It is evident that the perfectly competitive analytical framework is far from 
appropriate to analyse the economic structure and dynamics of the sector. 
Oligopoly economics seem appropriate, and are extensively reviewed in chapter 
II, in order to build a more suitable analytical framework. Traditional oligopoly 
theory, however, tends to be one-sided and focuses primarily on production, 
whilst assuming that oligopolists face the aggregate demand of 'many', 
'powerless' consumers, who are essentially price takers. As a result, their attention 
focuses on the reactions of their competitors, not their clients. To overcome this 
shortcoming, it is necessary to adopt a more suitable market scenario, that of a 
bilateral monopoly. Although not entirely fit for the case of iron ore, this 
framework provides useful insights in the ways that mutually dependent and 
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equally powerful economic agents behave when transacting with each other. The 
learning from this theory is then expanded to accommodate more than one such 
agents on both the demand and the supply sides. 
As a result of the imperfect structure of the iron ore market and the degree of 
concentration on both demand and supply, procurement strategies have 
traditionally favoured long-term ties between producers (mines) and consumers 
(steel mills). In the 1950's and 1960's the strategy favoured by many steel mills in 
industrialised countries was to hold substantial equity stakes in mines both at 
home and abroad, in order to ensure a steady flow of supplies. Since the 1970's, 
when Japanese steel mills became a dominant purchasing force, long-term 
contractual arrangements have become the most common procurement strategy in 
the iron ore market. Chapter III focuses on the structure of such contracts and then 
focuses of the development of Japanese) long-term contracts between steel mills 
and mines in Australia, Brazil and India, which provide the majority of Japan's 
iron ore needs. 
The central part of this thesis is contained in chapter IV, where an economic 
model of the iron ore industry is constructed on the basis of developing and 
improving the theoretical mechanisms suggested in literature. The second part of 
that chapter is dedicated to ascertaining the degree of interdependence between 
I The choice of Japan was dictated by the amount of publicly available infonnation on long-tenn 
contracts. 
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exporting and importing partners through the construction of a partial adjustment 
model looking at the allocation behaviour of the world's major importers during 
the period 1962 to 1996. 
Finally, chapter V focuses on the interpretation of the results of the econometric 
tests and links them to the theoretical model put forward in chapter IV. 
1.2 Economics of Mineral Resources 
Iron ore is one of a number of metallic ores which are produced on a large scale 
around the world. Metalliferous ores and processed metals are known to have been 
traded since antiquity, but iron ore is a relatively recent entrant in the international 
trade scene. 
Before focusing on the supply and demand characteristics of iron ore, however, I 
will take a look at the economics of non-fuel mineral resources, which will set the 
framework for the discussion of the iron market. 
1.2.1 Supply Determinants 
Like other minerals, metals are classified as exhaustible - or non-renewable -
natural resources. The central concept behind the supply of mineral commodities 
is the determination of a feasible rate of extraction, which will neither deplete the 
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resource too quickly nor leave it unexploited for too long. Let's start at the 
beginning, however. 
1.2.1.1 Extraction 
The first stage of mineral supply is the extraction of the metal-bearing ore. This 
depends on a number of factors, ranging from geological conditions to the market 
price of the commodity. 
1.2.1.1.1 Geological Conditions 
The geological formation of the mineral-bearing area determines the extent and 
quality of reserves. Large proved reserves are necessary for any mineral project to 
even begin, as the whole process takes a long time and is extremely capital 
intensive. In fact, long lead times - normally more than four years - are 
characteristic of mineral projects and the process of turning a mere suspicion of 
possible reserves into a fully fledged ore-producing unit consists of several 
consecutive phases2: 
• exploration for economic concentration of the mineral; 
• evaluation of mineralisation during exploration; 
• discovery; 
• evaluation and feasibility study of discovery; 
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• construction of the mine, which can be an open or an underground pit; 
• mining of the ore; 
• ore processing and refining; 
• distribution of the ore to the final markets. 
At the exploration stage the aim is to collect as much information as possible at 
the lowest possible cost. The techniques usually employed include aerial surveys 
and geochemical sampling, and these will provide a first indication of mineral 
concentration in an area. Once geological anomalies indicate possible 
mineralisation, more precise - and costlier - methods are used to determine the 
extent and quality of reserves. 
These methods include more frequent sampling and a more detailed geological 
mapping. The precision of the mapping will be verified by drilling the prospect -
a technique identical to wildcat drilling in oil exploration. When adequate samples 
have been tested and indicate, with a satisfactory degree of certainty, that the 
project has the required size and quality characteristics, it is registered as a 
discovery. 
The next stage is to carry feasibility studies regarding the development of the 
project. This will include plans about the development of underground or open-pit 
mines, and the design of a proper transport network to transfer the ore from pit to 
2 Trocki, L.K. (1990), op.cit. 
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consumption point. Another issue that is increasingly taken into account is the 
effect of the mining project on the flora and fauna of the area, so that landscaping 
is now an integral part of many new ventures. 
Once all the studies are in place, and finance has been arranged, the project enters 
the developmental stage. This includes the purchase of capital equipment and the 
hiring of labour in order to construct the mine and put in place all the 
accompanying infrastructure. This stage might take 1-2 years to complete, 
assuming that there are no major natural obstacles to overcome. 
The procedure does not end, however, with the extraction of the mineral. The raw 
material is usually processed before leaving the country of origin3, and then has to 
be transported from the processing plant to the export terminal. From there 
distribution is usually the responsibility of the metal fabricator, but this can vary 
from case to case. 
The above description is applicable for a project starting from scratch - a so-called 
greenfield project. Not all mining ventures are greenfield, however. In fact, they 
are classified into several categories: 
• ancient mines, which have been mined for several centuries; 
3 Crushing is usually the minimum, while further processing might also take place, like pelletising 
in the case of iron ore. 
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• previously mined deposits, which were abandoned in the past, but are now 
redeveloped, perhaps with the introduction of new technology; 
• expansions, which are attached to already existing mines; 
• previously known mineralisations, which have been known in the past but have 
never been drilled or defined; 
• previously known deposits, which have been drilled and defined, but were not 
previously mined because they were considered of inferior quality; 
• greenfield discoveries, which are projects starting from scratch, as was 
discussed before; 
• related discoveries, which are usually brought to light soon after major 
greenfield discoveries.4 
1.2.1.1.2 Technology 
Technology does, of course, playa great role in determining the rate of extraction 
and the degree to which probable reserves turn into proven reserves. In fact, 
technology might even make the difference in reaching the decision to develop a 
project. One particular area where technology plays a crucial role is transport. A 
typical example of this is found in the history of iron ore: exports of the raw 
commodity jumped in the 1950s and 1960s with the introduction of larger vessels 
which made economical the transportation of that relatively cheap commodity, 
over long distances. 
4 Trocki, L.K. (1990), op.cit. 
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Improvements in mmmg technology are also important, especially when 
underground excavation is used. Technological advances, for example, changed 
the face of coal mining, from a labour-intensive to a capital-intensive production 
process. Technology is also the parameter that might make some - previously 
uneconomical- reserves worthwhile exploiting. 
Metals can also be manufactured from recycled material. In fact, scrap may be an 
important source of secondary supply for some metals (e.g. aluminium), and may 
originate from the manufacturing process of crude metal or metal manufactures 
(manufacturing scrap), or from obsolete final products (recycling scrap), like 
aluminium from cans, and steel plate from car bodies and ships. Advances in 
technology affect the extent to which metal supply originates from primary or 
secondary sources. In the aluminium industry, for example, it is actually quite cost 
effective to recycle while, in the steel industry, technological advances in the 
electric arc furnace allow steel to be produced entirely from scrap material. 
Technological advances may also alter the way production is organised in metal 
manufacturing, which affects in turn the way mineral supply responds to new 
manufacturing procedures. We will see in more detail how the advent of 'mini-
9 
mills' has affected the way the steel industry has restructured its supply contracts 
with mineral producers. 5 
1.2.1.1.3 Economic Conditions 
Geological and technological conditions alone do not determine the decision to 
develop a mineral resource. Several economic parameters come into play, and 
these include capital and labour intensity, the cost of inputs, and the price of the 
extracted ore itself. The cost of capital and labour - the fixed and variable 
production inputs - together with the specific geological conditions, determine the 
final combination of these inputs and the shape of the production curve. Assuming 
that the producing firm has the objective of maximising its profits, production will 
expand until marginal cost equals marginal revenue from the sale of the 
commodity. 
The main drawback of the analysis used before is that it is, by definition, static. 
When dynamic price determination is of importance, a number of additional 
considerations enter the model, such as the nature of long- and short-term supply 
of production inputs, and the way these inputs are phased into production.6 As was 
discussed before, mineral production is a large scale process, which requires 
several years to set up, in order to run it at the minimum possible cost. As a result, 
S Note, however, that technological progress was not the only reason for change; economic 
conditions played an even more important role. 
6 For example, short term supply of labour tends to be more inelastic than long term supply. In the 
short term it is difficult for management to hire and fire as needed due to the strong objections 
that are likely to be raised by miners' unions. At the extreme, such inflexibilities can be 
10 
any decision to alter production fundamentals cannot be implemented 
immediately; a number of time lags intervene between the decision to change 
production and the actual change itself. Labys7lists three different types of lags: 
" ... (1) an implementation lag [1-2 years], which is the time lag between a change in price 
and the reaction by decision makers; (2) a technological or developmental lag [1-4 years], 
which is the time required to place new mining capacity into full production; and (3) an 
exploration lag [~ 4 years], which is the time between the decision to explore for new 
deposits and the utilisation of the deposits in production." 
The existence of so many lags implies that the response of supply, to changes in 
prices, is rather slow. As a result, supply conditions remain fairly stable for long 
periods and simply absorb - rather than react to - demand changes. Hence, 
capital-intensive low-variable-cost mines prefer to continue operating under 
unfavourable prices, as long as operating costs are covered. Such a behaviour, for 
example, has been observed in the copper market, whereby copper producers 
prefer to hold inventories when prices are low, and ration supplies when prices are 
high, in order to sustain short-term price stability. 
Despite any attempts for price stability, however, long-term price trends cannot be 
ignored. Supply will eventually have to adjust to any structural changes of 
demand. The problem, however, is that with total lead times of well over 6-8 
extended for many years, as evidenced by the long and painful experiences of West European 
coal mines, which had to be drastically downsized due to poor competitiveness 
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years, the effect of new projects coming into production could be devastating to a 
market much different from what it was when the project began. One such 
example of a new mining project that was heavily criticised for its bad timing was 
the Carajas project, a massive iron ore development in the north of Brazil. 
Production from that project was added to international iron ore supply at a time 
when prices were under immense pressure. In fact, the market depression was so 
severe that several steel mills in West Europe and Japan had to cancelliftings of 
the ore which were specified in their contractual obligations with mines around 
the world. 
Finally, supply decisions are very much affected by the economic objectives set 
by the mining company Profit maximisation is a central assumption in the 
classical supply model, but other objectives - like employment, foreign exchange 
earnings, etc. - may assume greater importance. 
1.2.1.1.4 Resource Ownership and Concentration in Supply 
Until know I have looked at considerations facing the individual producer of the 
metallic ore. It is often, however, that production and investment decisions are 
dictated by the structure of the industry, its participants, and the degree of 
concentration of supply. Mineral projects require substantial capital investments, 
which impose an entry barrier for new participants. The firms which are already in 
7 Labys, w.e. (1980), op.cit. 
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the market are few and large and their commitment is imposed by the level of exit 
costs. Similar considerations arise in the case of metal manufacturers, who also 
tend to be large in size and vertically integrated. With this kind of operational 
constraints it is not surprising that in most mineral and metal markets, power is 
concentrated in the hands of a few countries or companies. 
In many cases governments - especially in developing countries - are largely 
involved in the development of mining projects, because they view them as an 
integral part of their economic development plans. In doing so, they tend to 
assume a majority stake in such projects, in order to retain control of the foreign 
exchange earning capacity of the mining operation. 
Of course ownership concentration in the hands of a few companies only gives 
rise to oligopolistic - or in some extreme cases, in the past, even monopolistic -
behaviour. The copper industry in the United States, for example, has been 
scrutinised for price-setting oligopolistic behaviour; their aluminium industry was 
monopolised by Alcoa at the beginning of the century, before the company was 
broken down - much like what happened to Standard Oil. Oligopolistic behaviour 
doesn't always imply collusion among suppliers; firms might be following the 
pricing decisions of one of the bigger firms (although not necessarily the biggest), 
which becomes the market leader. One such example is the case of U.S. Steel, the 
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largest North American steel manufacturer, which often assumes a price-setting 
role, with the remaining steel manufacturers following suit.s 
One should note, however, that the mere existence of just a few producing firms 
doesn't necessarily imply oligopolistic behaviour. Sometimes demand structure 
has a considerable bearing on suppliers' behaviour. In the market for iron ore, for 
instance, procurement of imports is often undertaken by private or government 
agencies representing a country's steel manufacturers; this effectively creates a 
monopsony in the particular country and, if imitated by other importing countries, 
an oligopsony on a global basis. The situation then becomes much less clear, but it 
certainly puts a lot more pressure on suppliers to behave competitively. 
1.3 Iron Economics 
Iron is the most widespread of all metals. It is used almost invariably in the form 
of steel, which is present in almost every aspect of our everyday life. The 
buildings we live and work in; the cars we drive; the electrical appliances we use; 
the drills to extract oil; the machines we construct to manufacture new goods - all 
are made of, or contain, steel because of its strength and flexibility. As Fish 
(1995) puts it: 
8 This behaviour is also called signalling. See, for example, Martin, S. (1994~ p. 157) where the 
case of U.S. Steel is described. 
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"Steel is a material essential for the modem world. The industrial revolution would not 
have been possible without the development of iron and steel." 
Iron, however, is not a new metal; its use has been widespread for several 
thousand years.9 It was the development of technology that could produce it 
cheaply and in large quantities which made it indispensable for the industrial 
revolution. 
1.3.1 Physical Characteristics 
Iron - or ferrum as it is known in Latin - is a magnetic, malleable, greyish white 
metallic element. In the periodic table of elements its symbol is Fe; it has a 
specific gravity of 7.86; it melts at 1,535°C; it boils at 2,750°C; and it loses its 
magnetic properties at about 790°C. The metal exists in three different forms: 
ordinary, or a-iron (alpha-iron); y-iron (gamma-iron); and o-iron (delta-iron). The 
internal arrangement of the atoms in the crystal structure of the molecule changes 
in the transition from one form to another. Iron is an allotropic element, i.e. each 
of its forms has different physical properties. Allotropy and the difference in the 
amount of carbon taken up by each of the forms play an important role in the 
formation, hardening, and temperinglO of the steel. 
9 The earliest specimen known today, a group of oxidised iron beads found in Egypt, dates from 
about 4000 Be. 
10 Tempering is the process of bringing steel to proper hardness and elasticity by heating after 
quenching. 
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Chemically, iron is an active metal. It combines with fluorine, chlorine, bromine, 
iodine, sulphur, phosphorus, carbon and silicon. It burns in oxygen to form 
ferrosoferic oxide - Fe30 4• When exposed to moist air, iron becomes corroded, 
forming a reddish-brown, flaky, hydrated ferric oxide, commonly known as rust. 
Iron is one of the most abundant elements, estimated to make up about 4.6% of 
the earth's crust. It is very rare for metallic iron to appear in free form; instead, it 
is most frequently found in chemical compounds, i.e. ores. In general, grades of 
iron ore around the world range from 30% to 65% Fe. The principal ferrous ores 
are: 
• hematite (Fe30 4), which is the most common and, in its pure form, contains 
70% iron; 
• magnetite (Fe20 3), which when pure contains about 72%; 
• limonite (HFe02); 
• ilmonite (FeTi03); 
• siderite (FeC03), containing about 48% iron; 
• pyrite (FeS2), containing 47% iron; and 
• taconite, containing 15-35% iron 
The first four oxides are the most widely used iron ores. Pyrite - an iron sulphide 
- is the least common because of the difficulty in extracting the metal from the 
compound. Taconite is the ore with the most impurities, and has to be beneficiated 
and agglomerated before it can be used; some North American ores are taconites 
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and this is where pelletisation has been heavily used. Beneficiation and 
agglomeration are going to be discussed in the following section. 
Sometimes, iron ore deposits also contain valuable minerals of copper, titanium, 
phosphorus, vanadium, cobalt and, occasionally, even gold and silver. In the past, 
gold has been recovered from iron ore operations in Minas Gerais in Brazil; 
copper, cobalt, minor accounts of nickel, and unspecified amounts of gold and 
silver occur in the ore at Hierro, Peru. I I Therefore, it is common for the ores to be 
processed before they leave their origin in order to recover any of the above 
metals. 
1.3.2 Supply Determinants 
Iron is a metal which can be found in almost every country around the world. The 
problem is that it may be found in quantities which are too small, or formations 
which are too impure, to exploit. In North America, taconite formations are found 
in the Mesabi range in the Lake Superior region. Most North American iron 
formations contain 30% or more total iron, 60-80% of which is economically 
recoverable. 
Better quality iron formations are found in South America, especially Brazil. 
Brazilian itabirites are usually richer in iron content; the term was applied 
11 Balis, J.L. and J.A. Bekkala (1987), op. cit., p. 9. 
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originally in Itabira, Brazil, to a high-grade massive specular hematite ore (66% 
Fe), and is now used to describe formations in which ore is present in thin layers 
of hematite, magnetite, or martite. Iron ore may also be present in river bed 
deposits, such as the Robe River deposit in Australia; or in manganiferous or 
titaniferous compounds, like the ores found in Canada, India and New Zealand. 
Before we look at individual countries, however, we need to discuss in more detail 
the production characteristics and initial processing of iron ore. 
1.3.2.1 Iron Ore Processing 
As we have seen, iron is abundant and can be found in a variety of compounds. 
However, not all ores can be used directly for the iron-making process. Plain, 
unconcentrated iron ore as it leaves the mine, is classified as crude ore. If this ore 
can be used with minimal crushing and screening, it is considered as direct-
shipping ore. This is also frequently known as lump ore and refers to any 
relatively unbeneficiated product, with granules generally sized between 6 and 
30mm. 
Usually, however, most ores need to be beneficiated, i.e. processed until a 
considerable part of the gangue12 has been removed and their iron content 
improves. Hematite and magnetite are concentrated by means of magnetic 
12 Non-metallic part of the ore. 
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separators. Other ores, however, are concentrated by screening or flotation. In all 
cases, the products of the beneficiation process are called concentrates. 
After beneficiation, the ore has the proper iron content, but may not be suitable yet 
for use in the blast furnace, because the size of the ore particles is too small.13 At 
this stage, iron ore is usually known as jines, a term which refers mainly to the 
size of the ore granules, and is very important because it affects the usability of 
the ore in the blast furnace. 
Most iron ores with a particle diameter of less than -inch must be agglomerated. 
Agglomeration is a process in which small particles are combined to produce 
larger, permanent masses. There are two principal types of agglomerates - sinter 
and pellets. 
Sinter is produced by firing a mixture of fine ore, lime or limestone, and coke on a 
moving horizontal grate. The result is a rather brittle product, suitable for blast 
furnace feed, but sensitive to handling and transportation; this is the reason why 
almost all sintering facilities are located next to steel mills. 
Pellets are the product of a process whereby very fine iron ore (pellet feed) is 
rolled into 'green,14 pellets, using bentonitelS as a binder, and then fired at 1,250-
\3 If the ore is too fme it cannot be fed in the blast furnace, because it 'chokes' it and results in 
lower recovery rates of pure iron at a higher cost. 
14 i.e. unfired. 
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1,350°C in a furnace to produce the final indurated product. Pellets are normally 
between 9-16mm, with less than 5% below 5mm; have excellent burning 
characteristics and, hence, are ideal for blast furnace feed; and are also resistant to 
handling and transportation, which is why pelletising plants are usually located 
near mines. 
Pelletising normally yields products of at least 60% Fe content, with the average 
being 65% Fe. The process was originally used in the United States and Canada as 
a means of recovering more iron from the low-grade taconite ores that were 
available domestically. North America still possesses the largest pelletising 
capacity in the world, with some 90 million tons. In free-market economies, Brazil 
and Sweden have considerable facilities, while the former Soviet Union has a 
staggering 80 million tons of pelletising capacity in place. 
1.3.2.2 Iron Ore Producers 
The face of the iron ore industry has changed dramatically since the beginning of 
the 20th century. Until the 1950s most of the iron ore used in Europe was 
produced domestically - mainly in France, Sweden, Spain and Germany. As 
domestic reserves were depleted and post-war reconstruction multiplied the need 
for steel, iron ore had to be imported from abroad, often over long distances. In 
North America, the United States and Canada have traditionally been important 
IS A type of clay. 
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producers of iron ore, but most of their output is consumed domestically, or 
channelled in intra-regional trade. South America rose to prominence after the 
1950s, especially Brazil and Venezuela. 
The former Soviet Union and China remain the world's largest producers, but 
only a very small fraction of their production finds its way in the international 
market. Because of the domestic absorption of Chinese production, Australia 
emerges as Asia's prime supplier of iron ore, followed by India - another very 
important producer and exporter of iron ore in the region. 
African production is mainly channelled to the European market, with most of the 
deposits located in Western Africa and South Africa. But let us take a closer look 
at the most important suppliers of iron ore, around the world. 
1.3.2.2.1 Western Europe 
Today, Sweden is the only important West European producer, with France and 
Spain being distant second. Sweden's deposits are estimated in the range of 4.5 
Bmt and are produced mainly in the northern part of the country. Some of these 
deposits are located above the Arctic Circle, and contain some of the world's most 
important high-grade iron ore; the ore bodies of the Kiruna district - Kirunavaara, 
Luossavaara, Malmberget, and Svappavaara - account for over 90% of Swedish 
exports. The rest of Swedish production originates in the Orangesberg area in 
central Sweden, with the principal mines about 150 Ion west of Stockholm. 
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The country's iron ore production and exports are dominated by Luossavaara-
Kirunavaara AB (LKAB), a state-owned mining company, which was established 
in 1890. The company ships a number of ore grades with %Fe-content ranging 
from 61.8% for KDF's (Kiruna D Fines - high phosphoric), to 70.6% for MAF's 
(Malmberget A fines - low phosphoric). One important characteristic of Swedish 
mines is the fact that they are underground, as opposed to the open-pit mines in 
countries like Brazil and Australia, which are less costly to operate and, thus, 
more competitive in pricing their products. 
The other important producers in Western Europe are France, Spain and Norway. 
France is a deficit region, which not only consumes all the iron ore produced 
domestically but also imports substantial quantities of it. Spain produces 3-4 
million tons of iron ore per annum, most of which is handled by one company -
Compa a Andaluza de Minas (CAM). 
Norway has three companies producing iron ore: Nye Fosdalen Bergverk, with an 
underground mine in Fosdalen, at the northern head of Trondheimsfjord; Rana 
Gruber, with an open pit operation in Storforshei; and, the biggest of the three, 
Sydvaranger, with the 1.S Mmt-per-year Bj rnevatn mine, at Kirkenes. 
Sydravanger is primarily state-owned, while Rana Gruber used to be part ofNorsk 
Jernverk, the state-owned steel producer. 
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1.3.2.2.2 North America 
Most of the available iron ore reserves in North America are located in the United 
States. Crude ore reserves are estimated in the region of 100 Bmt, but most 
resources are primarily low-grade, taconite-type ores, of the Lake Superior 
district, that have to be processed in order to be suitable for commercial purposes. 
Apart from the Lake Superior region, other iron ore resources of the United States 
are widely distributed in several geographical regions, including Alaska and 
Hawaii. Several of the old mines are now out of action, however, and the main 
iron ore producing region is around Lake Superior, which includes the Mesabi, 
Cuyna, Vermillion and Fillmore ranges in Minnesota, the Black River Falls and 
Baraboo districts in Wisconsin, the Gogebic Range in Wisconsin and Michigan, 
and the Marquette and Menominee districts in Michigan. 
There are several mining companies producing iron ore in the United States and 
Canada, some of which are: Cleveland-Cliffs, Cyprus Northshore Mining, 
M.A.Hanna, Hibbing Taconite, L TV Steel Mining, Oglebay Norton, Pea Ridge 
Iron Ore, and Tilden Mine. They produce a number of iron ore products, with 
sinter and pellets being the most common. 
In Canada, production is dominated by the Iron Ore Company of Canada (IOC), a 
joint venture between Bethlehem Steel, Dofasco, Hanna Holding, Labrador 
Mining & Exploration, Mitsubishi Corp., and National Steel Corp. The other two 
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producers are Quebec Cartier Mining CQCM) - owned by Dofasco, Mitsui and 
Caemi; and Wabush Mines - a joint venture between Finsider, Cleveland-Cliffs 
and several North American steel mills. 
Production in the United States and Canada should be examined as one, since all 
of the iron ore output is used in the regional steel industry, especially in steel mills 
in the United States. 
1.3.2.2.3 South America 
Brazil has become Europe's most important supplier, with most of its production 
finding its way to German steel mills. Brazilian resources are estimated in the 
region of 40 Bmt, and are located primarily in two states - Minas Gerais (in the 
southern, more developed part of the country), and Para (in the northern, more 
remote and less developed Amazon region). In the south, the deposits are found 
mainly in the 'Quadrilatero Ferrifero'16, while in the north they are found near the 
municipality of Maraba in the Carajas range. The mines in the Quadrilatero 
Ferrifero have provided most of Brazil's production and exports, while production 
from the Carajas project started only in the mid-1980s. However, the Carajas 
resources are of magnificent abundance and quality; some 18 Bmt are estimated to 
be in place; their grade is in the region of 66% Fe; and the project is designed to 
yield some 35 Mmt per annum, at full capacity. 
16 Iron-bearing quadrilateral. 
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Brazilian iron ore production is dominated by a massive company, with 
considerable interests in other metal and non-metal commodities: Companh a Vale 
do Rio Doce (CVRD), which has only recently been privatised. CVRD produces 
about 80% of the country's iron ore, with grades ranging from 61-67% Fe. A few 
other iron ore companies produce the rest of Brazil's output. Of these, the most 
important is Minera es Brasileiras Reunidas (MBR), which has most of its mines 
in the state of Minas Gerais. Other, smaller, companies include: Ferteco Minera 0 
- a joint venture between Thyssen Stahl, Hoesch Stahl and Krupp Stahl of 
Germany; Hispanobras - a joint venture between CVRD and Ensidesa; Itabrasco -
a joint venture between CVRD and the Italian Finsider; Nibrasco - a joint venture 
between CVRD and Nippon Steel; Samarco Minera 0 - a joint venture between 
SA Minera 0 da Trindade and BHP Minerals; Samitri-SA Minera 0 da Trindade 
- a company owned by C a Sider rgica Belgo-Mineira; and, finally, Minas de 
Serra Geral - a joint venture between CVRD, Kawasaki, Nomura, and five more 
Japanese minority holders. 
Other Latin American producers include Venezuela, Chile, and Peru. Of these, 
Venezuela is the most important, with reserves estimated at 2 Bmt, and production 
about 20 Mmt per year. The entire production is handled by the state-owned CVG 
Ferrominera Orinoco, which operates four principal mines at Cerro Bol var, El 
Pao, San Isidro, and Los Barrancos. With the exception of EI Pao, all other mines 
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are in the 'Bol var Iron Quadrilateral', which is located in the valley of River 
Orinoco and its tributary Caroni. 
In Chile, iron ore deposits are estimated at 900 million tons and are located mainly 
in a fault zone, 600 km long and 25 to 30 km wide, paralleling the Andes. 
Production is about 8 million tons and is handled by C a Minera del Pacifico 
(CMP) from its two mines - El Romeral and El Algarrobo. Peru's output is just 
over 3 million tons per annum, and is produced by the state-owned Hierro Peru at 
its Marcona mine. 
1.3.2.2.4 Oceania 
After China, the most important producer of iron ore in the Pacific Rim is 
Australia. Production is normally between 110 to 120 million tons, most of which 
is exported, with iron ore reserves estimated at about 33 billion tons. Most of the 
Australian output is exported to other Pacific Rim countries, particularly Japan, 
South Korea, Taiwan and China. About half of Australia's iron ore comes in the 
form of lumps, while the remaining is usually pelletised at destination, although a 
pelletising capacity of 4 million tons is in place. As Bolis and Bekkala (1987) 
note: 
"Australia is one of the lowest cost producers of iron ore in the world, making its 
operations very competitive on the world market. This is attributable to several factors -
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large, high-grade deposits; high production; highly automated nature of the industry in both 
mining and shipping; and short distances from Japanese markets." 
Most Australian deposits are located in Pilbara, W A, with a few mines in the state 
of South Australia and the island of Tasmania. A handful of mining companies 
control the iron ore industry in Australia, and are also involved in the mining of 
most other metallic ores. The largest of these companies is Broken Hill 
Proprietory (BHP) Minerals, which operates its own mines and also participates in 
joint ventures with other Australian producers and Japanese steel mills. 
Hamersley Iron Proprietary is the second largest iron ore producer, and almost as 
influential as BHP in Australia's economy and politics. The company is wholly 
owned by CRA (Conzinc-Riotinto Associates), which started life after the merger 
of two British companies with interests in Australian mining. The company's 
mines are also located in the Pilbara region and include Mt. Tom Price, 
Paraburdoo, Channar, and Mt. Brockman. Savage River Mines is one of the few 
projects not located in Western Australia. It is owned outright by Cleveland-Cliffs 
and the mine is located in Tasmania. 
The rest of the mining projects are joint ventures between domestic companies 
and, usually, Japanese sogo soshas. Mt. Goldsworthy Mining Associates is a joint 
venture of BHP, CI Minerals, and Mitsui and its mine is located in the northern 
part of Western Australia, near the place with the same name. Robe River Iron 
Associates is owned by Robe River Mining, Peko-Wallsend Operations, Mitsui, 
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Cape Lambert Iron Ore Development Proprietory, and Pannawonica Iron 
Associates; it is also located in the Pilbara region. Mt. Newman is another joint 
venture between BHP, CI Minerals, and Mitsui-C.ltoh. Finally, there are a few 
more joint ventures, where the main shareholder is again BHP. 
New Zealand is a relatively small producer of mainly titanomagnetite Gust over 2 
Mmt p.a.), but about half of this production is exported, primarily to Japan. The 
project is located in Waipipi, on the North Island of New Zealand and is handled 
primarily by BHP. 
1.3.2.2.5 Asia 
Asian output is dominated by two main producers - China and India. However, 
while the latter exports over 60% of its production to the world market, the former 
uses its entire production to satisfy domestic needs. 
India produces well over 50m tons of crude ore per annum, which come from a 
number of private and state-owned companies. The National Mineral 
Development Corporation (NMDC) has mines in Bailadila (470 km from the port 
ofVisakhapatnam), and in Donimalai (in the Bellary-Hospet region, 500 km from 
Madras). NMDC's entire production is handled by the state-owned Minerals & 
Metals Trading Corporation of India (MMTC), and it is sold mainly to the 
Japanese market. 
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Apart form MMTC, there is a number of private companies that produce - and 
trade in - iron ore. There are two other important production zones in India -
Kudremukh and Goa. The first is operated by Kudremukh Iron Ore, a state-owned 
enterprise; while in the second there are several mines (in Sanquelim, Sonsbi, 
Orasso Dongor, Rivona, Guelliem and Codli), which are run by Sesa Goa - a joint 
venture, partly owned by Ilva of Italy. Other prominent iron ore producers/traders 
include Dempo, Mandovi Pellets, Salgaocar, Chowgule, Orient (Goa), and several 
smaller companies. Rather paradoxically, India also appears as a very small 
importer of ore as well (e.g. in 1995 it imported 1.7 million tonnes of iron ore). 
This can be attributed, however, to existing contracts between foreign mines and 
Indian steel mills for ores or tightly specified qualities that could not be 
substituted by local grades. By and large, however, India remains a prime 
exporter, particularly to the Far East Asian markets. 
China produced some 200m tons of crude ore (1992), but in 1993 it imported a 
further 33m tons, half of which come from Australia, and the rest from Brazil, 
South Africa, India, and Peru. While domestic ore production is expected to 
remain stable, imports of the raw material are expected to increase, with forecasts 
pointing to a figure of SOm tons of crude ore in the year 2000. Currently, the 
country's imports are handled by the state-owned China National Metallurgical 
Import & Export Corporation (CNMIEC), but its role is seen at best static or 
diminishing, with the major steel plants of the country, instead, set to become 
more active in procuring their own needs in iron ore. The three major steel 
29 
producers - Shougang, Baoshan Iron & Steel, and Wuhan Iron & Steel - have 
already approached enterprises in Australia, Brazil and India, respectively, with a 
view to securing captive mines. 
1.3.2.2.6 Africa 
The most significant iron ore producers on this continent are ·located in the west 
and south of Africa. Traditionally, Liberia was the most important iron ore 
producer in Western Africa, but civil unrest hit production after 1988. As a result, 
Mauritania has now emerged as the second most important African producer, after 
South Africa. 
Liberian production is mined at the Nimba project and handled by Liminco, a joint 
venture between Nimco (a subsidiary ofBRGM, France) and AMCL (a subsidiary 
of Allied Domecq, the parent of Allied-Lyons). 
In Mauritania, production is in the region of 10m tons per annum, and is 
controlled by SNIM SEM (Soci t Nationale Industrielle et Mini re), a joint 
venture between (among others) the state, Kuwait Real Estate Investment 
Consortium, Arab Mining, Iraq Fund for External Development, BRPM-Morocco, 
and the Islamic Development Bank. 
The Republic of South Africa is the top iron ore producer in Africa, with about 
30m tons produced in 1991. Most of the production comes from the Sishen mine, 
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which is located in the heart of the country, north of the Orange River. Production 
is handled by Iscor, the formerly state-owned (but now privatised) company, 
which also operates the electric railway that transports the iron ore from the mine, 
over a distance of 860 km, to Africa's deepest port - Saldhana Bay. 
The same port is used for exports from the Beeshoek mine, which is located some 
930 km inland and operated by the Associated Manganese Mines of South Africa 
(ASSOMAN). 
A few other African countries also produce iron ore, but in quantities which are 
rather insignificant for the international market, although their production is 
important for their domestic needs. These countries are Algeria, Tunisia, 
Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Morocco, Egypt; and deposits are also present in Gabon, 
Ghana, Cameroon and the Ivory Coast. 
1.3.2.2.7 Eastern Europe 
The combined production of all of its constituent democracies, places the former 
Soviet at the top of the world league of iron ore producers. Although production 
has been falling since the late 1980s, FSU production is in the region of 200Mmt 
per year, which accounts for about one-fifth of world production. Soviet ores are 
mostly low-grade, with %Fe contents ranging from 20-50%. All ores undergo 
beneficiation and have to be agglomerated to sinter or pellets. This is the reason 
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why the FSU has the world's largest pelletising capacity - some 80 Mmt - which 
accounts for about 30% of global capacity. 
Of the former Soviet states, Russia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are the 
most important producers. In Russia there are several mining companies, most of 
which have annual run-of-mine capacities in excess of 10 Mmt. These are: 
Bogolovsky Ore-Mining in the Sverdlosk region in Urals (40.7 Mmt); Lebedinsky 
Mining & Dressing Plant in Belgorod (45 Mmt); Michailovsky Mine in the Kursk 
region (40 Mmt); Sibruda - Siberian Scientific & Industrial Mining Amalgamation 
in the Kemerovo region (22.8 Mmt); Stoilensky Mine in Belgorod (15.6 Mmt); 
Uralruda Mining Production Amalgamation in the Sverdlovsk region in Urals (61 
Mmt). Many of these mines have rather low-grade ores - often as low as 20% Fe-
which decreases the quantities of high-grade ore that can be produced after 
beneficiation and agglomeration. 
In a similar manner, most Ukrainian mines have run-of-mine capacities in excess 
of 10 Mmt per annum. Most mines are located in the Dnepropetrovsk region: 
Inguletsky are Mine & Concentrator in (35 Mmt); Krivbassruda are Mining 
Amalgamation (21.7 Mmt); Krivorozhsky Central Mine (20 Mmt); Krivorozhsky 
Yuzhny are Mine (35 Mmt); Novokrivorozhsky Mine (30 Mmt); Poltavsky Mine 
(34 Mmt); and Sevemy Mine (48.5 Mmt). 
32 
Kazakhstan has five mines, three of which have annual capacities of over 10 Mm.t. 
These are: Kotomukshky (24 Mmt); the Lisakovsky (l0.6 Mm.t); and Sokolovsko-
Sarbaisky (27 Mmt). Finally, Azerbaijan has the much smaller Severo-Zapadny 
mine, which produces just about 2 Mmt per year. As in the case of Russia, 
Ukrainian, Kazakh and Azeri ores have an average 30% Fe content, which needs 
considerable beneficiation and agglomeration. 
1.3.3 Demand Determinants 
Iron ore is almost exclusively used in the production of steel. There are, however, 
a few chemical compounds of iron that have a variety of other minority uses. 
Ferrous sulphate (FeS04), called 'green vitriol', is used as a mordant in dyeing, as 
a tonic medicine and in the manufacture of ink and pigments. Ferne oxide, an 
amorphous red powder, is used as a pigment, known as either iron red or Venetian 
red; as a polishing abrasive, known as rouge; and as the magnetisable medium on 
magnetic tapes and disks. Ferric ferrocyanide (Fe4[Fe(CN)6]3) is a dark-blue 
amorphous solid, called Prussian blue; it is used as a pigment in paint and in 
laundry bluing to correct the yellowish tint left by the ferrous salts of water. 
Finally, potassium ferricyanide (K3Fe(CN)6)' called red prussiate or potash, is 
used in processing blueprint paper. 
Despite all these 'exotic' uses of iron, however, steel production remains the main 
force that drives the iron ore industry. Steel, in its simplest forms, is the most 
basic good needed for the industrialisation process of any economy. In fact, crude 
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steel production is often a signal of a buoyant manufacturing sector. The steel 
sector, of course, is not defined just from crude steel. Advanced steel products and 
steel alloys are goods of high added value, in which many industrial countries 
specialise, leaving the bulk of the production of 'plain', unalloyed steels to 
developing countries, with low labour costs. 
Demand for steel products is derived from a variety of industries and it is, 
therefore, segmented. The biggest consumers of steel products are: transportation; 
construction; machinery; cans and containers; appliances and equipment; mineral 
exploration industries; and any other sector that is not covered above. 
1.9.9.1 lronmaking 
The first step in processing the beneficiated - and, possibly, agglomerated - ore is 
its reduction to iron. There are two main processes for doing so: blast furnace 
reduction; and direct reduction. Blast furnace reduction is the most widespread 
method, so we are going to discuss it first. 
1.3.3.1.1 Blast Furnace 
The blast furnace is a 'tower', specially built to withstand high temperatures, into 
which sinter or pellets, coke and limestone are fed from the top. Coke is nothing 
more that coal which has been 'carbonised' in ovens, in order to improve its 
burning properties. 
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As these products fall in the tower they encounter the rising hot reducing gases 
and eventually settle on previous loads fed from the top. To keep the process 
going, hot airl7 is blasted through special nozzles - tuy res - so that the 
temperature of the coke remains at about 2,OOO°C. The iron in the iron ore, sinter, 
or pellets is melted out to form a pool of molten metal - known as pig iron - in 
the bottom - or hearth - of the furnace. As iron accumulates in the hearth, it is 
removed periodically from the furnace - an operation called tapping. The 
limestone combines with impurities and molten gangue from the ore, forming a 
liquid slag which, being lighter that the metal, floats on top of it, and is also 
removed periodically. The charging system at the top of the furnace also acts as a 
valve mechanism to prevent the escape of gas, which is taken off through large-
bore pipes to a gas cleaning plant. 
Blast furnaces rely on two important economic factors: first, that the process is 
continuous; and, second, that substantial quantities of pig iron are produced, in 
order to take advantage of scale economies. A modem blast furnace produces 
about 1 Mmt per annum, while an integrated steel facility should have a turnover 
of about 3 Mmt a year, in order to operate efficiently. 
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1.3.3.1.2 Direct Reduced Iron 
An alternative reduction process was developed by Midrex and HYL, whereby 
iron ore is mixed with coke or natural gas, and heated to about 900°C, in order to 
increase its iron content, normally to over 80%. The result of the process is not pig 
iron, but a product known as sponge iron, which can be fed directly to an electric 
arc furnace (EAF) to produce steel. Sponge iron - or direct reduced iron (DR!) - is 
more desirable than scrap in EAF steelmaking, because it has a lower level of 
metallic residuals and other impurities, than recycled scrap. 
The main drawback of this method is its high requirement for fuel. As a result, 
DR! plants are primarily located in energy-rich countries, like Venezuela, Mexico, 
Iran, Saudi Arabia, India and Indonesia. 
There are a few more iron making methods, which are of small significance right 
now, but might have a bigger effect in the future. Most of these techniques are still 
in the developmental stage - although for a few, commercial production has 
already started - and are: Eldred, Inred, Plasmamelt, DIOS, HIsmelt, Krupp-
COIN, Combismelt, and Corex. The common characteristic of all the above is that 
they employ direct smelting or smelting reduction technology. This process, 
which was originally developed by Nippon Kosan and Kawasaki, allows the 
smelting and reduction of iron ore in a single process and has four main 
objectives: 
\7 Frequently, hot air is enriched with oxygen. 
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• the direct input of iron ore, without need for sintering or agglomeration; 
• the substitution of coal for coke; 
• lower capital and operating costs; and 
• production on a smaller, and ecologically more sound, basis. 
The Corex process is now in operation in South Africa, where ISCOR produces 
some 300,000 mt per annum. Plans for Corex installations have also been 
approved by LTV Steel in the United States, and Pohang Iron & Steel in South 
Korea. The gist of the Corex process is that it uses coal instead of (more 
expensive) coke and the whole process has a useful by-product - gas - which can 
be used as fuel to produce hot-briquetted iron. 
1.3.3.2 Steelmaking 
The manufacture of steel is quite a separate procedure from that of iron, although 
both procedures co-exist in large, integrated steel mills. There are two methods of 
making steel, which are the most important - the basic oxygen furnace (BOF), 
and the electric arc furnace (EAF). Before these two, steel was produced with the 
open hearth method, but this process is now obsolete, although antiquated open 
hearth furnaces still exist in the FSU. 
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1.3.3.2.1 Basic Oxygen Furnace 
In the BOF method, scrap (25%) and molten iron (75%) are charged into a vessel 
- the converter. A water-cooled oxygen lance is lowered into the furnace and 
high-purity oxygen is blown on the metal at very high pressure. The oxygen 
combines with carbon and other unwanted elements, thus eliminating the 
impurities from the molten charge. 
These oxidation reactions produce heat, and the temperature of the metal is 
controlled by the quantity of the scrap added. The carbon leaves the converter as a 
gas (carbon monoxide) which can, after cleaning, be collected for re-use as a fuel. 
During the 'blow', lime is added as a flux to help carry off the other oxidised 
impurities as a floating layer of slag. Modern converters will take a charge of up 
to 350 tons at a time and convert it into steel with a charge-to-tap time of 40 
minutes or less. 
1.3.3.2.2 Electric Arc Furnace 
Cold scrap, or sometimes DR! is the only input of the EAF process. As its name 
implies, the process uses a powerful AC or DC electric current to melt the scrap or 
DR!. The furnace consists of a circular 'bath' with a movable roof, through which 
three graphite electrodes can be raised or lowered. At the start of the process, the 
electrodes are withdrawn and the roof swung clear. The steel scrap is then charged 
into the furnace from a large steel basket lowered from an overhead travelling 
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crane. When charging is complete, the roof is swung back into position and the 
electrodes lowered into the furnace. 
When the current passes through the charge, an arc is created, and the heat 
generated melts the scrap. Lime is added as flux and oxygen is also blown into the 
melt, so that impurities form a liquid slag and are removed at the end of each 
charge. Modem electric furnaces can make up to 150 mt of steel in a single melt, 
in less than an hour-and-a-half. 
1.3.3.2.3 Other Methods 
With the exception of open hearth steelmaking, which is now obsolete, the only 
other alternative method is the High Frequency Induction Furnace. The process 
uses electricity to melt a charge of cold scrap, but it does it using a coil, rather 
than cathodes. Furnaces of this type are usually less than 5 Mt. capacity. 
A number of secondary metallurgy methods are used to rid the steel from some 
harmful elements, which result from the oxygen process. More specifically, 
secondary metallurgy methods are used to: improve homogenisation of 
temperature and composition; remove deleterious gases, such as nitrogen, oxygen 
and hydrogen, in the steel; allow careful trimming of composition to exact ranges 
of analyses; remove phosphorus and sulphur; and refine the quantity of other 
metallic elements in the steel. 
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1.3.3.3 Trade 
Just over 40% of the world production in iron ore is traded internationally. In 
1995, world exports stood at just over 416 million tonnes, 58% of which were 
almost equally shared by just two countries - Brazil and Australia. Other 
important - although much smaller - exporters were India, Canada, South Africa 
and Ukraine. Brazilian exports are primarily channelled to Western Europe, with a 
smaller proportion going to the Pacific Rim. Australian exports, on the other hand, 
are destined for Japan, South Korea, and other Asian countries, including China. 
Canadian exports are primarily directed to the United States; however, both IOC 
and QMC are also very active selling their ore to Europe. Indian exports compete 
directly with those of Australia in Asian markets, while South Africa targets both 
European and Asian markets. Finally, Sweden exports all of its production to 
other European countries. 
Iron ore imports are even more biased towards two importing areas - Japan and 
Western Europe. In 1995, Japan imported 30% of total iron ore traded 
internationally, while Western Europe imported another 30% of it. Other Asian 
countries generated 18% of iron ore imports; while Eastern Europe and North 
America accounted for 8% and 5%, respectively. 
1.4 Conclusion 
Iron ore is the among biggest, non-energy extractive industry in the world in terms 
of value, and the biggest in terms of the volumes of cargo it channels in 
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international trade. Production and consumption of the ore is rather concentrated, 
with the top 10 importers and exporters accounting for some 90% of the annual 
trade flows. 
On the supply side, Australia and Brazil lead the small group of exporters and 
dominate the Pacific and Atlantic markets, respectively. Following these two are 
Canada, South Africa and Sweden, with a few more smaller producers each of 
which does not controls more that 1-2% of world supplies. On the demand side, it 
is primarily a handful of industrialised countries that lead the world steel 
production and, as a result, absorb most of the world's iron ore imports. Leading 
force among these countries is Japan, United States, the EU (led by Germany), 
and more recently South Korea and China. 
Germany 
10% 
Figure 1-1 
Import shares of iron ore by country in 1996 
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Two key characteristics of the iron ore market will be central to the ensuing 
discussion: there is only a small number of buyers and sellers; there is a great 
degree of interdependence among buyers and sellers and both groups are aware of 
this interdependence. 
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II. Review of Literature 
11.1 Non-Competitive Industrial Structures 
After the overview and technical characteristics discussed in chapter I, this chapter 
will deal with the theoretical proposals found in international literature, which are 
subsequently used (in chapter IV) to analyse the economic structure of the iron ore 
industry. There are two types of considerations coming into play when theorising 
the construction of an economic model for iron ore: what is the economic 
behaviour of agents participating in the market; and the way demand and supply 
interact to produce economic exchanges of the commodity, i.e. trade flows. 
The first section of this chapter is of particular importance to the subsequent 
discussion, as it sets the theoretical framework within which the iron ore industry 
- and in particular the trade flows it generates - is analysed. The focus is initially 
on oligopoly models and some of their extensions used to address more complex 
demand/supply structures. Following this, the attention is concentrated on bilateral 
monopoly models which, so far, have had only limited application to the iron ore 
trade. Concluding this first section is a review of the even more limited literature 
on bilateral oligopoly which seems to approximate much better the behaviour in 
the sector. Section 11.2 turns its attention to the other important aspect of 
modelling the supply and demand interactions in commodity trade. The second 
section concentrates on trade models and the variety of methodologies that have 
been applied to commodities in general, and iron ore in particular. 
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As it was discussed in chapter I, iron ore can be found in several geographical 
regions, but exists in abundance in only a few countries, which also have a 
considerable cost advantage in its production. The top ten exporters account for 
91 % of world flows. As it can be seen from Table II-I, this degree of market 
concentration on the supply side is not unusual for the sector and has persisted for 
over 30 years, during which period the top 10 exporters have controlled between 
85-90% of exports. Since 1975 Australia and Brazil are consistently at the top of 
this league and between them they have generated between 45-58% of exports 
flows. It is not surprising, therefore, that it is these two countries with their 
dominant position that usually take the lead in negotiating and setting 
international prices for the commodity. 
11.1.1 The Supply Side 
Disregarding the demand situation for the time being, we focus on supply which 
has the typical characteristics of an oligopolistic market structure, with two 
dominant players. The fact that it is companies, rather than countries, that conduct 
the business does not alter the situation much, as there is only a handful of very 
big mining corporations in each country. In the previous chapter we saw CVRD in 
Brazil and BHP with eRA in Australia being the world's leading iron ore 
producers, who are also the ones usually entering negotiations with buyers to 
determine ore prices every year. 
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Table II-I 
Market shares o/the top 10 iron ore exporters (1965-1995) 
1995 1990 1985 1980 
Australia 30% Brazil 28% Brazil 25% Australia 23% 
Brazil 28% Australia 25% Australia 24% Brazil 22% 
India 7% India 8% Canada 9% Canada 12% 
Canada 7% Canada 8% India 7% Sweden 6% 
S. Africa 4% FSU 6% Sweden 5% India 6% 
Ukraine 4% Venezuela 4% Liberia 5% FSU 5% 
Mauritania 3% Sweden 4% FSU 5% Liberia 5% 
Sweden 3% S. Africa 4% S. Africa 3% S. Africa 4% 
Russia 2% Mauritania 3% Venezuela 3% Venezuela 3% 
Venezuela 2% Chile 2% Mauritania 3% France 3% 
Total 910/0 Total 90% Total 90% Total 87% 
1975 1970 1965 
Australia 25% Australia 15% Canada 18% 
Brazil 19% Canada 14% Sweden 13% 
Canada 11% Brazil 10% France 12% 
Venezuela 7% Sweden 9% Venezuela 10% 
India 6% Liberia 8% Liberia 9% 
Sweden 6% Venezuela 7% Brazil 6% 
Liberia 6% France 7% Chile 6% 
France 5% India 7% India 5% 
Chile 3% Chile 4% Peru 4% 
Mauritania 3% Peru 4% USA 4% 
Total 90% Total 85% Total 87% 
Source: Authors' calculatIOns based on trade figures from UN Statistics Bureau 
The distribution of iron ore export shares, shown in Table II-I, leaves little room 
for doubt about the degree of market concentration in the industry. The level of 
concentration reported above is simply the straight forward m-firm concentration 
ratio, one of the most common, but simplest, measures of market power. This 
index adds up the m highest shares (in our case m = 10). Probably the most used 
index of market concentration in literature is the Herfindahl index which, in the 
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iron ore market, has moved from 0.09 in 1965 to 0.l8 in 1995, revealing an 
increased rate of concentration during these 30 years. 
11.1.1.1 Using Game Theory 
Because of the dominance of a very limited number of countries, i.e. the existence 
of a supply oligopoly, it is logical to expect that each market player is aware of the 
existence and the actions of the other players, and its behaviour takes the form of a 
strategy. Researchers have borrowed tools from mathematics in order to solve 
essentially problems of strategic behaviour, both in a static and dynamic context. 
In an oligopolistic market structure, where a firm no longer encounters a passive 
environment, such strategic interaction is better studied within the framework of 
non-cooperative games. In this context, oligopolists behave like players in a non-
cooperative game, where each player behaves in its own self-interest. 
Such games reach an equilibrium if, given the actions of its rivals, a firm cannot 
increase its own profit by choosing an action other than the equilibrium action. 
This state is known as a Nash eqUilibrium and is the basic solution concept in 
game theory. Nash equilibrium also generalises naturally to dynamic situations 
and to problems of incomplete information. This is quite important as soon as 
there are many time periods and any inter-temporal dependency of feasible action! 
sets, i.e. when players make choices in period t that affect their objective functions 
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or their set of feasible choices in a future time period t+t', where t' > O. To 
determine the consequences of actions taken in I, the players must forecast what 
will happen in I+t' given the state of the game at the beginning of that period 
(which is influenced by their actions in t). To calculate these expectations, each 
player assumes that all other players will play an optimal strategy in t+t '. 
Therefore, the solution of a dynamic game is "backward looking". For example, in 
a two-period game, the solution is given by starting with solving the second-
period Nash equilibrium as a function of the state of the game at the beginning of 
the second period (that is what happened during the first period), This means that 
the players can determine the future consequences of their first-period actions, 
because their first-period actions determine which second-period equilibrium will 
ensue; in a sense the remainder of the game is a foregone conclusion. Therefore 
the players choose their first-period actions with an eye toward their consequences 
in both periods. Thus it suffices to determine the Nash equilibrium of the 
corresponding game in which players take only first-period actions but with the 
same set of consequences as in the original two-period game. 
11.1.1.2 Cournot Oligopoly 
The first and simplest game, which might fit the case of the iron ore market, was 
first suggested by Cournot (1927) and was further developed and expanded by 
several other authors. Cournot's duopoly model is a one-stage game which makes 
I In game theory jargon, "action" is a decision taken as part of a series of other decisions, all of 
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the smallest possible departure from monopoly and examines a market supplied 
by two identical firms. 
Price 
Figure II-I 
Firm 1 's output in a Cournot (quantity-setting) oligopoly 
Market demand curve 
Residual marginal revenue curve 
Residual demand curve 
cr-________ ~------~----~~-----MC=AC 
Firm 1', quantity 
The behaviour Cournot assigned to his duopolists is rather simple: each firm acts 
in the belief that the other will maintain a constant output level. There are no fixed 
costs, just a marginal cost per unit which is constant at some level c. Given these 
assumptions, firm 1 will maximise its profit along a residual demand curve 
obtained by subtracting firm 2's output from the market demand curve. Firm I's 
profit maximising output will make its marginal cost equal to marginal revenue 
along the residual demand curve. This output is designated q.(qJ in Figure II-I 
which are linked together to fonn a "strategy". 
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because the output firm 1 decides to put on the market depends on the output of 
firm 2. By going through firm 1 's profit-maximisation exercise for different 
values of Q2' we can derive firm 1 's reaction curve. The reaction curve shows the 
output firm 1 will produce to maximise its profit, depending on the output of firm 
2. 
Figure 11-2 shows the reaction curves of both firms, i.e. the beliefs of each firm 
about the way the other firm will react. In general these beliefs are inconsistent, 
but there is one point in the diagram at which the beliefs of each firm about the 
actions of the other will be correct - the point at which the reaction curves cross. 
Figure 11-2 
Reaction curves for firms 1 and 2 
q).A Firm 1', output 
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This is the well known Cournot equilibrium. In the same figure the equilibrium of 
the duopolists is depicted against the monopolist's equilibrium (line qmqm) and the 
competitive equilibrium (line qcqc)' This implied that prices under a duopoly will 
be below those in the more restrictive monopoly but above those formed under 
competitive conditions. 
Figure 11-3 
Equilibrium in Cournot duopoly with unequally sized firms 
Firm 2's 
output 
llJ,E 
Firm 1's reaction curve 
Marginal cost = c 
Firm 1's readion curve 
Marginal cost = c* 
Firm 2'8 readion curve 
Firm 1'8 output 
In short, each Cournot duopolist restricts output, trying to maximise its own profit. 
In so doing, each misunderstands the way the other makes decisions. Individual 
output decisions are imperfectly co-ordinated, and total output exceeds the 
monopoly level. The Cournot equilibrium price falls short of monopoly price. 
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Coumot duopolists succeed in exercising some market power, some control over 
price. But because they act independently, they do not maximise their joint profit. 
The particular misunderstanding that is built into the Coumot model - the 
assumption that each firm believes that its rivals hold output constant - is 
implausible. However, the general prospect that in oligopoly fmns will 
misunderstand the way rivals behave is quite plausible. 
In the model discussed above, the assumption is made that the two firms are equal. 
In the more realistic scenario that the duopolists are of unequal size, the 
generalisation of the Cournot model intuitively suggests that increased market 
concentration will move the quantity determination closer to the monopoly 
equilibrium. In monopoly, if the firm raises price, the quantity demand falls. 
When the price elasticity of demand is large, a small increase in price will cause a 
large decline in sales. In such circumstances, the monopolist will not find it 
profitable to raise price far above marginal cost. This is formally expressed in 
literature in the following form, whereby the profit margin of the monopolist 
equals the inverse of the price elasticity of the demand for the product. 
P-c 1 
--=-
P BQP 
Eq. II-I 
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In the case of oligopoly now, the above formula can be transformed into the 
Lerner index of market power given below, where Si is firm i's market share and 
Ci is its cost. 
Eq.II-2 
In oligopoly, a change in the underlying production cost of a firm, will shift the 
reaction curve of the firm, as it can be seen in Figure 11-3. If firm 1, for instance, 
discovers a new production technique, so that its marginal cost falls to c*<c, firm 
l' s marginal cost curve shifts down. Firm l' s profit maximising output will 
increase, for any output from firm 2, as the marginal cost curve moves down the 
residual marginal revenue curve. Given firm 2's output, firm l's output will 
increase, resulting in firm l' s reaction curve shifting outward. If the lower-cost 
technology is unavailable to firm 2 there is no change in its reaction curve. As 
firm l' s marginal cost falls, the Coumot equilibrium point - the intersection of the 
two reaction curves - slides down firm 2's reaction curve (from E to E*). It is a 
general result - whatever the number of oligopolists - that in quantity-setting 
models, firms with lower marginal costs have greater market shares. 
The greater a firm's market share, the greater its market power. In Coumot-type 
models, each firm acts independently, and each fails to understand what the others 
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are doing. Hence total output exceeds the monopoly level and the price falls short 
of the monopoly level. But if firm i has a very large market share - if Si is near 1 -
the fact that firm i misunderstands what its small rivals are doing is of little 
consequence for the market price. When firm i is large in the market, price will 
depend mostly on its actions and firm i will exercise almost as much market 
power as would a monopolist. The result is that even though frrms act 
independently, larger firms will have more market power than smaller firms. What 
does this imply for industry performance? As Martin (1994) supports, "there is a 
recognition of interdependence in this market, but no co-operation." He continues, 
"the more concentrated the market in quantity-setting oligopoly, the greater the 
industry-average degree of market power." 
As stated earlier, Cournot's original model, and the models later derived from it, 
have each oligopolist believe that its rivals hold their output constant. This belief 
seems especially implausible, given that the defining characteristic of oligopoly is 
that firms recognise their mutual interdependence. It is possible to get around this 
implausibility by adding to the Cournot model the elasticity of rivals' output with 
respect to frrm i's output, which describes the way firm i expects others to react to 
what it does. This is given as 
q. Ilq . 
a.=-' ---' 
, q-; Ilq; 
Eq.II-3 
where for notational simplicity q-i is the output of all firms except firm i. 
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This is the percentage change in all other firms' output that firm i expects in 
response to a 1 percent change in its own output. This is called the conjectural 
variation for firm i because it describes the way firm i thinks competitors will 
react to what it does. When (Xi = 0 this means firm i thinks that the other firms will 
not change their output in response to its own output decisions. This is merely the 
basic Cournot assumption about behaviour. If instead (Xi = 1, then firm i makes its 
plans in the belief that if it restricts output by 1 percent, other firms will do the 
same. Firm i, in other words, expects rivals to co-operate in pulling output off the 
market. Finally if (Xi = -1, then firm i makes its plans in the belief that if it restricts 
output by 1 percent, its rivals will expand their output by the same percentage. 
Firm i believes that if it tries to pull output off the market, rivals will act to 
neutralise its attempt. 
Conjectural variations can be built in the way Cournot market eqUilibrium works 
and it changes the way the firms' reaction curves move. In the general case of N 
firms with unequal costs, Eq. 11-2 becomes 
P-cj a j +(l-a.)s. 
-----'- = ' , 
P 
Eq.II-4 
where Si' as before, is firm ;'s market share. Following from the discussion above, 
if (Xi=O we are back to the basic Cournot model, where the market power of a firm 
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is directly proportional to its market share and inversely proportional to the price 
elasticity of demand. If (Xj=l we are back to the monopoly case, where the firms 
market power is the inverse of its price elasticity of demand. Finally, if (Xi is 
negative, the reaction of other firms reduces firm i's market power. This is what 
we ought to expect: market power is the power to raise the price by holding output 
off the market and a negative conjectural variation means that the other fmns act 
to neutralise attempts to keep output off the market. 
The analysis above relies on the implicit assumption of 'one-shot' competition, 
i.e. firms simultaneously quote their prices or quantities and then disappear. In 
practice, though, firms are likely to interact repeatedly. Durable investments, 
technological know-how and barriers to entry promote long-run interactions 
among a relatively stable set of firms. This creates two problems: firstly, the one-
period analytical framework becomes rather unrealistic; the usual assumption of 
lack of collusion between oligopolists is hard to justify any longer. Firms operate 
in a multi-period reality and are round long enough to know their competitors and 
may be able to recognise some of their strategies and anticipate some of their 
reactions. 
11.1.1.3 Tacit Collusion 
In a slightly different context, Chamberlain (1929) suggested that in an oligopoly 
producing a homogeneous product, firms would recognise their interdependence 
and, therefore, might be able to sustain the monopoly price without explicit 
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collusion. The threat of a vigorous price war would be sufficient to deter the 
temptation to cut prices. Hence, the oligopolists might be able to collude in a 
purely non-cooperative manner, i.e. there is a possibility of tacit collusion. Tacit 
collusion has been discussed by several authors after Chamberlin and although 
they all recognised that repeated interaction between oligopolists might indeed 
facilitate it, they also suggest factors that might hinder it. 
Starting with Chamberlin's concerns about collusion, he advocated (1933) that a 
small number of firms produce an identical product, they would end up charging 
the monopoly price, i.e. the price maximising industry profit. As he put it himself: 
"If each seeks his maximum profit rationally and intelligently, he will 
realise that when there are only two or a few sellers his own move has 
a considerable effect upon his competitors, and that this makes it idle 
to suppose that they will accept without retaliation the losses he forces 
upon them. Since the results of a cut by anyone is inevitably to 
decrease his own profits, no one will cut, and although the sellers are 
entirely independent, the equilibrium result is the same as though there 
were a monopolistic agreement between them." 
Several contributions tried to formalise the discipline imposed by the possibility 
of reactions. The best-known among them is that of the kinked demand curve 
(Hall and Hitch 1939; Sweezy 1939) which oligopolists face in the market. In 
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their duopoly model, both firms charge a so-called 'focal' price Pfi which is 
expected to be close to - but not necessarily identical to - pm which is the long-run 
equilibrium price maximising monopoly profits. 
Suppose that a firm contemplates deviating form the monopoly price and it 
conjectures that its rival will stay put at PI if it raises it price above PI and will 
follow suit (match the price) if it cuts its price. As it can be seen from Figure 11-4, 
under such a conjecture deviating from the monopoly price is not profitable. An 
increase in price leads to a complete loss in market share and a zero profit. A 
reduction in price results in price declines in the direction A -+ Al and results in 
profits less than monopoly profits. 
Figure 11-4 
Kinked demand curve laced by each duopolist (or oligopolist) 
A 
PI 
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The kinked demand curve theory is not totally watertight and has been criticised. 
Although it is fairly straightforward that a firm will not set a focal price Pfabove 
the monopoly price pm, it is not clear what happens in the opposite direction. Any 
price Pf charged by all forms results in an 'equilibrium' as long as it lies 
somewhere between marginal cost c and monopoly price pm, so no steady long-run 
equilibrium can be specified and, indeed, any price between marginal cost and the 
monopoly price can be the outcome of price competition. 
As Chamberlin pointed out, there are factors that may hinder collusion. Two such 
factors, which are of particular importance and relevance to iron ore economics as 
well, are detection lags and asymmetries between firms. Chamberlinian tacit 
collusion is enforced by the threat of retaliation. But retaliation can occur only 
when it is learned that some member of the industry has deviated. In many 
industries, the prices charged by a manufacturer can be observed fairly quickly by 
its competitors. In others, however, prices may remain somewhat hidden. This 
may be the case, for instance, when the manufacturers sell to a small number of 
big buyers. This case is of particular to iron ore economics, as this is indeed the 
type of market interaction that takes place in reality. What happens in such case 
then is that rather than quoting a price, sellers make deals that are particular to 
each buyer and that the other competitors may observe only with a lag. Because 
retaliation is delayed, it is less costly to a price-cutting firm; therefore, tacit 
collusion is harder to sustain. 
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Information lags make the future more distant and thus make dynamic interaction 
less relevant. Scherer (1980) makes a similar point about the existence of some 
large sales situation, such as the arrival of a big order from a large buyer. In such a 
situation, one would predict that collusion will tend to break down because the 
short-run private gain from undercutting is large relative to the long-term losses 
associated with a subsequent price war. 
Oligopolists are likely to recognise the threat to collusion posed by secrecy, and 
consequently may take steps to eliminate it. First, they may create an industry 
trade association that (among other functions) collects detailed information on the 
transactions executed by the association's members or allows its members to 
cross-check price quotations. The members of the industry can also give advance 
notice of their price changes. Second, the oligopolists may impose resale-price 
maintenance on their wholesalers or their retailers. The idea here is that any 
deviation from collusive behaviour is easily detected because a manufactmer's 
good is sold at a single price ungarbled by distribution idiosyncrasies and price 
discrimination. Parallel to this concept but on a scale involving countries rather 
than firms is the "most favoured nation" clause, requiring that the seller charge a 
buyer a price no higher than it charges any other buyer, which serves as a 
significant deterrent to price cutting. Thirdly, industries producing goods whose 
transportation costs are high relative to their value are often alleged to use basing-
point pricing to collude. An example of basing-point pricing consists in charging a 
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unique price at the point of production, e.g. ex-works, farm gate, ex-terminal, 
f.o.b. loading port; prices to various destinations are then equal to the announced 
base price plus freight to those destinations. 
Chamberlin's suggestion that the likely market outcome is the monopoly price 
raises the question of what happens if the oligopolists have divergent preferences 
about prices and, in particular, different monopoly prices. For instance, their 
marginal costs may differ (as indeed they do among iron ore mines), so the lower-
cost firms would like to co-ordinate on a lower price that the higher-cost firms. 
The firms may also offer differentiated products (differentiated according to 
quality, location, distribution channels, etc.). It is often felt that heterogeneity in 
both costs and products may make co-ordination on a given price difficult. Under 
symmetric conditions, the price to co-ordinate on seems to be naturally the 
monopoly price. This price maximises profit and involves a symmetric repartition 
of profits. Under symmetric costs, there is no "focal" price on which to co-
ordinate. 
11.1.2 Combining Demand and Supply 
It is now time to introduce the industrial structure of the other "side of the coin" in 
the iron ore market, i.e. consumers. So far the discussion was based on the 
assumption that industry concentration exists only on the producer's side. Iron ore 
is the direct input in the steel production process, so it is expected that the world's 
biggest steel producers will be the major sources of demand for the commodity. 
60 
Steel production is concentrated primarily in the northern hemisphere, with Japan, 
the United States and European Union countries being the most prominent 
producers of steel. Within the European Union it is only a handful of countries 
that play a leading role in steel production and feature regularly in the league of 
top iron ore importers: Germany (also before unification as the Federal Republic 
of Germany), United Kingdom, France, Italy and Belgium. For the last 30 years 
these names have featured almost uninterruptedly in the top 10 world importers of 
Iron ore. 
Table 11-2 
Shares o/the top 10 iron ore importers (1965-1995) 
1995 1990 1985 1980 
Japan 29010 Japan 35% Japan 39% Japan 39% 
Gennany 10% Gennany 12% Gennany 14% Germany 15% 
China 10% Korea 6% Belgium 6% USA 7% 
Korea 8% Belgium 6% Italy 6% Belgium 7% 
UK 5% France 5% Poland 5% Poland 6% 
France 5% USA 5% France 5% France 5% 
Italy 4% Italy 5% USA 5% Italy 5% 
USA 4% UK 4% UK 5% Korea 3% 
Belgium 4% China 4% Korea 4% UK 3% 
Poland 3% Poland 3% Netherlands 3% 
Czech Rep. 2% Romania 3% 
Netherlands 2% Netherlands 2% 
Spain 2% 
Romania 2% 
Total 90% Total 91% Total 91% Total 90% 
1975 1970 1965 
Japan 41% Japan 35% USA 26% 
USA 15% Gennany 17% Gennany 20% 
Germany 14% USA 17% Japan 17% 
Belgium 8% Belgium 11% Belgium 13% 
UK 5% UK 7% UK 10% 
Italy 5% Italy 4% Italy 4% 
France 4% 
Total 91°/. Total 910/0 Total 91% 
.. Sou,c~: Authors' calculatIons based on tradejiguresfrom UN StatlSllcs Bureau 
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Top of the league since the 1970s has been Japan, with import shares between 
approximately 30-40%. Germany has been a regular second largest importer, 
while this position used to be territory for the United States in the past. Among the 
most interesting recent development was the appearance of other Far East Asian 
countries in the list, most notably Korea and China which took third and fourth 
place in 1995. A complete listing of countries accounting for at least 90% of 
world iron ore imports is given in Table 11-2 above. 
11.1.2.1 Bilateral Monopoly 
In view of the organisation of the demand side of the industry, it is reasonable to 
look at theories encompassing more restrictive types of industrial organisation, 
whereby agents (countries, companies) on both demand and supply are limited. 
The first candidate for such scrutiny is the bilateral monopoly model. To avoid 
some confusion which has occurred before in economic literature, a bilateral 
monopoly is present when an upstream monopolist sells its output to a single 
downstream buyer that may also be a monopolist in its output market. The theory 
of bilateral monopoly has a rich history that can be traced to the writings of 
Cournot (1838 and 1927) and Menger (1871). As Blair et al (1989) note, however, 
"over the 150 or so years that the problem has been under consideration, 
economists have offered a variety of solutions, ranging from a completely 
determinate intermediate good price and output to a completely indeterminate 
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solution within a specified range . . . this historical divergence of opinion 
concerning the correct outcome under bilateral monopoly still persists." 
What is then that makes bilateral monopoly such attractive a concept but creates 
such a variety of approaches to its solution? There are a variety of assumptions 
made at the outset of each bilateral oligopoly discussion, but we will first look at 
the most "conventional" analyses that have been offered over the years. Models 
can be broadly classified into deterministic and stochastic, according to whether 
the economic agents make their decision under condition of certainty or 
uncertainty. Models of certainty are discussed first. 
A "conventional" analysis of bilateral monopoly, found in several economics 
textbooks2, is summarised in Figure 11-5 below. A fixed input/output ratio equal to 
one is assumed, without loss of generality. If the downstream were competitive in 
the final output market, the derived demand for the input would equal DQ - Cr, 
where DQ is final product demand and Cr is the constant cost of transforming one 
unit of input x into one unit of output Q. Thus, DQ - Cr represents the average 
net revenue as a function of the quantity of x employed. With monopoly in the 
sale of Q, however, the derived demand for x will be the curve that is marginal to 
DQ - Cr , which is labelled Dx in the graph. Thus Dx represents the net marginal 
revenue product of input x. The curve labelled MRx is marginal to Dx and 
represents the marginal revenue associated with selling this intermediate good to a 
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downstream firm that has monopoly power in Q but not monopsony power in x. 
Note, however, that Dx cannot constitute the downstream firm's derived demand 
in the bilateral monopoly situation because a monopsonist is not a price taker and 
does not have a demand curve. 
Figure U-S 
Bilateral Monopoly 
$Ix 
MFCx 
MRPx=Dx 
x=Q 
Turning to the cost curves, ACx denotes the upstream monopolist's average cost 
of producing input x, and MCx is marginal cost. If the supplier of x were to behave 
as a perfect competitor, MCx would correspond to its supply curve. Then, if the 
downstream monopsonist were hiring this input form such a competitor, MFCx 
would be the marginal factor cost of the input. Authors adopting the standard 
2 See for example Baird (1975), Barrett (1974), Koutsoyannis (1975) and Mansfield (1982). 
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approach typically arrive at their conclusion that the bilateral monopoly problem 
is indeterminate by alternately assuming that one trading partner and then the 
other behaves as would a perfect competitor. 
If the upstream firm behaves competitively, then its supply curve will correspond 
to MCx. In this case, the downstream firm will arrive at the standard monopsony 
solution, buying x 2 units of the intermediate product at a price of P 2 per unit. If, 
on the other hand, the downstream firm behaves as a perfect competitor in its 
hiring decision, then the upstream firm will exercise its monopoly power in 
supplying the input. In this case we have the input monopoly solution at x 1 and 
P 1. According to the conventional analysis, these two outcomes set the bounds on 
the equilibrium price-quantity combination. Many textbooks usually conclude that 
the solution to the bilateral monopoly model will fall somewhere within the (p 1. 
x 1) - (P2. x2) range in Figure II-S. 
This so-called conventional solution has been criticised as incorrece because it 
fails to take into account one fundamental difference of bilateral monopoly (from 
perfect competition): the ability for co-operation and joint profit maximisation. 
Authors as early as Bowley (1928) have pointed out that there is a profit incentive 
for co-operation between upstream and downstream rmns under the conditions of 
bilateral monopoly, where some negotiation between buyer and seller is required 
J See for example Blair, Kaserman and Romano's (1989) critique of textbook treatment of 
bilateral monopoly. 
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for exchange to take place. The incentive to pursue joint profit maximisation 
arises because joint profits are not maximised at either of the two boundary 
solutions presented in the conventional analysis. Such co-operation may take the 
extreme form of vertical integration, as suggested by Stigler (1966) and Friedman 
(1976); or it may corne about through the bargaining process. For the latter, it is 
important to realise that the negotiation that takes place must involve quantity if 
joint profits are to be maximised. In this market setting, however, it is 
theoretically unlikely that one firm would chose price and allow the other to select 
quantity without negotiation. Rather, as Machlup and Taber (1960) point out, both 
price and quantity will be determined through bilateral bargaining. They also 
speculate that failure to recognise this essential difference between bilateral 
monopoly and all other market structures accounts for the lack of unanimity 
among the authors writing on this subject. 
To analyse the outcome of this bargaining process I use Blair's et al (1989) 
framework, assuming the following: 
x = intermediate product that is traded under bilateral monopoly conditions; 
C(x) = total cost of producing x; 
y = some other input that is competitively supplied at a constant cost of Py; 
Q = Q(x,y) = final output quanity, a function ofx andy; 
Px = price of the intermediate good x; 
P = P(Q) = final output inverse demand. 
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Now, if the two monopolists were to vertically integrate, the profit function of the 
integrated firm would be 
7r 1 = P[Q(x,Y)]'Q(x,y)-C(x)- Py' y 
Eq.II-5 
Profit maximisation by the vertically integrated firm would result 10 the 
production and employment of inputs x and y such that 
and 
(p + QdP I dQ)( 8Q lOx) = dC I dx 
Eq.II-6 
(p+QdPI dQ)(8QIt3y) = Py 
Eq.II-7 
That is, integrated profits are maximised where the marginal revenue products of 
the inputs are equated to their marginal costs. For the special production function 
employed in Figure II-S, this corresponds to x3 units of output (and input). It is at 
this output only that joint profits are at a maximum. 
Suppose, however, that the bilateral monopolists do not integrate vertically. 
Instead, they continue to conduct arms-length negotiations on Px and x. Then, as 
Bowley point out, such negotiations will necessarily result in precisely the same 
joint profit maximising quantity of the intermediate good being exchanged (and 
the same employment of input y). As a result, both the price of the final good and 
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its output are determinate in this model and are equal to the price and output that 
result with vertical integration. Blair et al (1989) proceed further to prove this 
result in the two more specialised cases: firstly, where either of the firms 
dominates in the negotiation procedure; and secondly where none of the firms is 
dominant in negotiations. In the first case the price (at the extreme) is achieved 
either at pU (if the upstream producer is dominant) or pD (if the downstream 
consumer is dominant). In the second case, the contract curve is the vertical line 
going through the intersection of MCx and MRPx. The extend of this curve is 
bound by the fact that neither monopolist need ever have negative profits in the 
event of breakdown of negotiations. In Figure U-5 above, the contract curve does 
not stretch beyond pU or beyond pD. 
Despite the very confident analysis of Blair, Kaserman and Romano (1989), 
however, there still seems to be persistent disparity in the results different authors 
get from their analyses of bilateral monopoly. Even their own analysis comes 
under scrutiny by Truett and Truett (1993), who argue that it is not reasonable to 
expect the solution to the traditional bilateral monopoly problem to yield a 
determinate quantity traded of the intermediate product but not a determinate 
intermediate product price. They find convincing the fact that under reasonable 
assumptions (downward-sloping demand curve for fmal product, increasing 
marginal cost of production of intermediate product) only one quantity traded of 
the intermediate good is consistent with joint profit maximisation. However, joint 
profit maximisation at all but one of the possible intermediate good prices over 
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time requires either (a) accommodating non-profit maximising behaviour on the 
part of one of the two parties to the bargain or (b) that one firm has a degree of 
power over the other that would seem difficult to maintain over very long periods 
of time. In the latter case, the dominant firm would have to be able to control both 
the price and output of the second firm, a degree of market power that would be 
greater than that a monopoly seller firm has over perfectly competitive buyers. 
Truett and Truett (1993) tackle this apparent anomaly by going one step further 
than the usual, somewhat vague (in terms of price determination) solution to the 
bilateral monopoly situation. They look at the contract curve in bilateral monopoly 
as the locus of tangent points between different isoprofit curves for the monopolist 
and the monopsonist and suggest that there should also be a determinate 
equilibrium price, which is found at the intersection of the seller's marginal cost 
function and the buyers marginal value product function. 
Figure 11-6 recreates the diagram used in Truett and Truett (1993), also found in 
Blair, Kaserman and Romano (1989), and which is based on the suggestions of 
Fellner (1947). 
The contract curve (KK') is vertical, indicating that Pareto-optimal joint profit 
maximisation is consistent with only one quantity traded, Q*, Of the isoprofit 
curves, 1tsO and 1tbO indicate the zero-profit indifference curves of the seller and the 
buyer of the intermediate good, respectively. 
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According to the analysis mentioned earlier, Fellner (1947) and Blair, Kaserman 
and Romano (1989) argue that the firms will somehow discover that joint profit 
maximisation requires Q* and will agree on that quantity and some price lying 
along the contract curve. Truett and Truett (1993) argue that despite earlier 
dismissals, it is at price p* that the bilateral monopoly will reach its equilibrium. 
They state a very simple reason for such a result: any other price used in 
combination with the equilibrium quantity Q* creates the incentive for one of the 
two firms to balk on the delivery of Q *. 
Figure 11-6 
Isoprofit Curves and the Contract Curve in Bilateral Monopoly 
$ 
MP~ 
o Q* 
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For example, let us assume that the dominant party is the buyer, who manages to 
impose the eqUilibrium quantity Q* and the equilibrium price pD which results is 
profits along 1tb4 for the buyer and 1tso (zero profits) for the seller. In view of this, 
the seller will have the incentive to perform worse than expected and end up 
delivering QU, which maximises its own profits for the given price. How can this 
be done? Quite easily and plausibly: production difficulties, shortages of raw 
materials, labour problems, and several other justifications can be (and have been) 
used. A similar situation can be envisaged in the case of the buyer balking on his 
purchase commitments, with a host of excuses and stalling techniques in his 
arsenal as well. 
Moreover, despite the fact that many authors have noted that bilateral monopoly 
requires negotiation of both price and quantity, not many have accounted for the 
fact that contracts are normally of limited duration and they have to be 
renegotiated. On the basis of this, Truett and Truett (1993) argue that if the two 
firms periodically renegotiate and neither has absolute market power, the goal of 
profit maximisation and reasonable assumptions regarding the reaction and 
counter-proposals of one firm to price/quantity offers by the other will lead them 
to an equilibrium at P*. This is the only price that does not create an incentive for 
either firm to either balk or renegotiate, given that each firm has acquired learning 
about the other firm's strategy through repeated renegotiations. 
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Much of the experience on which Truett and Truett (1993) build their arguments 
has been accumulated from the labour market and they often quote examples of 
labour disputes, labour contract renegotiations, balking on the part of both trade 
unions and employers, etc. Similar experiences, however, do exist in raw materials 
markets, as well. In the case of iron ore, more specifically, balking on deliveries 
has not been uncommon in recent years, as it is discussed in chapter III. 
11.1.2.2 Bilateral Monopoly under Uncertainty 
So far, the discussion has relied on an almost implicit, but very important 
assumption: modelling of economic behaviour is under conditions of perfect or 
complete information. There are other assumptions that have been made, of 
course, which are less or more critical, but the degree to which economic agents 
possess knowledge about their competitors and the market is quite important. In 
bilateral monopoly it is often assumed that both the monopolist and the 
monopsonist have complete information about each other's actions, strategies, 
preferences, cost characteristics, etc. Under these assumptions (and a few more 
like cost symmetry) the behaviour of both firms has been described as a two-
person variable sum game. 
Unfortunately, reality is quite different and does bring with it several degrees of 
uncertainty. Oligopoly - as well as game - theorists usually make a distinction 
between imperfect and incomplete information. According to Tirole (1988) an 
agent (or player) has imperfect information when he does not know what the other 
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players have done beforehand.4 On the other hand, an agent has incomplete 
information when he does not know the rival's precise characteristics 
(preferences, strategy spaces, cost structures, etc.) The two types of information 
asymmetry are often confused in literature, but it is games with incomplete 
information that are more interesting (and more relevant) in this context. This 
notwithstanding, we look only at the theoretical foundation of games with 
incomplete information (including one interesting application: sequential 
bargaining with incomplete information) and then focus on everything that has 
been written on bilateral monopoly under conditions of informational 
asymmetries. 
First we look at the perfect Bayesian equilibrium, which is combination of 
(subgame) perfect-equilibrium concept for dynamic games and the Bayesian-
equilibrium concept for games of incomplete information. A simple illustration of 
the perfect Bayesian equilibrium can be given with the help of Figure 11-7. 
This game has three players and takes place over three periods. In period 1, player 
1 can choose from among three actions: "left" (L I), "middle" (M I) and "right" 
(RI ). If player 1 chooses one of the latter two, player 2 gets to choose between 
"left" (L2) and "right" (R2)' although he is not informed of player l' s exact choice 
(he knows only that player 1 did not choose LI). The imperfect information of 
4 According to this defmition, a whole sub-set of games - simultaneous games - are games of 
imperfect information, by assuming that one player chooses before the other and that the latter 
does not know the action chosen by the former. 
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player 2 is represented by an information set {MI' RI}, characterised by the 
rounded rectangle around the two corresponding nodes (n2 and n3). Given his 
state of information, player 2 is faced with the same choices at nodes n2 and n3. 
Figure 11-7 
Game with Incomplete Information 
2 0 0 
0 
'--2 
(0 Os 1 
0 
R) L) 0 
0 1 0 0 1 4 1 1 3 0 1 0 
Finally, for move {MI' R2} or {RI, L2} player 3 must choose between "left" (L3) 
and "right" (R3) in the third period without knowing which of the nodes (n4 or ns) 
the game has attained. The values of the objective functions are written at the 
bottom of the tree. For example, for moves (MI, L2) player 1 receives 3, player 2 
receives 2 and player 3 receives O. 
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Solving this problem can be done using two different approaches: that of a game 
theorist and that of a statistician. The game theorist will need to know the 
subjective probabilities attached 0 each information set and will then equate this 
problem to a perfect-information game. The (Bayesian) statistician, on the other 
hand, will ask for a set of strategies, from which he will be able to calculate the 
probabilities which the players should attribute to the various nodes. In short, the 
optimal strategies in such an equilibrium must satisfy two conditions: (a) 
strategies are optimal given beliefs (necessary for perfect equilibrium); and (b) 
beliefs are obtained from strategies and observed actions using Bayes' rule 
(necessary for Bayesian equilibrium). 
The above game actually has a simple (trivial) solution, because of the existence 
of dominant strategies. Starting with player 3, he will always choose strategy L3 (it 
is the one that gives him positive payoffs, instead of zero). Because of this the 
game can be converted to a two-period, two-player game. We observe that player 
2 now has a dominant strategy (L2). Consequently, the unique perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium is given by strategy (MI' L2, L3)' 
One interesting application of a game with incomplete information is "sequential 
bargaining", for which we fo1low the discussion in Fudenberg and Tirole (1983). 
Bargaining usually involves asymmetric information. For instance, the se1ler 
(respectively, the buyer) may have incomplete information about the buyer's 
willingness to pay (respectively, the seller's reservation price). To the extent that 
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bargaining proceeds through a series of offers, refusals, counteroffers, and so on, it 
is natural to model it as a dynamic game of incomplete information. A simple 
instance of such a formalisation is given below. 
Consider the following simple bargaining problem: a buyer and a seller negotiate 
over one unit of a product (or a contract). The seller makes an initial offer of P}, 
which the buyer either accepts or refuses. If the offer is refused, the seller makes a 
second offer, P2. If the second offer is also refused, each party goes his own way 
and the seller keeps his product. The value of the product is s for the seller and b 
for the buyer. (Value must be interpreted in a broad sense that includes the 
possibility of outside exchanges with other parties). 
Assume that the discount factor is Os for the seller and ob for the buyer and that 
both parties are risk-neutral. Therefore, the utilities of the seller and the buyer are 
[p },b - P}] ifp} is accepted, [8sP2, 8b(b - p2J] if P2 is accepted, and [8ss,0] if P2 
is refused. Incomplete information is restricted in the following aspect: The seller 
does not know whether the value of the product is bor!!.(b < !!.)for the buyer. The 
seller puts equal probabilities on these two values, whereas the buyer knows b. 
Both parties know everything else. Assume that there is always some potential 
gain from exchange: s < !!. < b. Moreover, it is assumed that !!. > (b + s) / 2. This 
condition implies that if the seller were authorised to make only one offer, he 
would choose to sell surely (by charging!!.) rather than run the risk of losing the 
-
sale (by trying to sell at price b). 
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Looking now at the strategies and beliefs the following is possible. First, the seller 
makes an offer Pl. The buyer accepts (d} = 1) or refuses (d1 = 0), depending on 
P 1 and on his willingness to pay. Thus, the buyer's strategy can be denoted as d} 
(p } , b). If the buyer refuses P 1, the seller deduces from this a posterior probability 
- -
that the buyer's willingness to pay is equal to b, which is denoted as jJ( b 1 PI) . 
Obviously, p(1].1 PI) = 1- jJ(b 1 PI)' The seller then makes a subsequent offer, 
P2(P 1)· Finally, the buyer accepts P2 (d2 = 1) or refuses P2 (d2 = 0), according to 
the decision rule d2(P}, P2, b). 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) and Tirole (1988) outline five steps in resolving this 
game. 
(1) The first step consists of writing the "self-selection constraints" that must be 
satisfied by an equilibrium path. By self-selection constraints they mean the 
constraints expressing the fact that in equilibrium a player of a given type does not 
strictly prefer to adopt a strategy other than his own (such as that of the same 
player when he is of a different type). Here, the buyer can be of two types, Q and 
- -b. They refer to "the buyer of type Q" (respectively, "type b) to designate the 
buyer who attaches a value Q (respectively, b) to the product. During the second 
period, self-selection constraints are trivial; the buyer of type b buys if and only if 
P 2 ~ b. Analogously, the buyer of type of type b will accept an offer p} during the 
first period if an only if 
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The equation above represents the following: If the buyer accepts offer P 1, his 
utility is b - P 1; and if refuses, the seller charges P 2(P 1). 
(2) The second step is to look at the consequences of the self-selection constraints 
on the seller's posterior probability distribution over b. Clearly, it may be assumed 
that P 1 was refused (otherwise bargaining is completed and the distribution no 
longer matters). Since an offer accepted by the type-~ buyer, the probability of 
facing the latter type when the offer is refused is, at most, Y2. 
(3) The third step is to return to the strategy space by examining the effects of this 
distribution on the strategy of the seller in the second period. When the seller can 
make only one offer, and his distribution over b is uniform he behaves cautiously 
by assumption (that is, he charges ~). A fortiori, when his subjective probability 
-
of facing buyer b is less than Y2 he must also behave cautiously; therefore, 
regardless of P 1, we have P 2(P 1) = Q.. And the fmal two steps of characterisation 
are now: 
(4) Forecasting that the seller will charge Q. if he refuses the first offer, the buyer 
of type Q. accepts it if and only if P 1 ~ Q.. Buyer b accepts P 1 if and only if 
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(5) Finally, the seller chooses P 1 in order to maximise his expected profit. He 
chooses between Q and b depending on whether Q is greater or less than 
-(b + (} s Q) / 2. If he proposes Q, this offer is accepted by both types of buyer. On 
the other hand, if he proposes b , he benefits from buyer b' s impatience, knowing 
full well that he will be able to enter into an exchange in the second period if the 
buyer turns out to be of type Q. Because during the characterisation we dermed 
the players' strategies and beliefs for each history of the game, we conclude that 
the game has a unique Bayesian equilibrium. 
When the element of uncertainty is introduced in bilateral monopoly situations, 
several authors have reached quite interesting and insightful conclusions, although 
in most cases models had to be simplified considerably. Samuelson (1980), for 
example, looked at a very simple bilateral monopoly situation, whereby one of the 
two parties gets the chance (for some unspecified reason) to make a first and final 
offer to the other party. In this model each party is uncertain about the other 
party's reservation prices and, in making a price offer, each faces a trade-off 
between his individual gains (if a bargain is successful) and the probability that a 
mutually acceptable bargain is concluded. Williamson suggests some examples of 
where such a situation may arise, the most notable being that of a contract 
negotiation, whereby the respective reservation prices would represent the most 
generous offer of management and the minimum contract demand of labour. One 
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could think of a similar situation in an iron ore contract negotiation, whereby price 
(but not only that) is negotiated in a similar manner. Following the obvious 
observation that a transaction will take place if the either party makes an offer 
between the two reservation prices, he also notes that usually the profit 
maximising buyer "shades" his offer below his true reservation price, while the 
seller "marks up" his reservation price in making an offer. More importantly, 
however, Samuelson also concludes that a risk-averse party makes a more truthful 
offer than a risk-neutral one, an important conjecture on which we will refer to 
again in chapter IV. 
Williamson extended his observations on bilateral monopoly under uncertainty in 
a subsequent paper with Chatterjee (1983). Some of the most important points 
made there can be summarised as follows: 
• bargaining under uncertainty will, in general, fail to be Pareto optimal; 
• the higher the value placed on the good by the seller (buyer), the higher the 
price he demand (offers); 
• an increase in the risk aversion of the seller (buyer) implies uniformly lower 
(higher) offers by both parties in equilibrium; 
• the better the bargainer's information about his opponent, the better he can 
expect to fare in the negotiations; 
S Reservation price is the maximum (minimum) price that a buyer (seller) is willing to offer 
(receive). 
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• probability assessment becomes more complicated in an environment with 
stochastic dependence between the player values; 
• single-stage bargaining is rather restrictive as it fails to capture the pattern of 
reciprocal concessions observed in everyday practice. 
Rapoport and Fuller (1995) also look at the problem of bilateral monopoly with 
two-sided incomplete information, focusing on a more specialised case that 
involves a sealed-bid double auction mechanism. Although not directly relevant to 
our problem at hand, they make one very interesting conclusion: "Sellers tend to 
underbid and buyers to overbid ... however, strategic behaviour is moderated by 
the tendency to bid honestly ... honesty in bargaining is supported by social 
norms .. . more importantly. honest bidding in the bilateral monopoly task 
maximises the probability of trade ... if the subjects are more interested in 
maximising the efficiency of trade rather than their own expected value. their 
inclination to exaggerate their reservation prices must decline." 
Closing this section is a most challenging contribution by Dobbs and Hill (1993) 
who also looked at bilateral monopoly under uncertainty and suggested a 
completely different approach to the usual pricing problem facing both theorists 
and firms: where exactly on the contract curve will the final price lie? The authors 
propose the use of a non-uniform pricing schedule, rather than the application of 
single uniform price. They maintain that "appropriately designed, a non-uniform 
pricing schedule will be acceptable to the buying finn so long as the appropriate 
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profit transfer is effected and the joint profit maximising quantity traded. At the 
same time, the agreement need not involve requiring the firm to purchase the 
joint-profit maximising quantity ." They go on to support the use of a non-uniform 
pricing schedule in lieu of a contract when the bilateral monopoly takes place in 
an uncertain environment. They claim that a contract in such a case must be 
continually renegotiated, which would entail significant negotiation costs, or a 
"state-contingent',(j contract would have to be used instead. 
Following this initial observation, Dobbs and Hill investigate the advantages of 
using non-uniform pricing in bilateral monopoly under uncertainty, assuming risk-
neutral players. They end up with two similar propositions: firstly , they 
conjecture that a non-uniform pricing schedule (involving marginal pricing) exists 
(under certain conditions) that can resolve the bilateral monopoly pricing problem; 
and secondly, that a take-or-pay pricing contract exists which solves the bilateral 
monopoly problem. This latter contract also involves marginal cost pricing on the 
interval of uncertain demand and a take-or pay quantity and minimum payment. 
The authors conclude with some notable examples where take-or-pay contracts are 
indeed used in real life, such as in the case of gas, bauxite and coal. The same is 
not the case, to our knowledge, in iron ore, but their proposals offer a very 
6 A state-contingent contract specifies quantity and money transfer for each possible state of the 
world. 
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interesting challenge to the way long-term iron ore contracts are structured and 
their future survival. 
11.2 Commodity Market Models 
In the long history of studying the demand, supply and exchange of raw materials 
a multitude of models has been used. In the process, a number of methodologies 
has been applied to analyse different aspects of commodity economics. Labys 
(1983) and Labys and Pollak (1984) have collected and classified such models and 
their taxonomy is summarised in Table 11-3, which is reproduced from Labys and 
Pollak (1984, p. 45). 
Table 11-3 
Taxonomy of Commodify Modelling Methodologies 
What II the purpose What quantitative What economic ExamplHof 
of the methodology? method Is used? behaviour " commodity 
Methodol , Ifled? a llcatlons 
Market Model Demand, supply, Dynamic micro Interaction between Cobalt, 
inventories interact to econometric system decision makers in Energy, 
produce an equilibrium composed of reaching market Lauric Oils, 
price in competitive or difference or equilibrium based on Rubber, 
non-competitive differential equations demand, supply, Soybeans, 
markets inventories, prices, Sugar, 
trade, etc. Tunglten 
Process Model Demand and Dynamic micro Interaction between Petroleum, 
produdlon determined economic difference decision makers in Steel 
within an industry, equation system Industries, markets, 
focusing on suitable for integrating national economlel 
transformation from linear programming on based on demand, 
produd demand to production site inventories, 
input requirements production, 
investment, capacity 
utilisation, commodity 
Ineuts, erices, etc. 
Systems dynamics Demand, supply, Dynamic micro Interadlon between Aluminium, 
model inventories interact to econometric decision makers In Broilers, 
produce an equilibrium differential equation adjusting rate of Cattle, 
price emphasiSing role system which features production to maintain Copper, 
of amplifications and lagged feedback a desired level of Hogs, Orange 
feedback delays relations and variables Inventory in Juice 
in rates of change relationship to rate of 
consumJ!!!n 
Spatial equilibrium and Spatial flows of Adivlty analysis of a Interaction between Banan.l, 
er~rammi!!i models demand and suee~ seatial and/or decision makers In Broilers, 
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What II the purpose What quantitative What economic Exampl .. of 
of the methodology? method Is uled? behaviour II commodity 
Methodol I lfIed? a llcatlons 
1. Linear and and equilibrium temporal form. Degree allocating shipments Livestock, 
quadratic conditions assigned of complexity depends (exports) and Oranges, 
programming optimally in equilibrium on endogeneity and consumption (imports) Palm 011, 
depending on method of optimised through Wheat 
configuration of incorporation of maximising sectoral 
transportation network demand and supply revenues or 
functions minimising sectoral 
costs 
2. Recursive Production conditions Activity analysis Interaction between Coal, Iron, 
programming and input revenue involving a sequence decision makers in Steel, Wheat, 
determined through of constrained reaching market Com, 
primaVdual of linear maximisation equilibrium involves Soybeans 
programme. problems in which adaptive intertemporal 
Recursivity introduced objective function, processes related to 
through feedback limitation coefficients production, investment 
component which depend on optimal and technological 
includes profit, capital primaVdual solutions change 
and demand attained earlier in the 
seguence 
3. Mixed integer Spatial and temporal Activity analysis Interaction between Aluminium, 
programming equilibrium embodying involving spatial and decision makers in Copper, 
production-process, temporal optimisation finding minimum Fertilisers 
transportation, and but also including discounted costs of 
project investment integer (0/1) variables meeting specific 
components to represent capacity market requirements, 
additions i.e. eroject selection 
Optimisation model Supply and demand Dynamic micro Interaction between Aluminium, 
analysed in relation to econometric system decision makers in Copper, 011 
optimal resource featuring formal cartel- optimiSing resources 
exhaustion over time fringe models such as allocation and prices 
and cartel behaviour that of monopoly, over time in non-
Stackelberg and Nash- competitive markets 
Coumot involving bargaining 
activity 
Input-output model System regarded as Input-output model Interaction between Minerals, 
process that converts combined with macro non-fuel and fuel Energy, 
raw materials into economic framework commodities and Agriculture 
intermediate and final or disaggregated raw macro markets in 
products via materials balance reaching materials and 
intermediate framework energy balance 
processes. Investment including IUPPly-
strategies evaluated in demand determination 
terms of raw material 
sueel~ and demand 
Systems simulation Demand, supply and Dynamic micro Interaction between Beef, Energy, 
model other major variables econometric equation decision makers Fish, 
and objectives system which when belonging to the Livestock, 
considered as a formed into a system environment Multi-
complete system simulation framework baaed on performance commodity, 
rather than a single is coupled with activity variables such as Rice 
market analysis and/or revenues, costs as 
decision rules well as market 
variables IUch as 
demand, lupply, 
prlcel, etc. 
Among the earliest attempts to model trade flows are those of Tinbergen (1962), 
Poyhonen (1963), Pulliainin (1963) and Linnemann (1966). The 'gravity' models 
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developed by them explain trade by the income of each of the trading partners and 
the distance between them. 
The original Tinbergen-Linnemann framework is adapted by Tilton, Dorr and 
Whitney in their studies of non-ferrous metals. Tilton (1966) concluded that the 
choice of trade partners is strongly influenced by international ownership ties, 
political blocs, government regulation and participation in trade, established 
buyer-seller ties, and the heterogeneous nature of ores and metals. Dorr (1975) 
studied the trade in bauxite, alumina and aluminium and confirmed the fmdings of 
Tilton. Whitney (1976) showed that the geographical distances separating trading 
partners, together with their export and import potentials, are the most important 
determinants in the trade of more highly processed copper products. 
11.8 Iron Ore Market Models 
Unlike several other mineral commodities, Iron ore has not been tackled 
extensively in international literature. There has only been a handful of attempts to 
model either the behaviour of the iron ore supply/demand mechanism or the 
resulting trade flows. 
11.3.1 Gravity Models 
The earliest attempt to deal with iron ore trade is by Margueron (1969). 
Apparently influenced by Tilton, Margueron hypothesised in his study that the 
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flow of trade Tij' from the exporting country i to the importing country j depends 
linearly on the following nine variables: 
Tij = !(Xi. Mj. TCij. PCi. BFi. OWNij. EFTAij. BCWij. EECij) 
Eq.II-8 
where Tij is the volume of trade between country; and country j, in thousand 
metric tons contained iron; 
X; is the potential for export of country ;, proxied by the total export of 
country i, in thousand metric tons contained iron; 
Mj is the potential for import of country j, proxied by the total import of 
country j, in thousand metric tons contained iron; 
TC ij is the transportation cost per ton of contained iron from country i to 
country j, in US dollars; 
PC; is the per ton cost of iron ore export in US dollars; 
BF; is the cost of smelting the ore in terms of additional coke and 
limestone related to the chemical properties of the ore; 
OWNij' are foreign ownership ties, proxied by the actual export of country 
; to country j from firms controlled by country j; 
EFTA;} BCWij. EECij. are dummy variables which take the value one if 
the trading countries are both members of the same political bloc 
(European Free Trade Association, British Commonwealth and 
European Economic Community) and zero otherwise. 
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Estimates of the parameters show that the coefficients of OWNij. BF; and TCij 
are, respectively, significant at the 99, 94 and 86 per cent levels. Coefficients of 
Xi. Mj, PCi. EFTAij, BCWij. and EECij are not significant at the 86 per cent level. 
Signs of the coefficients are as expected except for PCi and EECij. On the basis of 
the above results Margueron concluded that the most important determinants of 
trade, in order of decreasing importance, are OWNij. BFi and TCij. 
Santos (1976) noted the following shortcomings in Margueron's work: 
a) Margueron interpreted statistical significance as a measure of the relative 
importance of the explanatory variables, which led to an erroneous conclusion. 
On the basis of the size of the beta coefficients the ranking of the significant 
variables in descending importance is TCij, OWNij and BFi. 
b) It was noted that at the 95 per cent level of significance only OWNij is 
significant and at the 90 per cent level only OWN ij and BFi are significant. 
c) Xi, Mj, PCi, EFTAij, BCWij, EECij are not significant in explaining trade 
flows, contrary to what traditional trade theories imply. 
d) Since Xi depends on PCi and BFi, inclusion of the latter two variables in the 
model appears superfluous. This misspecification could bias the results of the 
model. 
e) Since Xi and Mj are estimated by the total exports of country i and total imports 
of country j, they depend on Tij, since Xi equals the vector that results when Tij 
is summed allover j and Mj equals the resulting vector when Tij is summed 
over all i. Since causality apparently flows in both directions and not just from 
87 
the independent variables to Tij' simultaneous equation techniques should have 
been used to estimate the model's parameters. 
Santos (1976) in his study of iron ore trade, also used the Tinbergen-Linnemann 
framework to analyse international flows of the commodity. Like the Tinbergen-
Linnemann approach, the model consists of variables used to measure three 
determinants of trade: export potential, import potential, and resistance 
parameters. More formally: 
Tij = f(XP;, MPj. RTijJ 
Eq.II-9 
where Tij is the volume of trade between country i and country j; 
XP i is the potential for export of country i; 
MPj is the potential for import of country j; 
RTij is a set of 'resistance' variables, like tariffs. neighbour ties, transport 
costs, etc. 
Santos used the difference between mine production capacities and pig iron 
capacities in importing and exporting countries to measure, respectively, their 
import and export potentials. He also used neighbour ties (LNij), economic 
distance (EDij), long-term contracts (LTCij) and foreign ownership ties (OWNij) 
as resistance variables, while he correctly dropped variables representing 
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membership to politico-economic groups (such as the British Commonwealth and 
the EEC), since there are no tariff on non-tariff barriers in iron ore trade.7 
Santos's model consists of the main structural equation (III.3) and a number of 
ancillary equations used to estimate the export and import potentials of the trading 
partners, long-term contracts, pig iron and crude steel production capacities and 
reserves. 
Eq.II-I0 
where 10 .... 16 are coefficients, elij is the error term, and all the other parameters as 
explained above. 
Santos (1976, p. 58) found that only about 20 to 30 percent of iron ore trade could 
be explained by XP;. MPj and EDij. He also found that ownership ties and long-
term contracts were important determinants of trade, albeit the former diminishing 
in importance over time. 
When trying to analyse the determinants of long-term contracts, Santos found that 
the three variables he used (export potential, import potential and economic 
distance) explained only a small proportion of the dependent variable. He 
7 The absence of any such barriers from iron ore trade is still valid, as confirmed by Lord (1991, p. 
263). 
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attributed the unexplained portion to other factors affecting profitability or 
security of supplies. 
Santos found considerable deviations of actual iron trade flows from those 
predicted by his model. Several of these deviations appeared in bilateral flows 
between important exporter-importer pairs, such as Brazil-Germany, Brazil-Japan, 
Sweden-Germany, Sweden-Benelux, Australia-UK and Australia-USA, Although 
the model prediction for the very important Australia-Japan trade was very close 
to actual figures.8 
The model developed by Santos does not attempt to calculate any import demand 
or export supply elasticities for iron ore trade. When validated, the model yielded 
predictions significantly different to actual figures both for trade flows and mine 
production capacities. 
The model is also found wanting about its basic assumption about ownership ties 
and long-term contracts, although, in fairness, these shortcomings can only be 
highlighted only with the benefit of hindsight. Santos, as well as Margueron, paid 
particular attention to foreign ownership ties, which were quite important in the 
1950s and 1960s, but declined in importance in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as 
Santos himself observes. Ownership ties do still exist of course, but in many cases 
• In all cases, deviations refer to the predictions for 1973. Other substantial deviations were also 
noted for most of the years Santos used in his calculations (1950, 1955, 1960, 1965, 1970, 
1973). 
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just in order to take advantage of commercial profits, and perhaps establish a 
minimum level of commitment of mines to specific steel mills. The most recent 
example of steel producers acquiring such equity stakes in iron ore production has 
been that of Chinese mills in both Australian and Peruvian mines (reference from 
the FT to be provided). 
Long-term contracts also had a pivotal role in trade determination in the models of 
both Margueron and Santos. Although, long-term contracts still account for a 
significant part of iron ore flows, the 1980s also witnessed considerable defaults 
by the purchasing parties (due to stringent economic conditions), resulting in less 
iron ore liftings. As a result, long-term contracts now have a much shorter life (5 
years is the norm), incorporate more flexibility in terms of allowed deviations 
from agreed quantities, and price renegotiations are on a yearly basis. 
11.3.2 Oligopolistic Model of the Iron Ore Market 
Ten years after Santos's work, Priovolos (1986) presented the model he developed 
in the Commodities Division of the World Bank. His approach is different to 
those of Margueron and Santos in two ways. Firstly, he explicitly viewed the iron 
ore market within an imperfectly competitive framework, taking into account the 
idiosyncrasy of the market's price setting mechanism. Secondly, he focused on the 
production, consumption and price determination, with trade flows appearing only 
as a balancing element. Overall, his approach is quite similar to that of Morgan 
(1949), who also used the iron ore industry as an example of price and quantity 
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detennination in bilateral monopoly.9 Priovolos essentially views the market as a 
bilateral monopoly in each geographic region, with prices being set each year by 
the biggest regional producer (e.g. Brazilian mines) and the biggest regional 
importer (e.g. European steel mills). He does note, however, that " ... over the last 
few years, competition has increased. Consumers and small producers have started 
to negotiate prices and quantities before the conclusions of the negotiations 
between the representatives of Continental Europe and Brazil. The aim of 
consumers in doing so is to influence the outcome of the negotiations with Brazil, 
Australia and other major producers, whereas the aim of small producers is to lock 
in their share of exports early in the year." 
Table 11-4: Fint Pri(e Setten in Japanese and European Markets 
Japanese Market European Market 
First Price Setter Fines First Price Setter Fine. 
Settlement % change Settlement % change 
1981 2612181 CVRD +7.5 1512181 CVGlBelgium +6.1 
1982 2613182 Newman +17.2 512182 CVRD/Germany +15.7 
1983 2813183 CVRD -11.4 813183 IOC/Germany -11.2 
1984 20/1/84 CVRD -11.6 7/12183 QCMlGermany -8.5 
1985 31/1/85 MMTC 0 7/12184 QCM 1000Gennany 0 
1986 1312186 MMTC -1.88 3112185 QCM loe/Germany -1.1 
1987 2012187 Newman -5.0 513187 QCMlHoiland -9.3 
1988 22112188 Hamersley -4.0 24/12187 HamersleylBritaln +8.6 
1989 14/12189 Harnersley +13.0 19/12188 CVRD/Germany +13.0 
1990 24/1/90 Hamersley +15.96 17/1/90 CVRD/Germany +15.96 
1991 30/1/91 Hamersley +7.93 31/1/91 CVRD/Gennany +7.95 
1992 17/12191 Hamersley -4.90 17/12/91 CVRD/Germany -4.90 
1993 13/1193 BHP, CVRD, Robe -11.0 22112/92 SNIM/France -13.47 
19M 812194 Hamersley -9.5 812194 Hamersley/Gerrnany ~.n 
1994 812/94 Robe River -14.5 11/2/94 CVRD/Germany -9.5 
Note: Hamersley sales price in the European malt(et i. based on C&F price. 
Source: TEX Report, Iron Ora Manual 94195. 
9 The original standard exposition of bilateral monopoly is in Bowley (1928), and also in Hicks 
(1935) and Henderson (1940). 
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His observations are confirmed in Table 11-4, which shows that pricing initiatives 
in the European market were frequently taken by Canadian (QCM and IOC), 
Australian (Hamersley), Venezuelan (CVO) and Mauritanian (SNIM) fIrms, with 
Brazil's CVRD being the fIrst price setter only in 6 occasions between 1981 and 
1994. 
In his subsequent analysis, Priovolos assumes that " .... the general reference iron 
ore price (the CIF North Sea for Brazilian 65% Fe sinter fInes) is being negotiated 
and set between representatives of Brazil and Continental Europe. This reference 
price is assumed to affect the negotiations of all other iron ore prices (in a non-
homogeneous way). Under these negotiations [he assumes that] market 
participants recognise their mutual interdependence and reach mutually 
satisfactory agreement as to the reference price and the quantity that Brazil will 
export to most EEe countries." 
Both negotiating parties make estimates about prices and quantities of iron ore 
that will maximise their own profIts. So, for example, a European steel mill solves 
its profIt maximisation problem - as a discriminating monopsonist - by equating 
marginal revenue with marginal cost. In a similar manner, a Brazilian mine -
acting as a discriminating monopolist - also equates its marginal revenue with its 
marginal cost in order to maximise profits. to 
10 In both cases the equality of marginal revenue with marginal cost is the ftrSt order condition of 
the profit maximisation problem. . 
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However, adds Priovolos (1986, p. 26) " ... both participants in the negotiations 
know that their desired price and quantity maximise their own profit but not the 
profit of the other party. During the negotiations they will apply their bargaining 
power in order to achieve an outcome (i.e. a set of price and quantity) as 
favourable as possible to their operations. The participants agree first on the 
quantity to be traded. Usually the allotment is greater that the actually traded 
quantity. The agreed quantity is not binding on either party. The existence of spot 
market makes the quantities of iron ore competitively determined. Moreover, the 
competitive determination of the output results from the theory of bilateral 
monopoly and the analysis of the collusion and bargaining process of negotiating 
parties." 
Priovolos uses the bilateral monopoly theory to establish the range within which 
prices will be negotiated, so that none of the negotiating parties is driven out of 
business. The determination of a specific price depends on the relative bargaining 
power of the iron ore supplier and the steel consumer. This second stage of price 
setting is analysed within the framework of a generalised stochastic n-person 
game without transferable utility as analysed by Nash, Shapley and Harsanyi and 
discussed in Friedman (1979). 
In his model specification, Priovolos estimates iron ore production by regressing it 
on the rental cost of capital and the cost of petroleum and per unit of ore, the 
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deflated dollar price of ore and the potential ore output. Apparent production of 
iron ore, on the other hand, is regressed on crude steel production, scrap prices and 
the deflated import price of iron ore. 
When dealing with iron ore trade, Priovolos observes that " ... most iron ore 
producers are important exporters and most iron ore consumers are often 
important importers." For this reason, imports and exports are calculated as 
simply balancing any demand deficits and production surpluses, respectively. 
Priovolos' simplifying assumptions about the price/quantity setting mechanism in 
the iron ore market facilitates his subsequent analysis, but does so at the cost of 
ignoring the actions of other exporters and importers of iron ore. It is true that 
West European countries source most of their supplies from Brazil, and similarly 
Japan from Australia, but it is also true that West European also buy from Canada, 
Sweden, Australia and African countries, while Japan also imports from Brazil, 
and India. 
While the notion of viewing the iron ore market as a string of bilateral monopolies 
in the Atlantic and Pacific markets is attractive, bilateral oligopoly might be much 
closer to describing the situation in the iron ore market. As Scherer and Ross 
(1990, pp. 528-529) note "It is entirely conceivable that a few end product sellers 
could have sufficient power as buyers to hold the price of intermediate products 
supplied by upstream oligopolists at or near competitive levels. At the same time 
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they might find themselves unable to depart appreciably from competitive pricing 
in their end product markets." They add that " ... oligopolists are prone to cut prices 
in order to land an unusually large order, especially when they have excess 
capacity. Large buyers can exploit this weakness by concentrating their orders into 
big lumps, dangling the temptation before each seller, and encouraging a break 
from the established price structure ..... Large buyers also play one seller off against 
the others to elicit price concessions. For instance, each of the major US 
automobile manufacturers has traditionally had a principal tire supplier, but each 
also spreads its business around to other tyre makers so that it can threaten to shift, 
or actually shift, its distribution of orders in favour of the supplier who offers 
more attractive terms." 
A similar situation can be envisaged in regional iron ore markets, whereby 
importers may threaten to buy from suppliers other than the ones geographically 
closest, in order to achieve better purchasing terms. The threat by the buyer, 
however, is not so much that of ceasing imports from the closest supplier, as that 
of reducing his dependence on his main supplier. After all, buyers are also limited 
in their choice of suppliers by two main factors: (a) specification of the ore 
(quality), and (b) distance from the supply source (transportation costs). 
11.3.3 Spatial Equilibrium Model of Iron Ore Trade 
Toweh and Newcomb (1991) use a spatial equilibrium model to analyse iron ore 
trade. Their model is based on Samuelson's (1952) analysis of trade as a multi-
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market spatial equilibrium, shown as a computable programme which sums up 
over the competing regions a quasi-additive measure of welfare called net social 
pay-off. A linear programming approach to calculate the effects of trade was first 
suggested by Henderson (1958), but Toweh and Newcomb use a quadratic 
programming variant of this approach, as suggested by Takayama and Judge 
(1964, and 1971 pp. 129-172). 
The authors use the supply function estimates by of the US Bureau of Mines, 
while they estimate econometrically the demand function for 5 regions: EEC, 
USA, Japan, Other Western Europe, and Other Pacific Basin. Their demand 
estimates are based on observations of iron ore prices, steel production and 
industrial production from 1956 to 1984. The coefficients of the ore price are as 
expected, but statistically insignificant, a fact which is partly attributed to the use 
of OLS methodology rather than 2-stage-LS. Steel production, on the other hand, 
is positively correlated with demand for iron ore and the coefficients are 
statistically significant.11 
The authors maintain that " ... that the model's estimates of demands in the five 
regions are indeed close to the observed. This indicates that the model's ability to 
estimate future demands is good." Looking closer at the model's predictions, 
however, there are several important trade flows which are missed. For instance, 
II The only exception is Japan, in whose case the coefficient of industrial production is statistically 
significant,. 
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the model predicts zero trade between Australia-EEC, Canada-EEC, and Brazil-
Japan, which were (in 1984) respectively 14 million tonnes, 13.7 million tonnes, 
and 28.8 million tonnes. 
Despite these discrepancies, however, Toweh and Newcomb reach a number of 
very interesting conclusions. They note, for instance that "".there are significant 
costs attributable to misallocations. The discounts signalled are from $1-3 per 
tonne on deliveries of ore from Australia and Brazil to the most remote mills in 
Europe and Pacific Basin Respectively, while the obtainable premiums of 
Australia and Brazil in the markets of comparative advantage, the Pacific Basin 
and Europe respectively, are less than expected. Similarly, African producers 
(Liberia, Mauritania and South Africa) discount in their markets of apparent 
advantage, Europe, and more deeply yet to penetrate Pacific Basin markets." They 
also conclude that "".their results appear to confirm that competitive pressures 
exist in the world iron ore markets as of 1984 which encourage the penetration of 
markets remote from the major producers, leading to lower than equilibrium FOB 
prices. The welfare costs of these subsidies, combined with bilateral agreements, 
are not on average paid by consumers, but fall largely on the producers, who 
absorb transport costs to reach more remote buyers and lower rents obtainable 
under eqUilibrium conditions from closer mills. Australia subsidises Western 
Europe trade and collects lower rents from the Japanese market; Brazil subsidises 
Japanese trade, collects significant rents from Western Europe and US markets; 
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Canada subsidises Japanese trade and collects significant rents from the USA, but 
lower rents from Western Europe markets." 
11.4 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was twofold. Firstly, the most relevant part of the 
theory of industrial organisation was reviewed with the aim to apply its learnings 
and important conclusions to the discussion of iron ore that takes place in chapter 
IV. The focus of this part of the literature review was the non-competitive market 
structures: oligopoly, bilateral monopoly and bilateral oligopoly. All structures 
have partial applications to the case of the iron ore market, but the one that seems 
to be closest to the international order in the sector is bilateral oligopoly. 
The second part of the literature review focused on economic and econometric 
models that specifically turn their attention to international trade in commodities 
and in particular iron ore itself. To date there have only been two attempts to 
model iron ore trade: Santos (1976) and Priovolos (1986). Both models were 
discussed and criticised for their shortcomings. The aim of the chapter IV is: 
firstly, to apply the discussion so far in the iron market and particularly the 
interaction between the major trading partners who generate more that 90% of the 
world's trade in the commodity; and secondly, to test the theoretical foundation of 
this behaviour with a simple, partial equilibrium econometric model. Before 
proceeding with the theory, it is important to first tum our attention to one of the 
most significant characteristics of the iron ore market: the existence of long-term 
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contracts which have dominated international trade flows over the last 30 years 
and the role they play in shaping the behaviour of the economic agents ( countries) 
that are bound by them. 
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III. Long-term Contracts and Iron Ore Trade 
111.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter I, three main points emerge, which have a bearing on the 
way international markets for iron ore are organised. 
• iron ore is almost exclusively used for the production of steel; 
• steel mills are the only customers of iron ore mines and, although scrap can be 
used to a certain extent, iron ore is by far the most important raw material for 
steelmaking; 
• there are only very few dominant iron ore producing countries, which have 
large capacities and low costs, and dominate the supply side. 
Because of these peculiarities, the procurement of iron ore supplies is handled 
directly by iron ore producers and steel mills. There is no scope for the existence 
of trading companies, and those that do exist are mere agents either for mining 
companies or for steel mills. As we have seen, steelmaking is a continuous 
procedure. A blast furnace needs a minimum throughput in order to operate at all, 
and production cannot be halted, except for necessary repairs to the refractory 
lining; it is paramount that iron ore feed be continuous and guaranteed. 
In addition, the countries participating in the trade of iron ore are rather few, both 
on the buying and the selling side. Indicatively, in 1995 just the top five countries 
- Australia, Brazil, India, Canada and South Africa - shared between them 75% of 
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world exports, while the top eight countries - Japan, Germany, China, Korea, UK, 
France, Italy and the USA - accounted for the same proportion of world imports. 
Against this background, it is not unreasonable that, like for other raw materials 
(e.g. bauxite, copper and coal), buyers have always been anxious to secure 
supplies of iron ore. A steady procurement of iron ore is essential in the steel-
making process, both for operational and strategic purposes. In the 1950s, the 
large quantities of steel needed for the reconstruction of post-war Europe could 
not have been sourced from the declining supplies of the continent, originating 
primarily in Germany, Sweden and France. This forced the largest of steelmakers 
to take the initiative in securing iron ore supplies from abroad, mainly in the form 
of majority stakes in new mine developments in Latin America and Africa. 
Following the example of many steel mills in the United States, European mills 
tackled the problem of supply security through the acquisition of equity stakes in 
foreign iron ore mines. 
In the 1960s and 1970s strong economic growth brought about, apart from 
prosperity, concerns on the sustainability of the rate of such growth and fears that 
many raw materials would be exhausted in the space of 30 years. It was around 
that same time that Japanese economic growth took off to create the economic 
miracle that all other Pacific Rim countries would later try to mimic. With a 
pronounced lack of any natural resources and the relative inability to force their 
way into mining projects, the Japanese developed a completely different strategy 
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to that of their Western counterparties for the long-term procurement of iron ore. 
The result, as Rodrik (1982) notes, was that " .. .Japan [was] able to procure much 
of her raw materials during the 1960s and 1970s at more favourable terms [than 
the US], even though the latter country had tighter links to its supply sources." 
Despite this initial success, however, Japanese long-term contracting has not been 
without its problems, as I will discuss later in this chapter. 
In the last 20 years, long-term contracts (LTC's) have been the main form of 
procuring iron ore for most industrialised importing countries, especially Japan 
and the six most important EU steel producers (Germany, France, UK, Belgium, 
Netherlands and Italy). From the producers' point of view, L rcs have been the 
main method of securing long-term financing for mining developments in both 
leading exporters: Brazil and Australia. But why have L rcs been so popular? 
111.2 Long-term Contracts: A Transactions Cost 
Approach 
Indeed, one might ask, what factors determine whether transactions between 
suppliers and their customers are realised through vertical integration, long-term 
contracts or simple spot market deals? 
To answer these questions, I first look at the paradigms offered by other raw 
materials markets, most notably coal. The reason for choosing coal is twofold: 
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a) Coal, like iron ore, is characterised by the extensive use of long-term 
transactions, with the pricing of such transactions being rather inflexible and 
dependent on factors other than purely competitive demand and supply 
economics. Although, like in iron ore, there is a spot market in coal, price 
quotations there are largely affected by the specific qualitative characteristics 
of each type of coal produced by individual mines and companies. This co-
existence of a large term and a smaller spot market is not specific to coal and 
iron ore only. However, in other commodity markets where this occurs, the 
quality differentiation problem is very little or non-existent because of the 
widespread standardisation (e.g. in copper, aluminium, petroleum) and hence 
contracting parties can concentrate on price setting. The result, of course, is that 
spot market prices, even though strictly referring to relatively modest 
quantities, accurately reflect the market equilibrium and are hence used as 
benchmarks in 'spread' pricing formulas. 
b) The industrial structure of both the coal and iron ore markets is largely devoid 
of important vertically integrated structures, which means that most of the 
pricing is taking place on an arm's-length basis. The same cannot be said for 
other raw materials, like copper and bauxite/aluminium, where transfer pricing 
has been (and still is) quite prominent. 
Returning to the insight offered by the coal sector, Joskow, in a series of papers 
(1985, 1987, 1998 and 1990), looks in detail at the characteristics of a large 
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number of contractual agreements between coal mines and power generating 
utilities across the United States. To do so, he resorts to the theory of transactions 
costs economics, whereby economic institutions emerge to minimise the costs of 
making transactions. "These costs" notes Joskow (1985) " include both ordinary 
production costs (land, labour, capital, materials, and supplies) that make up the 
components of a neo-classical cost function and certain transactions costs 
associated with establishing and administering an ongoing business relationship." 
"There exists" he continues "a continuum of potential governance structures for 
vertical relationships. At one extreme we have vertical integration. At the other 
extreme we have Walrasian auction markets. In between we have a wide array of 
potential contracting institutions that mediate transactions through the market but 
involve the use of a variety of specialised contractual provisions that arise as a 
consequence of efforts by firms to minimise the total costs of transactions over 
time." 
111.2.1 Transactions Costs and Transactions Characteristics 
Transactions costs include a number of elements, such as the costs of negotiating 
and writing contracts, costs of monitoring contractual performance, costs of 
enforcing contractual promises and costs associated with breaches of contractual 
promises. Joskow (1985) distinguishes four important characteristics that affect 
the nature and the magnitude of these transactions costs: 
• the extent to which the contemplated transactions are characterised by 
uncertainty and complexity; 
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• the extent to which cost-minimising transactions (in the neo-classical cost 
function sense) require one or both parties to a transaction to make durable 
transaction-specific sunk investments; 
• the extent to which there are diseconomies associated with vertical integration 
that must be traded off against transactions costs that arise when market 
transactions costs that arise when market transactions are relied upon; 
• the frequency of transactions. 
As uncertainty and complexity become more important in a vertical relationship 
the expected costs of writing, administering and enforcing full contingent 
contracts increases. When uncertainty and complexity are important it becomes 
uneconomical to write full contingent contracts and market contracts will tend to 
be incomplete. A contract is incomplete in the sense that it does not specify 
unambiguously the obligations of each party in every possible state of nature. 
Under economic and financial duress ambiguities allowed for by incomplete 
contracts develop into incentives for one or both parties to 'misbehave' by taking 
actions that increase the cost or reduce the revenues that will be obtained by the 
other party. This 'rogue behaviour' has been termed 'opportunism' by 
Williamson, in the sense that such behaviour does not maximise joint profits and 
is thus inefficient. Much of the theory of transactions costs is set in a competitive 
framework, i.e. many buyers and sellers. Opportunism can emerge ex post because 
certain characteristics of the supply relationship give one or both parties to the 
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transaction some monopoly power when certain contingencies arise. Such 
monopoly power is usually attributed to the presence of durable transaction-
specific sunk investments, but may also be due to conventional moral hazard 
arising from information asymmetries. In the latter case, incentive problems arise 
because one party to the transaction both can affect (uncertain) outcomes by his 
own behaviour and has better (less costly) access to information about the causes 
of observed outcomes. The agent can exploit an information monopoly to its 
advantage. 
Focusing on the iron ore market, within the conceptual framework described 
above, both sources of rogue behaviour are possible. With regard to the moral 
hazard argument, one might argue that both parties can withhold from each other 
vital information on short term (up to 1 year) future demand or supply (e.g. a steel 
mill has low-cost information on short term demand by looking at its orderbook, 
and a mine knows exactly when new capacity becomes available, also in the short 
term). Such information, however, is accessible to all parties once the short term is 
over and can be - and indeed is - used in subsequent contract negotiations. As a 
result, the incentive to 'misbehave' which may be created by moral hazard is not 
deemed of major importance. 
More importantly, the presence of transaction-specific sunk investments can be an 
incentive for one party to 'hold up' the other ex post and can lead to costly 
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haggling. Williamson (1983: p. 526) identifies four different types of transaction-
specific sunk investments: 
a) Site specificity: buyer and seller are in a 'cheek-by-jowl' relation with one 
another, reflecting ex ante decisions to minimise inventory and transportation 
expense. 
b) Physical asset specificity: when one or both parties to the transaction make 
investments in equipment and machinery that involves design characteristics 
specific to the transaction and which have lower values in alternative uses. 
c) Human capital specificity: arising as a consequence of learning-by-doing, 
investment, and transfer of skills (human capital) specific to a particular 
relationship. 
d) Dedicated assets: general investments that would not take place but for the 
prospect of selling a significant amount of product to a particular customer. If 
the contract is terminated prematurely, it would leave the supplier with 
significant excess capacity. 
Of the four types identified by Williamson, I consider (b) and (a) to be the most 
important, with (d) following suit and (c) being the least important. Physical asset 
specificity is very much connected with the smelting technology employed by the 
steel mill. To take advantage of scale economies, some flexibility has to be 
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sacrificed, so that most of the iron ore input has to be of a certain grade and purity, 
often tied to a specific mining company or even a specific mine. Such specificity 
means of course that the mill needs to ensure a long stream of uninterrupted ore 
shipments that will let it use its furnace with maximum efficiency, with only a 
small degree of flexibility allowed to face supply disruptions. From the mine's 
point of view, long-term exports of ore are indispensable for planning and 
financing new mining projects, but the inflexibility of tying up certain mines to 
specific steel mills is not always desirable. Hence, the effort of many mining 
companies to offer a more standardised, beneficiated product, usually in the form 
of pellets, which can be marketed more easily and which also allows for some 
value to be added before leaving its country of origin. 
Site specificity has also been an important factor in tying up mining companies 
and steel mills in long-term contractual relationships. As iron ore is a relatively 
cheap raw material, transport cost minimisation (more than inventory cost 
minimisation) has been a major decision factor to enter L TCs, with port terminal 
developments and project-specific acquisition of ships featuring frequently in 
contractual agreements. Since the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s and 1970s, 
iron ore trade benefited immensely from scale economies derived from the 
employment of large size bulk carriers and even larger dedicated ore carriers. 
Under type (d), dedicated assets, come primarily investments in new mining 
capacity. Again the Caraj s project in Brazil is one such prominent example, since 
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its viability largely depended on pre-selling a large part of its productionl to 
European and Japanese steel mills under L TCs. 
Finally, human capital specificity, may be important in the case of small, less 
experienced producers of iron ore - such as Mauritania and Liberia - which rely on 
the supply of technology and know-how by industrially developed trading 
partners. 
111.3 Characteristics of LTCs in Iron Ore 
Defining what is a long-term contract in the iron ore market is not as 
straightforward as it may sound. Rogers and Robertson (1987) define it simply as 
a contract whose duration is expressly stated to be five or more years. Joskow, 
however, when examining coal procurement contracts, adopts a more flexible 
definition. Contracts are considered to be long-term even when they are less than 
5 years long, but are repeated often enough to establish a long-term relationship 
between suppliers and buyers. 
Whatever the precise definition of an LTC may be, it is certain that they have been 
used extensively in international iron ore trade, especially since the mid-1960's 
with the initiation of Australian shipments to Japan. Rogers and Robertson (1987) 
believed L TCs to account for over 60% of international iron ore trade at the 
I Rogers and Robertson (1987) report that 25 million tonnes per annum out of a projected 35 
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beginning of the 1970s, while de Sa and Marques (1985) claimed they covered as 
much as 85% of that trade until 1983 when the first sharp price decreases took 
place. To date, the largest part of Brazilian and Australian exports are still realised 
through L Tes, and it is indeed the availability of such arrangements which is vital 
for the realisation of long-term investment strategies. 
Following the example of their Japanese counterparts, European steel mills, led by 
Germany, have had similar arrangements with both Brazil and Australia, 
alongside captive mines in Liberia and Mauritania and short-tenn (annual), 
flexible contracts with other suppliers, like Sweden, Canada, South Africa and 
India. In the United States the bulk of imports originates from Canada, since most 
of the contractual relations are ruled by ownership ties between US mills and 
Canadian mines. The result is a rather confusing picture of trade flows running in 
both directions, with Canada, however, consistently being the net exporter. In 
addition, ore is imported from Venezuela and Brazil, although in the past Chile 
and Peru have also been important sources of US imports. 
111.3.1 Contract Duration, Pricing and Quantities 
Iron ore contracts come in a variety of fonnats, depending upon the time and 
duration of the agreement. Most LTCs are quoted on f.o.b. tenns, with the 
exception of contracts between Australian mines and European mills which are 
million tonnes annual capacity were thus pre-sold. 
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negotiated on a C&F basis. Some of the features of L TCs include: quantity, term 
and delivery schedule; loading and discharge terms; quality and quantity 
monitoring; pricing and payment method; provisions in the case of force majeure 
and/or disputes; and any additional requirements like taxes, duties, export 
licences, etc. 
The three most important of the these characteristics are duration, pricing clauses 
and contracted quantities. All three characteristics have changed since the 1960s 
with the overall effect being a move towards more flexibility in all aspects. 
Typically, LTCs between major purchasers and sellers signed in the 1960s were 
between 10 to 15 years with prices fixed for an initial period of three to six years, 
and price renegotiations at intervals of about three years thereafter. Tonnage 
flexibility was typically set at plus or minus 10% of the contracted quantity and 
the prices were set on an f.o.b. basis. There were several L TCs, however, with 
different terms and conditions, like alternative tonnage options, longer or shorter 
terms than 10-15 years and C.l.F. rather than F.O.B. pricing. 
During that period, L TCs achieved the objective for which they had been 
designed. They provided an important element of stability to prices and quantities 
traded and served as collateral for obtaining new mine finance at a time when 
several new mines were developed. This was accomplished with relatively little 
conflict over terms and no serious negotiations of major contract terms. The 
events of the 1970s, however, presented a number of major difficulties to both 
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iron ore producers and purchasers which had not been foreseen when the early 
L TCs were signed; and these were to result in substantial changes to contractual 
practice. 
The inflationary pressures being exerted on the international economy and the fall 
of the US dollar (in which contract prices were stipulated) combined to lead 
producers, faced with rapidly rising costs, to seek to renegotiate the pricing 
provisions of contracts. In some cases prices were increased by invoking a 
contract's hardship clause (i.e. a clause providing for contractual adjustment in the 
event of one of the parties suffering substantial economic hardship). However, by 
the mid-1970s the practice under most L TCs had evolved to allow for annual price 
revisions. More frequent price revisions were ruled out due to operational and 
planning constraints. 
Rogers and Robertson (1987) mention another innovation introduced during the 
1976-77 contractual negotiations: 'brick' pricing. "Brick pricing involves splitting 
the annual tonnage into two parts, the price of each part to be negotiated at two 
yearly intervals in alternate years. This allowed the parties to adjust the contract 
for inflation and changing market conditions on an annual basis; but the fact that 
half the tonnage had a fixed price over two years gave more stability to the 
arrangement than if the price for the whole tonnage were negotiated every year." 
113 
Further problems with the instability of the US dollar have led to the introduction 
of a currency clause in some contracts, giving either party the right to request a 
review of the contract terms if a significant change in the value of the US dollar 
occurs. 
What particularly hit iron ore producers, however, were the massive quantity 
renegotiations after 1983, forced upon them by buyers who were over-committed 
and could no longer lift the amounts of ore stipulated in their contracts. This was 
the culmination of pressures by importers since 1975, when their forecasts of the 
growth in steel production started looking largely overestimated. The result was 
that tonnages taken by steel mills under L Tes fell well short of 90% of the basic 
contract tonnages on several occasions. For example, the delivery of Brazilian and 
Australian iron ore to Japan was approximately 60% of the minimum basic 
contract volume for the year April 1982 to March 1983. Some contracts were even 
terminated by buyers without the prior agreement of ore producers. For example, 
in 1983 British Steel sought to terminate some of its L Tes in order to cut its 
contract commitments by 40% from 1982 levels and use the cheaper annual 
market instead.2 
Since the dire mid 1980s, contracts have normally been shorter in duration (5-7 
years normally), with more flexibility incorporated in tonnage options and pricing. 
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111.3.1.1 Pricing 
Price detennination for iron ores is probably the most intriguing and confusing of 
all commodity pricing procedures. Both the quotation of iron ore prices and the 
way they are reached are worth closer attention. 
There is no 'international' reference price for iron ore. Ore qualities differ widely 
and it is common that ores from different mines have their own quotations. It is 
also common that prices are quoted for different types of ore; usually lumps, fmes, 
pellets, and sinter. The following table gives an example of iron ore price 
quotations in 1994. 
Japanese Market 
Hamersley (Australia) 
CVRD (Brazil) 
Caraj s 
ltabira 
European Market 
Hamersley (Australia) 
CVRD (Brazil) 
Caraj s 
ltabira 
LKAB (Sweden) 
Table 111-1 
Iron Ore Prices (1994) 
Fines 
25.66 
Fines 
23.51 
23.01 
Fines 
32.80 
Fines 
26.47 
25.47 
Fines 
28.10 
Source: Bailey (1992) 
2 rex Report, Iron Ore Yearbooks, 1982·1997. 
115 
Lump 
33.26 
Lump 
24.77 
Lump 
40.28 
Pellets 
45.60 
All prices are quoted on the basis of their iron content. All the above prices are in 
cents per 1 % Fe in a long tonne. Thus, assuming that Hamersley fmes are 62% Fe, 
their price in the European market would be [25.66 x 62 =] $15.90 per long ton. 
Prices in the iron ore market are renegotiated and settled once a year. There are 
two distinct markets: Japan and Europe. The Japanese steel mills start negotiations 
around November each year, with each of the Australian ore producers and with 
CVRD of Brazil. In the European market, negotiations start at about the same 
time, and are usually conducted between CVRD and two agencies representing 
interests of German steel mills - Rohstofthandel and Erzkontor. Price negotiations 
usually carry through to the beginning of the following year, developing into a 
'war of words' , with suppliers and consumers trying to demoralise each other. 
It is interesting to have a quick look at this 'game of charades' for the 1993/94 
price negotiations, as they were described in the rEX Report: 
"For the Japanese market, ahead of the European market, the ftrst-round preliminary price 
talks for 1994 began on November 10, 1993, between Japanese steel mills and four major 
Australian and Brazilian suppliers. The negotiations for price setting were made in the 
following order: November 10 = Australia's Hamersley Iron and Brazil's CVRD; 
November 15 = Australia's Robe River Mining; November 16 = Australia's BHP Iron 
Ore." 
The steel mills' view was that. ... 
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" ... the demand for iron ore for fisca11994 is expected to increase in some areas. However, 
the world's demand for iron ore is likely to decrease as a whole, particularly in the Pacific 
region, affected by the sharp decline in Japan's demand for iron ore. Since the Japanese 
steel industry is surrounded by a very severe environment, Japanese steel mills hope that 
the suppliers will kindly recognise the situation and have the spirit of 'the same crews in 
the same boat' in determining the price of iron ore for fiscal 1994." 
Iron ore suppliers thought, however, that. ... 
" ... the world's demand and supply situation for iron ore for 1993 remained firm, compared 
with that for 1992. The iron ore suppliers expect that the situation will remain unchanged 
for 1994; even though Japan's demand for iron ore decreases, for other Asian countries, 
demand for DR-use iron ore can be expected to increase. Such being the case, it will not be 
unnatural for the suppliers to ask for a price hike for fiscal 1994, as long as viewed from 
the present demand and supply situation." 
Meanwhile, in the European market. ... 
" .... the price setting negotiations commenced between German steel mills and Rio Doce 
International from December 13, 1993, a little later than usual. According to the sources 
concerned, the negotiations involved a total of 20 German representatives of 
Rohstofthandel (the largest iron ore importing company) and Erzkontor (iron ore importing 
company, and steelmakers including Thyssen)." 
Not surprisingly .... 
" ... at the first-round price talks, German steel mills .... call for a price reduction for 1994." 
As was expected .... 
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" ... Rio Doce International showed reluctance to the request for price reduction from 
German steel mills. .... The CVRD side is well aware of, and understand, the difficult 
situation in which German steelmakers are placed. However, it is difficult for CVRD to 
accept a request for price reduction, in the light ofCVRO's present fmancial conditions and 
the frrm iron ore market." 
Thus, both the Japanese market and the European market completed the price 
negotiations on December 21, 1993. The European market commenced the 
second-round price talks on January 2, 1994, and the Japanese market commenced 
the third-round preliminary talks on January 17, 1994. In the following few days, 
Australian suppliers agreed to talks on the basis of a price reduction. In view of 
the news in the Japanese market, negotiations between German and Brazilian 
parties were heading towards the same direction. 
At the beginning of February, we had the final accords for price settlement in both 
markets ..... 
"At the price talks conducted on the morning of February 8, 1994, Hamersley Iron 
officially accepted the price reduction proposal demanded by Japanese steel mills. The 
proposal comprised the reduction rate of9.5% for fine ore, and that of 5.9% for lump ore." 
Soon afterwards, agreements were achieved with Robe River Mining, BHP, 
CVRD, MBR, CMP of Chile, Iscor of South Africa, IOC of Canada, and MMTC 
of India. Meanwhile, in the European market. ... 
"Hamersley Iron Pty. acted quickly for price settlement in the European market. On 
February 9, one day after the first price settlement was completed in the Japanese market, 
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the price of Hamersley iron ore on a C&F basis was settled between Hamersley Iron and 
BSC (British Steel) of the UK. ... On February 11, Rio Doce International reached an 
accord on the price for ltabira and Caraj s iron ore with German steel mills .... LKAB of 
Sweden completed, on February 17, the price settlement with German steel mills on fines 
and pellets for shipment in 1994 .... Meanwhile, the price settlement was completed within 
February 1994 for SNIM of Mauritania, BHP Iron Ore of Australia, Sydvaranger of 
Norway, and MBR of Brazil. The price settlement was also completed within March for 
QMC and IOC of Canada, and CMP of Chile." 
It is also interesting to observe the market leaders in price settlement. 
Traditionally, CVRD leads the European market negotiations with Germany's 
Rohstoffhandel or Erzkontor, and either BHP or Hamersley (owned by RTZ) do 
the same with a representation of Japanese steel mills in the Pacific market. The 
1980s saw, however, numerous disruptions to that tradition, as shown in Table 2 
below. For instance, during the 14 price negotiations between 1981-1994, CVRD 
reached an agreement first only 5 times, and in all but one cases it did so in a 
rising market. IOC and QCM of Canada took the initiative in price negotiations 
between 1983 and 1987 in the Atlantic with all negotiations resulting in price 
decreases. In other instances, Hamersley (a marginal supplier to Europe) and 
SNIM (a rather small-size supplier) were first to conclude negotiations, thus 
forcing the leading Atlantic market participants to end speculation and complete 
their bargaining process. 
In a similar fashion, in the Japanese market CVRD was the first to complete 
negotiations in 1981, 1983 and 1984, with MMTC of India doing the same in 
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1985 and 1986, thus stealing the wind off the sails of Australian mines, which are 
the natural leaders in the Pacific market. 
Table 111-2 
Iron Ore Price Fixing 
Japanese Market European Market 
First Price Setter Fines First Price Setter Fines 
Settlement (%) Settlement L%L 
1981 26/02181 CVRD +7.5 Feb-81 CVGlBelglum +6.1 
1982 26/03/82 Newman +17.2 05/02182 CVRD/Germany +15.7 
1983 28/03183 CVRD -11.4 08103183 IOC/Germany -11.2 
1984 20/01/84 CVRD -11.6 07/12183 QMC/Germany -8.5 
1985 31/01/85 MMTC 0 07/12184 QMC IOC/Germany 0 
1986 14/02186 MMTC -1.88 03112185 QMC IOC/Germany -1.1 
1987 20/02187 Newman -5.0 05/03187 QMClHoliand -9.3 
1988 22112188 Hamersley -4.0 24/12187 HamersleylBritain +8.6 
1989 14/12189 Hamersley +13.0 19/12188 CVRD/Germany +13.0 
1990 24/01190 Hamersley +15.96 17/01190 CVRD/Germany +15.96 
1991 30/01191 Hamersley +7.93 31/01191 CVRD/Germany +7.95 
1992 17112191 Hamersley -4.90 17/12191 CVRD/Germany -4.90 
1993 13/01193 BHP, CVRD, Robe -11.00 22112192 SNIMlFrance -13.47 
1994 08/02194 Hamersley -9.50 08/02194 Hamersley/Germany -6.77 
08/02194 Robe River -14.50 11/02194 CVRD/Germany -9.50 
Source: rEX Report. Iron Ore Yearbook, 1995/96 
The pattern emerging from the discussion above is not what one would have 
expected from a market characterised by oligopoly, although on the buyer side the 
almost uninterrupted appearance of Germany and Japan could suggest the 
existence of an monopsony in the Atlantic and Pacific markets, respectively. 
I doubt the existence of such an oligopsony in the Atlantic market, mainly due the 
fact that Germany - the most important importer - relies more on Brazil for its 
supplies - the largest exporter - than Brazil relies on Germany as a market for its 
imports. Evidence to this effect is also provided by Figure III-I, which shows an 
increasing dependence of Germany on Brazil for its imports, and Figure 111-2 
which shows the opposite being true for Brazil. 
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Figure 111-1 
German Imports by Source 
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Figure 111-2 
Brazilian Exports by Destination 
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The case for Japan, however, offers evidence, at least in the past, for the existence 
of monopsony in the Pacific market. This case will be examined in more detail in 
a following section, where I discuss the long-term Japanese procurement strategy 
since the 1960s. 
111.4 Long-term Contracts as a Bargaining Tool 
In the previous chapter I discussed a possible framework for the explanation of the 
behaviour of steel mills and iron ore mines when they engage in annual price 
negotiations. The largest part of the discussion looked at bilateral monopoly as an 
attractive analytical framework, but the limitations are quite obvious. Bilateral 
monopoly is an attractive model for studying economic behaviour, but it is not 
very often that it is applicable in real life. 
Many models of bilateral monopoly have looked at everyday life situations when 
two individuals come into one-to-one contact in order to exchange a commodity. 
Any such contact involving two individuals (e.g. the purchase of a car, or a 
holiday and so on) may be viewed a trade between two monopolists which mayor 
may not face information asymmetries. 
In the case of iron ore, however, the negotiating agents do think strategically and 
take into account other participants in the market, i.e. buyers do realise the 
existence and significance of alternative suppliers and vice versa. This is also 
reinforced by the repeated interaction of the agents over several periods and by the 
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existence of long-term ties between them, whether these are called minority equity 
stakes, financing deals or long-term contracts. 
Table 111-3 
Contracted and Actual Imports of Iron Ore by Japan 
Imports from Australia Imports from Brazil 
Contracted Actual Importsl Contracted Actual Imports! 
Volume Imports Contracts Volume Imports Contracts 
(m.tonnes) (m. tonnes) (m.tonnes) (m. tonnes) 
1966 1330000 2043491 154% 1000000 1704461 170% 
1967 2660000 8313833 313% 2350000 2430664 103% 
1968 4270000 13813940 324% 3200000 2198482 69% 
1969 13730000 23234523 169% 5890000 4185450 71% 
1970 15890000 36596955 230% 5890000 6779361 115% 
1971 18140000 46287396 255% 8690000 8996651 104% 
1972 27740000 48294755 174% 9690000 9334542 96% 
1973 33840000 64238641 190% 14690000 12821283 87% 
1974 37040000 67880987 183% 22940000 19522809 85% 
1975 40640000 63253080 156% 24440000 23459583 96% 
1976 44490000 64094316 144% 25840000 25380371 98% 
1977 47740000 63103364 132% 26240000 23742697 90% 
1978 49265000 52626268 107% 35315000 20815439 59010 
1979 54360000 55297480 102% 39640000 26136093 66% 
1980 66862000 60040060 90% 43390000 28522932 66% 
1981 79562000 54860965 69% 45990000 27164735 59% 
1982 79762000 54139956 68% 53450000 27346237 51% 
1983 66937000 49772804 74% 45990000 23509201 51% 
1984 62737000 58357452 93% 46090000 29017413 63% 
1985 66637000 54321348 82% 46090000 29064068 63% 
1986 70137000 46893889 67% 48590000 26633279 55% 
1987 71087000 43413754 61% 47565000 26831270 56% 
1988 66500000 52415696 79% 44990000 27931730 62% 
1989 73780000 56275433 76% 38430000 29520127 77% 
1990 72015000 53852628 75% 38835000 30198492 78% 
1991 52710000 58353791 111% 42560000 28470416 67% 
1992 55200000 104137622 189% 42600000 53514070 126% 
1993 54250000 106946248 197% 36150000 55644356 154% 
1994 53920000 55409205 103% 41880000 27873986 67% 
1995 55250000 58727456 106% 34800000 27627593 79% 
1996 53720000 59527894 111% 34860000 26645608 76% 
Long-term contracts are not unusual in commodity markets, even the most liquid 
ones, like crude oil for example. The fact that many raw materials are quite 
frequently located away from consuming markets, usually in developing countries 
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and at large distances makes the use of long-term contracts quite natural. For the 
importers contracts ensure availability of supplies, hopefully at the most 
competitive price. For the exporters contracts mitigate the risk of developing new 
reserves and have no markets to sell them to. 
The existence of long-term contracts is not unique to iron ore. Bauxite, copper 
ores and most metallic ores are sold on that basis. More notably, crude oil is also 
sold largely on the basis of the long-term contracts, despite the fact that oil 
supplies are far from short in current (late 1990s) markets. 
What makes iron ore contracts rather more unusual in commodity markets is that 
they also include in the price negotiations that take place every year between steel 
mills and mines. Whereas in commodities such as copper, aluminium and oil, 
among others, there is a very liquid end-market with price discovery taking place 
in organised exchanges, iron ore prices are fixed with a series of bilateral 
negotiations, with the first few prices fixed between leading buyers and sellers 
acting as signals to the rest of the market participants for their own negotiations. 
More importantly, however, a long-term contract is also a statement of 
commitment between the two parties. The extent to which a contract is fulfilled 
demonstrates frrstly the conviction of each party in the quantity/price decision 
they have made and secondly their willingness to maintain this commitment in the 
future. The first characteristic is very important in the whole bargaining 
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procedure. One would theoretically expect that once the two parties of a bilateral 
monopoly agree on the quantity maximising their profits they will keep the 
commitment to this quantity stable and only haggle on price. 
However, when one compares actual import volumes with contracted volumes the 
picture is quite different. One such notable example is Japan and its main two 
partners with which it has a series of long-term contracts. Japan's relation with its 
iron ore suppliers is discussed in the next section, but it suffices to say that the 
Japanese were probably the first to actively pursue a strategy of building 
relationships through long-term contracts rather than vertical integration with 
mines. Table 111-3 above shows the contracted and actual import volumes of Japan 
with Australia and Brazil. It also shows the ratio of imports to contracted volwnes. 
It is interesting to see how this ratio fell below 100% during the 1980s, even 
below the usual lifting margins of 5-10% stipulated in most contracts. 
In fact, throughout the 1980s one wonders what was the real value of such long-
term contracts. Their quantity-setting function is certainly questionable in light of 
the repeated failures to stay within contract specifications almost every single year 
of that decade. Also interesting is the observable difference between Australia and 
Brazil in the variations of the above take-up ratios. The worse hit from this 
evidence seems to be Brazil, not an unlikely outcome in view of the fact that 
Brazil is at a relative disadvantage due to its distance from Japan. 
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If quantity-setting is not anymore the reason for long-term contracts, what is then? 
Price-setting is certainly a very important function but does not need the long-term 
contract framework to function properly. Price negotiations taking place every 
year do not really price the specific contracts. Rather they price any transaction 
that may take place within the year. The continued existence of such contracts I 
can attribute to two reasons: they still provide a solid basis for bringing on line 
new mining projects (whether greenfield or extensions); or they are used as a 
bargaining weapon by buyers in order to countervail the apparent dominance of 
the comparatively fewer iron ore suppliers. Let's examine each of these two 
possible reasons separately. 
It is quite obvious why a mining project would need long-term contracts in order 
to take off. Exploration and development of a mine is always expensive, 
especially in the case of greenfield projects. Even when the ore is located near the 
surface and does not require underground mining methods, a large capital 
expenditure is required to create the infrastructure to move the ore from 
production site to export outlet. Unfortunately not many mines are conveniently 
located near the coast. In most cases a transport system has to be put in place 
before any output can be channelled to the international market. The case of the 
Caraj s project is again quite typical. The ore extraction itself is not particularly 
difficult, but the mines are located some 1000 km inland; as a result, a dedicated 
transport system had to be put in place, including a railway, an export terminal on 
the north Brazilian coast, and a pelletising plant. 
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This type of investment does indeed need the level of buyer commitment implied 
by the existence of long-term contracts. It is doubtful, however, how many such 
new project come into production anymore. The last such big project was Caraj s 
and only very few, much smaller mining projects have been put in place since the 
mid-1980s. The majority of all existing contracts are mere extensions to older 
contracts and in most cases these extensions are shorter in duration than the 
original contracts. There does not seem to be any compelling reason why such 
contracts should still be in place. 
The second possible reason for such contracts to exist is their function as a 
bargaining tool in annual price negotiations between steel mills and iron ore 
mines. Contract extensions can be interpreted by sellers as positive signals from 
the buyers about their commitment. In exactly the same, but opposite, manner the 
amount of long-term contracts with other sellers signals the long-term intentions 
of a buyer with regard to their import allocation preferences. Scherer and Ross 
(1990) describe this as countervailing power in bilateral negotiations. 
A very interesting and slightly more formal view of a similar bargaining process is 
discussed in Sadanand (1996). Departing from Rubinstein's (1982) seminal model 
of bargaining with full information, Sadanand looks at the bargaining process with 
an endogenous element of waiting times and the risk of no-trade also present. 
Practically this means that one party may gain benefits from delaying the reaching 
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of an agreement by introducing waiting during the bargaining process, so that he 
learns more (reduces his information asymmetry) about the other party. It also 
means, however, that such delay also brings with it the risk of a deal not being 
reached because the other party might reach a deal with outside competitors in the 
meantime. 
It is not difficult to relate this kind of situation to the iron ore market, although 
this time instead of waiting it is long-term contracts that enter process as a 
bargaining tool. The risk of not doing business at all is rather difficult to envisage 
in the iron ore market. When large importers are concerned, e.g. Japan or 
Germany, it is quite unthinkable that they will not purchase at all from Australia 
or Brazil, respectively. After all, these are their most competitive suppliers. The 
risk here is not the complete collapse of negotiations, but the erosion of market 
share that each importer might suffer in relation to his competitors. It is this risk 
and how strongly it is perceived by sellers, that buyers will count on to gain a 
stronger bargaining power over them. 
111.5 Japan and its Strategy in Long-term Contracting 
As discussed earlier on, the Japanese were among the first to resort to long-term 
contracts in order to secure a continuous uninterrupted supply of iron ore. From 
the mid-1960s onwards, Japan entered the international raw materials markets on 
a large scale in order to fuel the growth of their manufacturing sector. Possessing 
little or no domestic supplies, Japan was unable to establish vertically integrated 
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structures. Part of the disadvantage faced by Japanese enterprises was mitigated 
by the country's institutional framework. On the one hand, the relatively high 
levels of domestic protection shielded metals processors from foreign competition. 
On the other, the more relaxed Japanese anti-trust environment (especially in 
comparison with the US) allowed the formation of import cartels by the largest 
firms (sogo sosha), thus enhancing their bargaining leverage vis- -vis ore-
exporting countries. 
The combination of these two factors eventually led the Japanese to adopt a 
strategy of long tem contracting in the 1960s, which at the time might have been 
considered a second-best strategy, in comparison to the strategy of vertical 
integration adopted by their American and European competitors. That strategy, 
however, appeared to have paid quite handsomely3, especially in view of the 
effects that widespread nationalisations had on vertically-integrated metal 
manufacturers. Illustrating this point, Rodrik (1982) compared iron ore prices 
charged to US and Japanese steel mills between 1960 and 1976. He found his data 
to point to a significant improvement over time of Japan's import prices relative to 
those of the US. Such was this improvement that by the 1970s Japan was 
obtaining iron ore at discounts of 20-50% below the US prices. In 1960, US steel 
mills had a 16% cost advantage over Japan in their iron ore input; by 1976, this 
cost advantage had been dissipated into a 43% disadvantage, Japan having 
3 At least that was the perception of American researchers (e.g. Rodrik. 1982) who witnessed 
considerable problems with the vertical integration strategy adopted by US steel mills. 
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obtained its ore at lower cost since 1967. The Japanese steel mills had managed to 
incur only a 23% increase in iron ore costs between 1960 and 1976, whereas US 
steelmakers were faced in the same period with a massive cost increase of 148%. 
To achieve this, Japanese importers had come along way from the 1950s when 
most of their requirements for minerals were obtained through spot or short-term 
contracts with developing countries. Mainly due to transport costs, it appears that 
Japanese steel mills were at the time paying around 50% more for their iron ore 
than European mills. Following the lifting of the Australian iron ore export 
embargo in 1960, there was a rush of American and European capital to mine the 
vast deposits of that country. Finance for these ventures was obtained in large part 
with the assurance provided by the long-term contracts signed between the 
Australian mines and Japanese steel producers. 
In those initial long-term contracts Japan exhibited a strategy which is followed to 
date: its largest steel mills formed a buying cartel in 1964 when the vast extent of 
the Australian deposits became evident. Called the Committee of Ten, the cartel 
allowed the Japanese to negotiate as a single unit while the Australian mining 
companies and the different states competed with each other on the terms of the 
contracts. None of the Australian entities knew the precise extent of Japan's ore 
needs, and they certainly had no way of correctly forecasting the explosive growth 
Japan's steel industry was about to undertake. Consequently, each mine feared the 
prospect of being underbid by the others and of being left with no secure future 
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outlet. In addition, Australian producers felt the pressure from mines in India and 
Brazil which were also waiting in the wings to sign long-term contracts with 
Japan. As a result, the prices Japan obtained from Australian producers were on 
average close to 20% lower than those paid for imports from other sources in 
Asia, Africa and America. Moreover, despite the insistence of the Australians for 
c.i.f. prices, the contract prices were stipulated in f.o.b. terms, which allowed the 
Japanese to reap the benefits of future declines in freight costs. 
Twenty years later, the Japanese were still successful in maintaining their strategy 
both in the iron ore and coal markets. As Frost (1984) observes, that "Japan relies 
exclusively on external suppliers of iron ore. In order to remain competitive, Japan 
must ensure the lowest price for its raw materials. Quality and continuity of 
supply are assumed. Having established a dominant position, the Japanese are 
often able to control the negotiations." "However", he continues, ''the Japanese are 
conscious that the tactic they have successfully employed over time, particularly 
in the purchase of coal, may well be used against them." Responding to this 
challenge to their negotiating power, the Japanese have learnt to adapt their 
bargaining strategy. In the 1980s they followed a tactic of identifying a weak link 
- a supplier in a particular country that would, for various reasons, be prepared to 
settle on a lower price in favour of a definite contractual agreement over a given 
period. These negotiations are concluded prior to the formal negotiations for large 
tonnages from that country's (or other countries') main producers. Table 2 above 
shows the results of this tactic. From 1981 to 1986 Japan concluded pricing 
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negotiations with companies who were outside its main supplier (Australia) like 
Brazil's CVRD and India's MMTC or with relatively smaller suppliers from 
Australia, like Hamersley.4 
Long-term contracts continued to serve the Japanese well throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s. Despite frequent renegotiations of these contracts, the superior 
bargaining position of the Japanese deriving from their monopsony power in the 
Pacific market, ensured that the contracts would work to the advantage of the 
Japanese steel producers. The three largest exporters of iron ore to Japan -
Australia, Brazil and India - have always been more dependent on the Japanese 
than Japan has been dependent on them, although in more recent year both 
Australia and Brazil have been trying to diversify away their large dependence on 
Japan, and have partly succeeded in doing so.s Australia, more specifically, has 
systematically managed to degree of its dependence on exports to Japan, with the 
percentage of Australian exports directed to Japan decreasing every single year 
from a 77.7% in 1981 to 52% in 1992. 
Apart from smart negotiating tactics, the Japanese also promoted improvements in 
shipping technology so as to reduce the transport components of iron ore costs. 
4 On the basis of conatcted long-term tonnage, Hamersley (owned by CRAlRTZ) was the largest 
supplier with almost 30 million tons per annum, while Newman (owned partly by BHP) came 
second with 23 million tons per annum. 
sIn 1982, for example Japan imported 44.5% of its needs from Australia, 22.5% from Brazil and 
13% from India. In the same year, Australia directed 74% of its exports to Japan, Brazil 38.3% 
and India 63%. For comparison, in 1992 Japan depended 45.8% on Australia, 23.5% on Brazil, 
and 14.6% on India; a situation largely unchanged. On the other side of the equation, however, 
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The Japanese pioneered the construction of large bulk/ore carriers and highly 
efficient port unloading facilities. As a result, freight charges as a share of the 
landed cost of Japanese iron ore fell by more than 50% in the two decades 
between 1956 and 19766, while the average shipping distance increased by almost 
1000 miles in the same period. Although developments in shipping of iron ore are 
also very important in the iron ore industry, they are beyond the scope of this 
thesis, which does not propose tackling such issues at all. 
Finally, the Japanese enterprises have tried to assure adequate supplies of iron ore 
world-wide by taking small equity stakes in mining projects, and by increasingly 
offering financial assistance for the development of new mines, expansion of 
existing ones, new port facilities and new pelletising plants to earn the 
commitment of their suppliers. This strategy has often elicited complaints that 
Japan has been deliberately attempting to maintain excess supply in the iron ore 
market by fmancing more new capacity than was warranted by the incremental 
growth in demand. 
Overall, the strategy of long-term contracting supplemented by infrastructure 
investments at home and abroad and small equity stakes in mines has served the 
Japanese well, but not without problems. The successful early negotiations of 
Japanese mills with Australian mines, left the latter dissatisfied quite soon after 
Australia depended on Japan for 52% of its exports, Brazil for 25.5%, while India with 62% 
remained unchanged. 
6 Lieberman, M. (1981) 
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contracts were signed. In the 1970s Australian complaints became more bitter as 
world inflation and the devaluation of the US dollar eroded the rice provisions of 
the contracts. From the Japanese point of view, long-term contracts provided 
security but often proved cumbersome with their inflexibility in terms of both 
quantities and prices. Since 1972 the Japanese have been concerned about the steel 
slump and have consequently been asking for - and usually getting - reductions in 
contracted tonnages. The short-lived recovery of the world economy in the early 
1980s led many to believe that the then forecasted scarcity of iron ore supplies 
would soon curtail the strong negotiating position of the Japanese.' After 1982, 
however, the sharp decline of steel production combined with the increased iron 
ore supply from new mining projects, made the Japanese even more anxious to 
renegotiate their long-term commitments and seek even more flexibility. 
An idea of how this aspirations were fulfilled in practice can be given from the 
duration and terms Japanese long-term contracts with its three most prominent 
suppliers: Australia, Brazil and India. Table IV.3(a)-(c) shows all the outstanding 
contractual commitments with Australian mines. As one can see evidence of the 
flexibility sought by the Japanese in the duration, and in some cases in the 
quantity stipulations, of the contracts. L TCs negotiated in the 1960s and 1970s 
were almost invariably in excess of 8 years, with some of the older contracts 
lasting for over 20 years. The Hamersley contracts, for example, lasted between 
10 years (No. 1 contract) to 19 years (No. 4 contract) with quantity variations 
7 Frost, F. (1982) 
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normally being at ±10% at the mill's option. In a similar manner the contracts 
negotiated in the 1970s with BHP for Mt. Newman ore were between 10 and 16 
years long. Such long contractual arrangements also existed with smaller mining 
companies, such as Robe River and Savage River. In contrast to the above, 
contracts negotiated in the early 1980s, when Japan started feeling the pressure on 
its steel industry, contract duration decreased to between 5 and 8 years, whether 
new or renegotiated contracts. Interestingly enough, quantity stipulations also 
became more flexible, with the usual ± 1 0% margin, being replaced in many cases 
with alternative arrangements.8 
Japanese LTCs with Brazil have experienced similar changes (see Table IV.4(a)-
(b». Contracts renegotiated in the 1980s were generally shorter than their 
predecessors, with the notable exception of the Caraj s contract which was signed 
in 1986 for 15 years, but provided adequate flexibility (+10%/-20%) for the steel 
mills. L TCs with Indian companies have been shorter on average than with their 
Australian and Brazilian competitors. Duration normally varies between 5 and 8 
years, with many contracts being of annual duration only, but usually renewable 
for a number of years, thus establishing a form of long-term relationship between 
suppliers and buyers. 
• A common margin option featuring in Japanese L TCs with Australia in the 1980s and 1990s is 
+100/01-15% at mill's option, with margins such as ±15% and ±20% also featuring. In one case 
(the 3-year Robe River Flex contract) tonnages were allowed to vary at ±1.5 million tons, 
which implies a variation margin of just over ±25%. 
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111.6 Conclusion 
Long-term contracts have been, and still are, the main vehicle used in international 
iron ore trade. They have been used extensively by all the major importers and 
exporters of the commodity, the former wishing to secure continuous supplies of 
raw material and the latter striving to earn long-term commitment (and revenue) 
from their customers. Initially used by the Japanese as the most viable solution to 
procure raw materials for their booming economy, L TCs became popular with 
other developed economies, especially after the restrictions on foreign 
participation imposed by host countries and their nationalisation programmes. 
In the 1960s and 1970s L TCs served well the international iron ore trade and 
brought a relative stability in prices, thus maintaining the impetus of world 
economic growth. In the 1980s, however, many importers found themselves over-
committed to L TCs and sought, and achieved, massive renegotiations in contract 
terms. The main outcome of this readjustment to world economic conditions, has 
been a tendency towards relatively shorter contracts (5-8 years instead of 15-20 
years) with more flexible quantity requirements and an annual price renegotiation 
a standard in all markets. 
Long-term contracts have evolved over the years, and I believe them to be more of 
a bargaining tool, rather than a mechanism that determines the optimal quantity of 
ore that must be traded between partners in order to maximise their joint profits. 
The experience of the 1980s was one of successive failures on the part of 
136 
importers to take delivery of their contracted quantities. Increasingly, the reasons 
for the existence of such contracts remain thin on the ground. Their persistence 
could be attributable to their qualities as bargaining tools during the annual price 
negotiations. 
In the last part of this chapter, I focused on the LTCs Japan has negotiated over 
the years. Most of the general observations made earlier are also valid in the case 
of Japan, which in fact pioneered the widespread use of L TCs. For a considerable 
amount of time Japan exerted an almost oligopsonistic advantage over its 
suppliers, especially over Australia, which has been for a long time largely 
dependent on Japanese imports. This state of affairs, however, has shown 
evidence of changing towards a more competitive market structure as more 
prominent steel producers have appeared in the Pacific market and Australia has 
been systematically trying to diversify its export markets. 
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Table 1II.4(d) 
Australian Contract Notes 
Hamersley (CRAIRTZ) 
No.1 
Extension of No.1 
No.2 
No.3 
Extension of No. 2 - No. 3 
No.4 
Fine ore 
Extension Contract of Fine Ore 
Mt Newman (BHP) 
Core 
HG1 
HG3 
HG5 
HG9 
Additional 
LG1 
SF1 
ROM 
ROM 2 
ROM 3 (Sumitomo) 
ROM 3 (Kawasaki) 
Rex 
HG10 (A) 
HG10 (B) 
Marra Mamba Fines 
On April 16, 1965 a 16-year contract was signed for a total 65.5 million MT 
until 1976. On September 1976 an additional and extension contract was 
signed with 1990 the final contractual year and annual volume increased 
from 5 to 8 million MT. 
Total quantity 156.2 million tons over 25 years I Plus or minus 10% 
11 million tons per year from April 1995 for 7 years, totalling n million tons 
I Plus or minus 10% at mill's option 
Original contract: 40 million tons from 1969-1979 
2-year extension contract for 8.4 mt for 1980-81 
6-year extension contract for 1982-87; 4.23 mtpy 
Original contract: 15 million tons for 10 years starting in 1969. 
2-year extension for 3 mt for 1980-1981 
6-year extension for 9 mt for 1982-1987 
6.5-9.5 million tons per year from April 1996 for 3 years, totalling 
19.5-28.5 million tons. 
The original 15 year contract starting from 1972 for 140 million MT was 
replaced by an extended 19 year contract for 222 million tons. 
Annually 2.5 million MT for 6 years; 1979-1984 
Annually 2.5 million MT for 5 years covering 1 April 1985 to 31 March 1989 
10 million tons per year from April 1996 for 7 years, total 70 million tons 110 
more or less at mill's option 
100 mt total for 16 years starting from 1969. No quantity margins. Several pI 
clauses. 
Extension contract - 7.5 million tons per year from April 1985 for 5 years, tot. 
37.5 million tons 
Extension contract - 7.5 million tons per year from April 1990 for 7 years, tot. 
52.5 million tons 1100/0 more or 15% less at mill's option each year 1 For 19~ 
more or 40% less following conclusion of Core. 
7-yearcontract for total of 33.6 mt, from 1981 to 1987. Plus/minus 10% 
6.5 million tons per annum from 1981 to 19881 Extension for 1 year (1989) 1 
miliontons 
10 year contract for total of 21.3 rnt; 1976-1985, plus/minus 10%. 
5 year extension contract for 2.2 million tons per annum 1 Pius-minus 10% 
5 year contract linked to POrt extension, total 7 million tons 
Independent contract with Kobe Steel, 1986-1989,0.35 million tons 
Originally known as LG2, independent contract with Kobe Steel, 1981-1987, 
0.9 rnt p.a. Extension for 2 years to cover 1988-1989 
Independent contract with Sumltomo Metal, 1986-1990,0.8 million tons p.a. 
4 year independent contract with Sumltomo Metal, 1976-85,0.75 million ton 
10 year independent contract with Sumltomo Metal, 1976-85, 0.5 million ton 
4 year extension contract for 1986-1989. 
10 yeas contract with Kawasaki Steel, 1976-1985. 
6.6 million tons per year from April 1997 for 3 years 1 Plus or minus 2 million 
tons per year at buyer's option. 
8.5 million tpY from April 1990 for 6 years. 1100/0 more or 15% less at mill's ( 
0-1.5 mtpy from april 1990 for 6 years. 
Total 9 million tons for five years from April 1992.1 Buyer's option :t10% 
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Robe River (RRMC) 
No.1 
No.2 
No.3 
Core 
Flex 
Mt Goldsworthy (BHP) 
3 year extension contract 
1 year contracts 
3 year contract 
3 year extension contract 
3 year extension contract 
BHP 
Yandi 
YampiSound 
Savage River 
Long term contract 
3 year contract 
15 year contrat from 1972 for pellets and fines; renegotiated several times. 
Plus/minus 10% 
Additional 6.5 million tons per year for 7 years from April 1990, total 45.5 mil 
tons I No mill's option except 1996 when minus 70% or plus 10% applicable 
to Core conclusion. 
13 year contract, 1972-1983 
Extension for 5 years, 1986-1990 
5 mtpy for 6 years from April 1990, total 30 million tons. I ±20% at mill's optk 
0-4 mtpy for 6 years from April 1990, total 0-24 million tons. 
9 million tons per year from April 1996 for 7 years totalling 63 million tons I F 
or minus 500,000 tons per year at buyer's option. 
5.5 million tons per year from April 1997 for 3 years I Plus or minus 1.5 millk 
tons per year at buyer's option. 
1980-1982, 7.n5 mt p.a., plus/minus 10% buyer's option 
1988: 1903-2246 mt; 1989: 3.33 million tons 
Total 11. 07 million tons from April 1990 to March 1993. I No tonnage option 
specified 
Total 11.7 million tons from April 1993 to March 1996.1 ±15% at buyers opti 
Total 11 million tons from April 1996 to March 1999 I Plus or minus 15% at t 
option. 
Originally from April 1992 to March 1999, 3.3 mtpy, 22.5 million tons total. I· 
-15% at mill's option. 
From April 1992 to March 2000, variable shipments I +10% or -15% every y. 
Annual contracts with primarily individual mills, with progressively decreasi~ 
quantities towards the mine's closure in 1993. 
Total 45 million tons for 20 years after 1968 
3 year contract for 220-440,000 tons. 
Source: TEX Report, 1980181 to 1994195 
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Table III.S(c) 
S. American Contract Notes 
Brazil 
Itahira NO.5 Total 95 million tons in 15 years from fiscal 1979.1 ±10% at mill's option.Bric 
Itahira NO.6 
Itahira NO.8 (A) 
Itahira NO.9 (B) 
hahira PSC 
NIBRASCO (pellets) 
carajas 
carajas (additional) 
MBR 
MBR (Core) 
MBR (Rex) 
SAMAR CO (48% BHP) 
SAMARCO (48% BHP) 
Peru 
Shougang Hierro Peru 
Chile 
Romeral 
Romeral P.F. 
Algarrobo 
Venezuela 
pricing. 
Total 85.35 million tons from f1SC811979. 1 ±10% at mill's option.Brick pricing 
5 million tons per year for 5 years for April 1995 - March 2000 1 +5% 1 -15% 
year at buyer's option. 
5 million tons per year for 6 years for April 1995 - March 2001 1 +5% 1 -15% 
year at buyer's option. 
Total 37 million tons in 20 years from 1976.1 Same conditions as CVRD No. 
contract. 
Originally, 15 years at 6 mtpy from August 1978. Then renewed for 3.5 millie 
tons per year for 5 years from April 1994 to March 1999 
Total 145.5 million tons in 15 years from April 19861 +10%, minimum 80% c 
contract base quantity guaranteed by mills. 
1 million tons per year for 9 years from April 1992, total 9 miUion tons 1 Sanlf 
conditions as for base agreement. 
16 year contract from 1973 to 1988. Also a 1 year extension for 1989. 
6 years form April 1997 to March 2003. This replaces the second part of the 
original 12 year contract which run from 1991 to 1996 
3 years from April 1997 to March 2000. This extends the 7 year contract whc 
ran from 1990 to 1996. 
400,000 tons per year for 4 years from April 19891 ±10% at buyer's option 
1 million tons per year in 7 years from January 19931 +10% or -15% at buyE 
option. 
All contracts with Hierro Peru and: Nippon Steel (1979-83), NKK (annual), K 
Steel (1976-83), Surnitorno Metal (annual), and Nishin Steel (annua~. 
750,000 tons per year for 7 years from April 1992, total 5.25 million tons. 1 + 
-20%. 
2.5 mtpy 1981-85, 5 year contract 
2.5 mtpy 1986-1989, 3 year contract 
3.52 million tons from April 1990 to March 19931 ±10% at buyer's option. 
1.1 million tons per year from April 1993 to March 1998, total 5.5 million tom 
Plus-minus 10% at buyer's option. 
April 1990-March 1993, Total 3.3-3.4 million tons 
April 1993-March 1998, Total 6 million tons 1 Plus-minus 10% per year. 
10 year contract, 1978-1987. Several restrictions on price variation. 
April 1990-March 1993, Total 4.35 million tons 
April 1993-March 1998, Total 7.25 million tons 1 Buyer's option ±10% 
All contracts are for one year only. 
Source: TEX Report, 1980181 to 1994195 
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Japanese Long-Term Contracts with India 
Quantities in '000 tons 
0 
.... 
:E 
:E 
.c 
a. ~ ~ ~ Q) 
E '0 Q) 
"0 Q) <1l I <1l ...... 
·co 0 ...... "0 
<1l ~ co ~ Cl. ~ 7800 3300 
7800 3300 
N/A N/A 
N/A N/A 
N/A N/A 
N/A 
7800 3300 
7800 3300 
7800 3300 
7800 3500 N/A 
7800 3500 I I 
7800 3500 II II 
5400 2500 :11 II 
5400 2500 I I I 
4500-5500 2500- 3000 1500-2000 3030-3250 
4500- 5500 2500-3000 1500-2000 3030-3250 
4500- 5500 2500-3000 1500-2000 3030-3250 
4500-5500 2500-3000 1500-2000 3030-3250 
4500- 5500 2500-3000 1500-2000 3030-3250 
1800- 3400 1400-3200 300- 1000 1000- 1500 
1800-3400 1400- 3200 
1800- 3400 1400- 3200 
1800-3400 1400- 3200 
1800- 3400 1400- 3200 
300- 1000 1000- 1500 
300-1000 1000- 1500 
300- 1000 1000- 1500 
300- 1000 1000- 1500 
146 
ns 
0 
C> 
Q) ...... 
<1l 
"S u 
~ 01 0 0 
== 
a. <1l 0 E 01 "0 0 
<1l ~ .c Q) t- o 0 CJ) 
-- 500 
500 
N/A 
-- N/A 
-- NlA 
-- N/A 
-- N/A 
-- 2100 
-- 2100 2100 1350 
-- 2100 2000 1350 
-- 2070 1350 
-- 2070 2120 1550 
500 I 2120 1550 
500 I 2000 1550 
500 I I 2000 1550 
500 1900 
500 1600 1035 
1600 1035 
1600 1035 
1600 1035 
1035 
Table 1I1.6(b) 
Japanese Long-Term Contracts with India 
Quantities in '000 tons 
t"O 
Q) 
>. 
-
. c 
(/) ..- t"O 
-"0 ~ Q) 
"0 t Q) t"O t"O .... .... a.. .c t"O ..... ]! .... 0 0 C/) t"O ~ ~ t"O 0 "> c - 0 "0 t"O "8 .c 0 0 c ----- 0> 0 Q) Q) Q) ...J t"O "0 "0 E ~ :0 "0 E E E Q) c ~ (/) c c .... .... E t"O 0 0 Q) t"O t"O t"O t"O Q) LL LL C/) C/) co co C/) 0 r i= ~ 1981 850 570 1100 1040 480 50 450 250 300 1982 850 570 1100 1040 480 50 450 350 160 1983 850 N/A N/A N/A 480 NlA N/A N/A N/A N/A 1984 850 N/A N/A N/A 480 N/A N/A N/A N/A NlA 1985 N/A N/A NlA NlA N/A NlA N/A N/A 1986 N/A N/A NlA N/A N/A N/A NlA N/A 1987 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NlA 1988 570 1100 1140 
-- 600 350 1989 570 1340 
-- 700 350 1990 850 570 N/A 480 
-- N/A N/A 1991 850 570 1440 340-480 
-- 650 350 1992 570 1460 340-480 550 350 1993 570 1100 1460 340-480 
-- 550 350 1994 
-- 1100 1460 340-480 
-- 550 350 100-200 
--1995 
-- 1100 1460 340-480 
-- N/A N/A N/A 1996 200 1100 1457 340-480 500 
-- 320 100 200 --1997 340-480 
--1998 340-480 
--
1999 
2000 
2001 
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Table 1II.6(c) 
Indian Conttact Notes 
Bailadila 
MOH 
Paradeep 
Kudremukh 
Chowgule 
Tudou 
Oempo 
Salgaocar 
Fomento 
Fomento 
Fomento 
SMIL (Shan-Kan) 
Bandodkar 
Mandovi Pellets 
7.8 mtpy for 5 years, 1981-85 
4.5-5.5 mtpy for April 1991-March 1996 
10 year contract from April 1981, total 34.6 million tons 
2.5-3.0 mtpy for 5 years, from April 1991 to March 1996. 
1988 & 1989: Year1y contracts for 0.7 million and 0.3 million tons at mill's op 
1.5-2.0 mtpy from April 1991 to March 1996 
Annual contracts for 1987, 1988, 1989 
3 year contract 1990-92 for 2.25 million tons p.a. 
New terms to previous contract: 3.03-3.25 mtpa from April 1991 to March 1! 
2 rolling annual contracts with 4 mills and NKK 
500,000 tons per year for 5 years, from April 1993 to March 1998. 
Total 16 million tons in 8 years from 1981. 
Total 1 0 milion tons for 5 years from 1991. 
11.8 million tons in 8 years from 1982 
Total 7.75 million tons for 5 years from 1992 
5 year contract with Sumitomo, 850,000 tpy, 1985-89 
3 year contract with Sumitomo, 600-850,000 tpy, starting 1993. 
1 year contracts for 1993 with Godo steel for 70-100,000 tons 
1 year contracts with NSC for 500,000 I ±10% buyers option. 
3 year contract from 1989 to 1992 for 1.1 million tons p.a. 
5 year contract, 480,000 tpy, 1985-89 
10.5 year contract, 1978-1988. 
Source: TEX Report, 1980181 to 1994195 
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1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
Table 111.7 (a) 
Japanese Long-Term Contracts with Africa, Canada and Sweden 
Quantities in '000 tons 
«S 
U 
'C 
..... 
~ 
en 
c: 
co 
E 
.... 0 0 C/) u C/) rn ~ 
600 
1000 
1000 
1000 
1000 
1000 
3826 700 
3826 700 
N/A N/A 
4000 10 
4000 1000 
4000 1000 
4000 1000 
4000 1000 
4000-5000 1000 
4000-5000 1000 
4000-5000 1000 
4000-5000 1000 
4000-5000 1000 
1000 
,~ 
c:: 
«S 0 ... «S 
'C ~ 'C () ::l Q) ~ 
«S .Q ~ ~ :J 
-I 
120 
390 160 
130 
149 
Q) 
::t:. 
co 
«S -1 
'g 
«S 0 
c: .... .... 
«S co 
0 0 
5000 
5000 
5000 
5000 185 
5000 360 
5000 350 
5000 350 
5000 350 
5000 350 
5000 500 
5000 500 
5000 
5000 
5000 
5000 
2070 
• • II 
2300 
2300 
2300 
2300 
2300 
2300 
2300 
2300 
c: 
I\) 
'C CD Q) ~ ~ 
tJ) 
-I 
T~ble 1II.7(b) 
Rest-ot-world Contract Notes 
S.Africa 
Iscor 
Assoman 
Canada 
Carrol Lake (IOC) 
Tasu 
Liberia and Mauritania 
Sweden 
LKAB 
12 year contract for total 77 mt, from 1976. 
5 year contract for 4 mtpy, 1991-95 
5 year extension, from April 1996 to March 2001. Lump 4 million tpy. Fines ( 
million tpv.1 Buyer's option: +15%/-10% (lump); 0-1 million tpv (fines) 
Originally 1 mtpy, April 1991-March 1994. Then renewed for 1 mtpa from Ap 
1994 to March 1997.1 ±20%. Subsequently renewed as 5-year contract for s 
quantity. 
15-year contract for total 75 m tons form 1973 to 1988 
1-year contract for 1989 
April 1990-March 19931 Buyerts option ± 10% 
April 1993-March 1997 1 Buyerts option ± 15%. 
8 year contract, 1976-1983 
9 year contract with SNIM, from 1973, 2.2 mtpy. 
7 year contract with LAMCO from 1979. 
Spot contracts (1 year), mines developed primarily with French assistance 
Total 4.5 mt for 4.5 years. 1 mtpy contracted. 
Source: TEX Report, 1980181 to 1994195 
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IV. An Economic Model of Iron Ore Trade 
[V.l Introduction 
In the previous two chapters I looked at two most important aspects of the current 
thesis: existing literature that could be applied - with some modifications - to the 
iron ore industry; and the central role played by long term contracts in the 
international trade of the commodity. 
This chapter proposes a new approach towards the explanation of the behaviour of 
participants in the international iron ore market, and tests the validity of this 
theory with a series of simple econometric tests, which look at the strategic import 
allocation decisions of the importers since the early 1960s (in most cases) taking 
simultaneously into account price signals from all major exporters to each 
importing nation. The chapter starts with my explanation of the behaviour of 
partners engaging in iron ore trade and continues with the methodology and data 
considerations for the econometric tests mentioned above. Test results and their 
interpretation are covered chapter V. 
IV.2 Explaining the Behaviour of Trading Partners 
IV.2.1 Demand for Iron Ore 
A concept central to the analysis of demand for commodity imports, and iron ore 
imports in particular, is that of differentiation. This essentially means that an 
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importer perceives commodity exports from alternative countries as embodying 
different proportions of characteristics. This interpretation of commodity 
differentiation is based on the characteristics approach in the economics of 
consumer behaviour. Commodities become horizontally differentiable when 
importers differ in their choice of product types even though their quality may be 
the same; in contrast, commodities are said to be vertically differentiable when 
their product types differ only in quality and all importers have the same 
preference ordering. 
Characteristics that have to do with horizontal differentiation may include, for 
example, marketing conditions, and cultural, historical, or political ties between 
trading partners. Characteristics giving rise to vertical differentiation are directly 
or indirectly linked with the quality of the commodity. 
When iron ore is the commodity in question, quality is a source of vertical product 
differentiation in terms of the iron content of ores originating in different 
countries. In contrast, marketing arrangements, in the form of long-term supply 
contracts is the predominant source of horizontal product differentiation. 
Another factor that may be used to explain commodity flows is the fact that 
importers often prefer to diversify the suppliers of a commodity rather than 
purchase from only one country. This situation is described by the variety 
152 
approach to consumer preferences. Both approaches are next discussed in more 
detail. 
IV. 2. 1. 1 Commodity Characteristics and Commodity Trade 
The commodity characteristics approach to analyse imperfect market structures 
was formally introduced by Hotelling (1929) in his seminal work on spatial 
economic theory. He used geographic location as a characteristic explaining 
consumer behaviour for goods otherwise physically homogeneous. Apart from 
transport costs, he attributed commodity differentiation to existing socio-
economic ties, 'the mode of doing business', and 'differences in service or 
quality' . 
An alternative approach, originally developed in household theory, is borrowed 
from Gorman (1959 and 1980) and Becker (1965), according to which utility is 
derived from the consumption of characteristics produced by the household from 
purchased goods. This concept was adopted by Kelvin Lancaster who further 
developed and expanded it. According to Lancaster (1966, 1971), the 
characteristics contained in a commodity are objectively defined, whereas the 
consumers' preferences for characteristics are subjectively determined. Each 
consumer, therefore, derives a different level of utility from the consumption of 
those characteristics. A consumer's behaviour may then be explored without 
knowledge of his or her utility function. In Hendler (1975) and Lucas (1975), 
however, it is shown that Lancaster's formulation depends on two critical 
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assumptions: the non-negative marginal utility of characteristics; and their weak 
separability so that utility depends only on the total amount of characteristics in a 
commodity and not on their proportions in alternative supply sources. Lancaster 
later (1979) extended his approach to analyse markets which are monopolistically 
competitive, a generalisation which lends itself to many applications in the 
analysis of consumer demand and non-competitive markets. 
The characteristics approach offers an intuitively appealing explanation of why 
importers differentiate between supplying countries even though the commodity 
itself might be homogeneous. Unfortunately, it suffers from the inherent limitation 
of yielding a solution in which each buyer purchases from only one supplier. 
Diversification of supply sources arises only from aggregation of consumers 
(Lancaster 1975, pp. 571-572). Thus, a country's diversification of different 
exporters of a particular commodity is simply interpreted as the summation within 
the country of purchases by individual agents from a single supplier. Clearly, this 
approach is unrealistic; however, alternative approaches have been proposed. 
IV.2.1.2 The Variety in Trade Approach 
The analytical framework of this approach has been borrowed from consumer 
preference theory, which discusses product choice and optimal product variety. 
The central argument of this theory is that products that are near substitutes for 
one another will give rise to monopolistic competition because of consumer 
preferences for product diversity. As shown by Spence (1976) and Dixit and 
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Stiglitz (1977), a consumer's desire for diversity arises from the convexity of the 
indifference curve for imperfectly substitutable products. Strict convexity means 
that any straight line drawn between two points of an indifference curve will 
always lie above any point along the curve. As a result, a combination of products 
is always preferred to specialisation in just one product. 
In the context of international trade, a 'product' is the commodity originating from 
a specific supplier, hence embodying a set of intrinsic characteristics. Strict 
convexity of an importer's preference curve results in the importer opting for a 
diversity products, which is translated into a diversity of exporting countries, 
which supply him with a slightly different version of the commodity he is after. 
Krugman (1979, 1981), Dixit and Norman (1980), Hart (1985a, 1985b), Helpman 
and Krugman (1985), and Venables (1987) have used the preference for diversity 
implied by strictly convex indifference curves to derive a monopolistic 
competitive model of international trade for examining the welfare implications of 
markets with differentiated goods. 
This approach is not, however, without its flaws. Strict convexity of indifference 
curves for import demand imply a relentless strife for import diversity, which is 
not always true. An importer may be unwilling to diversify his supply sources, if 
choosing one supplier only means favourable marketing arrangements. Moreover, 
a strictly convex indifference curve is unlikely to hold for all products. If the 
importer of a physically homogeneous commodity views exports from alternative 
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suppliers as perfect substitutes, then the importer's indifference curve for 
alternative suppliers will be a straight line. 
IV.2.1.3 The 'Diversity as a Characteristic' Approach 
A third line of thought, suggested by Lord (1991), offers a fresh approach which 
reconciliates the two approaches discussed above. More specifically, the concept 
of 'commodity type' is introduced, which embodies the consumer's choice of 
characteristics from a variety of products. In the trade context, differentiation of a 
commodity exists at the level of the exporter. It is not the physical characteristics 
of a commodity only that determine importer preferences; it is also the 
characteristics of the exporters themselves, as well as the wish for diversity, which 
can also be considered as a characteristic. 
In the case of iron ore, this approach offers an insight where other approaches (e.g. 
spatial equilibrium analysis) cannot always explain export demand (e.g. in Japan) 
for ores originating from distant suppliers (e.g. Brazil), when closer suppliers 
(e.g. Australia) are available. Indeed, the history of iron ore trade, especially from 
the 1980s onwards, shows that the biggest importers of iron ore show a clear 
tendency to diversify their sources of supply. Japan, South Korea, and the most 
prominent West European importers each source their imports from over 10 
suppliers, albeit each of them having one or two predominant suppliers. 
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IV.2.1.4 Imperfect Competition in Iron Ore Trade 
As noted in previous chapters, the most salient feature of iron ore is that it is 
almost exclusively used in the blast furnace operation of pig iron, which is further 
processed into crude steel in basic oxygen furnaces. The demand for iron ore is, 
therefore, derived from the demand for steel by end users, such as the construction 
industry, manufacturing, engineering, shipbuilding the automotive industry, etc. 
Since the demand for steel is relatively insensitive to changes in its own price, 
particularly in the short run, aggregate demand for iron ore can therefore be 
expected to also be insensitive to its own price changes in the short run (Tilton, 
1978). 
There are several more factors contributing to this price inelasticity. Iron ore only 
accounts for a relatively small proportion of the costs for finished steel, 
approximately 5% of it. Large price reductions in iron ore prices are unlikely to 
induce additional demand. On the other hand, large increases in demand are 
unlikely to undermine short-term demand as the amount of resources dedicated to 
steel production are quite inflexible. To achieve much needed scale economies a 
steel mill requires the highest possible rates of capacity utilisation. In addition to 
the difficulty of quick divestments, labour is also difficult to scale down in the 
short term. In some of the traditional large steel manufacturing nations steel 
workers' unions have accumulated considerable rights for their members, making 
quick labour downsizing almost impossible. 
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In Europe, for example, the steel industry went (and still is going) through a 
painful and prolonged restructuring process in order to decommission some of its 
excess capacity. In the USA, on the other hand, the industry has followed a 
different path, opting increasingly for electric arc furnace capacity which are of 
considerable smaller scale than integrated steel mills. Although less efficientl for 
large scale production of pig iron, electric arc furnaces offer considerable 
flexibility in production, allow for more precision in product specification and are 
ideal for the production of small consignments of high specification steel alloys. 
Despite the considerable incursion of the electric arc furnace in iron smelting, 
however, the vast majority of the world's production still comes from basic 
oxygen converters and iron ore is very much the dominant feedstock of the iron 
and steel industry. So what about the situation on the supply side? 
Over the last 30 years, the dominance of Brazil and Australia is quite indisputable 
and one may well wonder whether the supply side is not in fact quite close to the 
duopoly model discussed in chapter II. However, there still remains some 40% of 
international supply which is accounted for by an additional 8 countries, some of 
which like Canada, India and Sweden are always in the league of top exporters. So 
the traditional oligopoly model needs to be modified to accommodate 2 dominant 
firms (countries in our case) as well as a number of non-dominant small firms. 
I A typical blast oxygen furnace (or converter) yields about 400 tonnes of molten (Pig) iron in 
about 40-45 minutes; an electric arc furnaces produces about 150 tonnes in about 30-35 
minutes. 
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The theoretical expectation that the low cost producers tend to dominate the 
market can be broadly accepted as valid in the case of iron ore. As it can be seen 
from Figure IV -1 and Table IV -1, the lowest cost producers are predominantly 
located in Brazil and Australia, while some of the highest cost ones are found in 
Canada and the USA. 
Figure IV-l 
Industry Cost Curve (fob) for Iron Ore (1993) 
50 
I 
40 I 
~ 
I 
jH' 
~ ... 
,.,A 
I 
10 
~~ 
./ 
o ttii1ll1l11111111111 
Source: Hellmer (1996) 
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Table IV-l 
Major iron ore mines in the Western world ranked by cost o/production, 1993 
Mine Country Operator Grade Mining cost 
US/mtu 
Morro Agudo Brazil Samitri 52 3.06 
Corrego do Meio Brazil Samitri 63 3.13 
Channar Australia Hammersley 63 3.52 
Mina do Andrade Brazil Samitri 66 3.69 
Aguas Claras Brazil MBR 68 4.57 
Carajas Brazil CVRD 66 4.73 
Mina Pau Branco Brazil Mannesmann 67 5.01 
Feijao Mine Brazil Ferteco 65 5.21 
Pico Mine Brazil MBR 67 5.28 
Dominalai India NMDC 63 5.42 
MutucaMine Brazil MBR 68 5.94 
Conceicau Brazil CVRD 58 6.20 
Timbopeba Brazil CVRD 65 6.21 
Brockman No 2 Australia Hammersley 62 6.30 
Caue Brazil CVRD 56 6.49 
Casa de Pedra Brazil Siderurgica 61 6.61 
Kudremukh India Kudremuch 39 6.84 
Bailadia India NMDC 64 7.09 
Middleback Australia Hammersley 65 7.29 
Mount Tom Prince Australia Hammersley 64 7.30 
Robe River Australia Robe River 57 8.15 
Alegria Brazil Samarco 52 8.67 
Yandi Australia BHP 58 8.83 
Mount Goldworthy Australia BHP 59 9.15 
Paraburdoo Australia Hammersley 64 9.25 
Fabricia Mines Brazil Ferteco 55 9.65 
Piar Division Venezuela Ferrominera 65 9.96 
Mount Whaleback Australia Mount Newman 64 10.79 
Sishen South Africa ISCOR 59 12.77 
Romeral Chile Mineral del Pacifico 48 13.47 
Pau Division Venezuela Ferrominera 64 14.75 
Mamberget Sweden LKAB 62 20.80 
Aigarrobo Chile Mineral del Pacifico 48 22.95 
Kiruna Sweden LKAB 62 23.90 
Wabush Canada Cleveland 38 24.92 
Carol Lake Canada lac 58 26.11 
Mount Wright Canada QMC 30 27.88 
Savage River Australia Cleveland Cliffs 35 27.96 
Eveleth USA Eveleth Taconite 24 29.81 
Mines Terres Rouges France ARBED 30 36.57 
LTV Steel Canada LTV Steel 54 37.74 
Algoma Canada Algoma Steel 35 40.88 
Hibbing Taconite USA Bethlehem Steel 27 42.91 
Empire Mine USA Inland Steel 29 50.91 
Source: AME (1994) 
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Among the lowest cost mines are those of CVRD, which is the dominant Brazilian 
producer holding about three quarters of Brazilian iron ore production and which 
is the most likely company to lead annual price negotiations both with German 
and Japanese importers. 
In the Pacific market it is two dominant companies, BHP and Hamersley, which 
are the first usually to negotiate (separately) with the team representing 
collectively the Japanese steel mills. Given the weight of Australia in the Pacific 
and Brazil in the Atlantic market, one would expect that the biggest buyers in each 
of these markets (Japan and Germany) to procure the great majority, if not all, of 
their supplies from the cheapest and closest supplier. 
If one could envisage a situation like the one described above, the economic 
structure in each of the two geographically separate markets would be akin to that 
of bilateral monopoly; in our case, two sets of bilateral monopolies in different 
parts of the world. Indeed some authors (e.g. Priovolos, 1986) have based their 
analysis of the iron ore market as a string of bilateral monopolies between pairs of 
countries. As was shown in the previous chapters, however, the past patterns of 
iron ore trade flows have shown several considerable diversions from the profit 
maximising quantities and in some cases complete break down in negotiations; all 
offering very little evidence of collusive behaviour to maximise profits. 
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The model of bilateral monopoly is a very attractive theoretical proposition, but it 
is rather difficult to encounter it in practice. It is not surprising, therefore, that in 
all bibliography considerable discussion has gone into the theoretical specification 
of bilateral monopoly interaction, but little has actually been empirically tested. 
As Azzam (1996) notes, "what is surprising is that bilateral oligopoly, which 
would seem to be a more realistic case, has attracted little theoretical or empirical 
interest. In theory, one could devise a game-theoretic model of bargaining 
between sellers and buyers. In practice, this would require models of coalition as 
there are more than two players (Meyerson, 1991). The empirical possibilities 
from such models would, however, still remain limited." 
Concomitant evidence on why the bilateral monopoly analytical framework would 
be wrong (especially when looking at the global market for iron ore) does exist. 
All major consumers do import ore from than one sources. The United States, for 
example, uses domestic reserves, imports from Canada (in some cases from 
subsidiary mining companies there) and also imports from Brazil. Japan is geared 
up for imports from Australia and perhaps India. In a bilateral monopoly 
framework, little explanation can be offered as to why Japan should also import 
from Brazil. Germany imports from Brazil most of its needs because they are the 
most competitive resources. Again, its imports from Sweden2 and even Australia 
are not theoretically justified. 
2 In the case of Sweden as an exporter to North West European countries, Hellmer (1996) 
maintains that the reason for its continued presence is the successful product differentiation it 
has implemented, especially through the production of high value added/high specification 
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Ownership ties still exist between steel producers and mines. They may not be as 
dominant as they used to be in the 1950s and 1960s, but they can still serve as an 
important bargaining chip. European steel mills have minority stakes in several 
Brazilian mines, frequently in partnership with CVRD, who - theoretically - is 
their major adversary. France and Italy both have equity stakes in West African 
(Mauritanian) mines, trying also to reduce their dependence on Brazil and 
Australia. 
In the United States, where steel mills depend on Canada, Brazil and Venezuela 
for 95% of their imports, steel production economics have advanced more rapidly 
than in other parts of the world. Steel 'mini-mills' have mushroomed and now 
provide possibly some 30% of US steel production (Crandall, 1996). Mini-mills 
depend on steel scrap and direct reduced iron (a form of very high grade iron ore, 
also known as 'sponge iron') and are thus much less dependent on iron ore.3 In 
view of this development, a swift move away from the dependence on iron ore 
from Latin America can become a credible threat in iron ore price negotiations 
pellets. Although not exactly an unrealistic claim, it is disputed by Ericsson (1996) who sheds 
doubt on the survival of LKAB (the Swedish iron ore exporter) due to its product 
differentiation policy. "The effects of this oligopolistic structure [of sellers] with the relatively 
few [ ... ] well organised buyers of iron ore are not studied" says Ericsson. He continues, ''the 
steel works of Western Europe see a strategic advantage in having at least one local supplier to 
compete with the overseas producers of Latin America and Australia. [ ... ] European steel mills 
have interests in several overseas iron ore producers. Rather than exapnd their production 
capacity they choose to buy ore from LKAB." 
3 Direct reduced iron (DRl), however, does come from iron ore itself, so that dependence on high 
quality, low cost, producers from abroad is still inevitable. Only mills exclusively using scrap 
can rely on domestic recycle supply and scrap imports, possibly from other developed 
countries. 
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between the United States and its trading partners. The move may not be possible 
to implement within a year or two, but the threat is a lot more realistic 
nevertheless. A move away from basic oxygen reduction to electric arc production 
can only be detrimental for the long term market shares of iron ore exporters and 
strategic behaviour may restrain them from forcing their bargaining advantages in 
periods of high import demand. 
Last, but not least, in the string of reasons making the bilateral monopoly 
framework less and less adequate, is the development of long term contracts and 
their changing role in the last ten years. As it was discussed in chapter III, long 
term contracts gradually took over large equity stakes in iron ore mines as the 
most widely spread medium of ensuring long term, continuous supply of raw 
material to steel mills. This is not only true for iron ore; it is also the modus 
operandi of the coking coal industry, whereby steel mills rely on such 
arrangements to secure adequate supplies of anthracite and high quality 
bituminous coal, which they subsequently carbonise and use in the iron 
manufacturing process. 
Despite the long term commitment implied by such contracts, the trading partners 
(predominantly importers) have repeatedly demonstrated their unwillingness to 
adhere to their contractual obligations and have on many occasions failed to lift 
the amounts of cargo stipulated in the contracts (see Table IV -2). As a resul~ long 
term contracts become progressively less of a means to provide security of 
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supplies. Contributing to this malaise (for exporters) is the chronic overcapacity of 
iron ore supplies and increasing price competition (Chang, 1994). What long tenn 
contracts still provide, however, is a fonn of approval for a supplier's reliability, 
ability to deliver iron ore at the right quality and price and the accompanying 
credit worthiness that such an endorsement entails. For the exporter, long tenn 
commitments from buyers are essential for long tenn planning and development 
of existing and new production capacity, as they help to secure the backing of 
investors and financiers. 
Despite the advantages of long tenn contracts for both buyers and sellers, they are 
without a doubt too restrictive. The sharp downfall of world industrial production, 
and the subsequent decline in steel production and iron ore imports highlighted the 
inflexibility of long tenn contractual arrangements. Since the 1980s contracts have 
factored in additional flexibility, primarily through shorter durations and wider 
margins for the quantities of ore that are to be lifted every year. Contracts lasting 
15-20 years are a thing of the past. It is now more likely that 5-8 contracts are 
used even for greenfield projects, shorter tenns for simple extensions of existing 
contracts. At the same time, the typical lifting margin of ±5% on the contracted 
quantity is more likely to be ± I 0 or 15%. 
Long term contracts and minority stakes may not be used effectively to directly 
secure supplies, but their existence does signal the importer's intention to procure 
his raw material year after year. In the negotiating process that takes place every 
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year in order to determine prices, long term contracts are bargaining chips rather 
than determinants of the quantity maximising the joint profits of bilateral 
monopoly. 
Table IV-2 
Contracted and Actual Imports of Iron Ore by Japan 
Imports from Australia Imports from Brazil 
Contracted Actual Imports! Contracted Actual Imports! 
Volume Imports Contracts Volume Imports Contncts 
(m.tonnes) (m. tonnes) (m.tonnes) (m. tODDes) 
1966 1330000 2043491 154% 1000000 1704461 170% 
1967 2660000 8313833 313% 2350000 2430664 103% 
1968 4270000 13813940 324% 3200000 2198482 69% 
1969 13730000 23234523 169% 5890000 4185450 71% 
1970 15890000 36596955 230% 5890000 6779361 115% 
1971 18140000 46287396 255% 8690000 8996651 104% 
1972 27740000 48294755 174% 9690000 9334542 96% 
1973 33840000 64238641 190% 14690000 12821283 87% 
1974 37040000 67880987 183% 22940000 19522809 85% 
1975 40640000 63253080 156% 24440000 23459583 96% 
1976 44490000 64094316 144% 25840000 25380371 98% 
1977 47740000 63103364 132% 26240000 23742697 90% 
1978 49265000 52626268 107% 35315000 20815439 59% 
1979 54360000 55297480 102% 39640000 26136093 66% 
1980 66862000 60040060 90% 43390000 28522932 66% 
1981 79562000 54860965 69% 45990000 27164735 59% 
1982 79762000 54139956 68% 53450000 27346237 51% 
1983 66937000 49772804 74% 45990000 23509201 51% 
1984 62737000 58357452 93% 46090000 29017413 63% 
1985 66637000 54321348 82% 46090000 29064068 63% 
1986 70137000 46893889 67% 48590000 26633279 55% 
1987 71087000 43413754 61% 47565000 26831270 56% 
1988 66500000 52415696 79% 44990000 27931730 620/0 
1989 73780000 56275433 76% 38430000 29520127 77% 
1990 72015000 53852628 75% 38835000 30198492 78% 
1991 52710000 58353791 111% 42560000 28470416 67% 
1992 55200000 104137622 189% 42600000 53514070 126% 
1993 54250000 106946248 197% 36150000 55644356 154% 
1994 53920000 55409205 103% 41880000 27873986 67% 
1995 55250000 58727456 106% 34800000 27627593 79% 
1996 53720000 59527894 111% 34860000 26645608 76% 
Japan has been a master at this game and has consistently used to improve its 
position vis- -vis Australia who is naturally the most cost efficient supplier due to 
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its competitive mining cost and low freight costs. Australia has been supplying 
40-50% of Japanese needs, despite the fact that Japan has consistently been trying 
to increase its 'portfolio' of importers by forging relationships with - mainly -
Brazilian and Indian mines. However, in periods of crisis (for example 1980-1990 
in Table IV -2) it is the more distant, less competitive, importers that are hit the 
hardest. 
Under the light of the observations made above, I find it very difficult to accept 
that the market for iron ore functions as a bilateral oligopoly where two partners 
determine their mutual profit maximising quantity and simply bargain to get a 
price as favourable as the circumstances allow. In bilateral monopoly models a 
breakdown in negotiations is a possible outcome, with no trade taking place. The 
reality of iron ore trade has demonstrated cases where price negotiations were 
unsuccessful; however, trade in the commodity did continue to flow between 
partners and prices were later determined retroactively. The negotiating parties do 
realise that their mutual dependence extends far beyond a single period and for 
this reason their actions are appropriately mitigated. Room for manoeuvring is 
mostly available for long term changes and such strategic decisions are made in 
view of the realisation that other market participants (apart from the pair of 
negotiators) do exist and can be used as credible threats during negotiations. 
Although profit maximising behaviour is not an unreasonable target for each 
partner, long term survival is in many cases a more realistic objective, given that 
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there is such strong interdependence between - at least the major - trading 
partners. This interdependence among more than just two partners (Le. the 
bilateral oligopoly situation) gives bilateral negotiations a different weight. In 
perfect competition it is a very large number of such bilateral deals between 
market participants that eventually produce a market consensus on market prices 
and traded quantities, although each such individual deal cannot drastically 
influence the market on its own. In bilateral monopoly it is just one negotiation 
that clears the market. In the case of bilateral oligopoly however, each bilateral 
transaction is made in the knowledge that each of the partners will also trade with 
the remaining buyers and sellers and whatever price is reached will function as a 
signal for any subsequent negotiations. In addition, each bilateral transaction is 
made in the knowledge that subsequent partners wi1l be limited in their options by 
what has already been agreed in the previous negotiations. It would be easier, 
however, to understand the issues that arise by means of an example. 
When Germany enters negotiations with Brazil it realises that Brazil is the most 
competitive supplier, but over-dependence on one country is risky. So Germany 
also looks at alternative - perhaps higher cost - suppliers, such as Canada, South 
Africa and Australia, or other smaller producers who wi1l provide some cushion in 
case negotiations with Brazil turn sour. This effectively means that the price target 
for Brazil is not necessarily what maximises its profit. From the theory of bilateral 
monopoly in chapter II, we saw that bargaining for price is limited in the range 
[PD, pUl, with pD being the minimum acceptable price for the supplier and pU the 
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maximum the buyer is willing to pay. For convenience, Figure IV-2 reproduces 
price setting under such circumstances. 
Normally Brazil will try to push its advantage as closer to pU as possible, where its 
zero-profit indifference curve 7tsla shifts along its marginal cost curve (Mel) as 
further to the right as possible, indicating higher profits. However, Brazil now has 
to keep in mind that Germany is also going to negotiate with one or more 
alternative suppliers whose indifference curves might lie lower, in our example 
they could be represented by 7ts2a' 
Figure IV-l 
Price Setting in Bilateral Oligopoly 
o Q* 
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The reasons why the profit maximising point of other suppliers lies below that of 
Brazil need not be discussed without loss of generality.4 These competitors might 
have overall higher costs, represented in the above figure by curve Me2• It is also 
likely that a competitor might even have a minimum acceptable price (pD') higher 
than Brazil (p~. The key issue here, though, is that they are willing to bargain up 
to a price (pu') which is lower that that aimed for by Brazil (pu). The net result is 
that Brazil cannot afford to disregard what other competitors have offered or are 
willing (according to its estimates) to offer. If long-term security of export 
markets is important it will have to lower its ambition from pU to a lower level, 
possibly pUt if we assume, as above, that the competitors' profit maximising curve 
is 1tsla• If it pushes hard to achieve pU, it is quite likely that Germany will choose 
to buy some of its needs at least from the alternative supplier and hence move its 
profit curve from 1tb1a to the more desirable 1tb1b• 
There is of course the 'catastrophe' scenario where the market is so low that 
sellers will have to settle for very low prices, close to their minimum acceptable 
levels. In such case, Brazil has the overall advantage as its profit indifference 
curve can slide down as far as 1ts1b' which is lower that the nslb curve that the 
alternative supplier needs to at least achieve. At the end of the day Brazil is the 
overall cheaper producer and the most able to survive a protracted bout of low 
prices . 
.. One such reason might be, for example, that third suppliers might be happy to settle for lower 
prices (at least for a short time) in order to gain market share at the expense of more 
competitive suppliers. 
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Germany, as I mentioned, is actively trying to diversify its heavy reliance on 
Brazil by procuring some of its needs from other countries, even though such 
supplies might not be as competitive. On the other hand, it also realises that Brazil 
is becoming a more aggressive supplier, who actively seeks other outlets for its 
exports, in order to ensure long term survival. During negotiations, Germany will 
push for a price as close as possible to pO, but a very low price might end in a no 
trade situation, if Brazil manages to find alternative outlets for its exports, willing 
to pay a better price. 
The no trade situation in a market with so heavy interdependencies is rather 
unlikely, as we noted earlier. It does send signals, however, that the long tenn 
relationship between Brazil and Germany may be at stake if the parties push too 
hard their bargaining strengths. The overall result is, first the closing up of the [pu, 
pO] range, and then a long term movement towards the middle of the range. 
Destabilising factors do exist, that will create diversion from the long run 
tendencies. For example, new dynamic importers entering the market (like Korea 
in the 1980s and China in the 1990s) may create an upset in the balance of power 
between the main importers and exporters. 
From the above discussion, a set of principal characteristics for the behaviour of 
the iron ore market - and perhaps any similar market fmding itself in an 
oligopoly/oligopsony situation - could be derived. 
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• All market participants are well aware of the presence of, and mutual 
dependence on, each other; 
• Straightforward joint-profit maximisation between each pair of trading 
partners may not be the prime objective due to their strategic behaviour. 
• Pursuit of joint-profit maximisation is mitigated or hindered by a variety of 
factors, such as the threat of reduced long term contractual commitment in the 
future, loss of import market share, reduced financial assistance for new 
projects. 
• When joint-profit maximisation is a goal, it is likely that the price range that 
constitutes the negotiating interval in order for trade to take place will be 
narrower that the price interval set by the seller's marginal cost and the 
buyer's marginal revenue in a bilateral monopoly situation. 
• Implied by the above is the fact that all partners have a decision horizon that 
stretches beyond the one-year restrictive framework suggested by many 
models. 
The market for iron seems to be moving away from the bilateral monopoly to a 
bilateral oligopoly state, with a possible future as a more 'mature' market. As 
Chang (1994) also notes, there have been changes in the nature of contracts and 
increased competitive pressures on the steel industry world-wide with a trend 
towards the closure of the least efficient steel producers. What is the next stage? 
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Observing similar markets, like the market for coal for example, the natural 
progression is towards a more flexible and open market. Coal also has a long 
history of transactions based on long term contractual commitments, with many 
power generating utilities being tied to specific mines that could provide the exact 
grade of coal suitable for the furnace of the particular power plant. Under the 
mounting competitive pressures imposed by oil and gas and with the aid of 
technological improvements that made possible the 'cleaner' combustion of 
'dirtier' coal, the industry moved towards a more liberal organisation of its 
procurement strategies. The coal market today still relies on long and medium 
term contracts, but increasingly buyers and sellers resort to the active spot market 
that has emerged. The pacemaker in this process is the United States, which 
possesses some of the most competitive coal reserves, has a very competitive 
domestic coal market and is a dominant exporter to the international market. The 
increased liberalisation of the coal market in the 1980s culminated in the 
launching of the first coal futures contract on the New York Mercantile Exchange 
in 1998. Although mostly of domestic importance, this development highlights the 
move towards a more competitive market, with a solidly founded spot segment 
that allows the determination of reliable benchmark prices, and the added 
advantages of price discovery and price risk hedging offered by an organised 
futures market. 
Without a doubt, the iron ore market is still far from the progress achieved in the 
coal market. There are signs, however, that indicate a desire for a move towards 
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the same direction. The increased demand for flexibility in long term contracts and 
their use as bargaining chips rather than means of determining profit-maximising 
traded quantities; the move of both buyers and sellers towards more 
diversification of their imports sources and export outlets, respectively; the 
oversupply of iron ore in the world market; technological developments that make 
use of less iron ore and more scrap; are all contributing to this move. A first step 
will be perhaps in the structure and pricing mechanism of long term contracts. In 
most commodities, including coal, the usual pricing structure is based on the 
'cost-plus' system. Prices are determined as premia paid on top of what both 
negotiating parties agree as a reasonable and true cost basis. 
Cost-plus pricing is by nature more transparent and open to comparisons across 
buyers and sellers. More transparent pricing leads to more reliability of a nascent 
spot market. If this grows into a strong and reliable spot market it can provide a 
solid recourse for buyers and sellers, both to satisfy their transaction needs and to 
generate benchmark prices. It is the spot market then that will absorb demand and 
supply imbalances and will reflect the market consensus on the fair market of the 
commodity. Business can still be conducted with the help of contracts 0 varying 
duration; pricing, however, can be done on a formula basis as a differential from 
the spot market. This is the case of the oil market and several agricultural markets 
and this is, possibly, where the gas and coal markets are heading towards. 
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IV.S Estimating World Import Shares of Iron Ore 
As it was discussed in the previous section, the target for many importers of iron 
ore is not to simply determine a joint-profit maximising quantity and then 
negotiate on a price settlement as far below as possible from their maximum 
acceptable price pU. Profit maximisation is of course one of the targets of each 
pair of trading partners, but they cannot negotiate without taking into account 
information (not necessarily complete or correct) and speculation/expectations 
about the possible (re-)actions of their competitors. An oligopolistic seller 
negotiates knowing that other sellers will take advantage of any 'slip-up' in order 
to increase their market share. He also knows that the buyer has a portfolio of 
importing options and will allocate his imports among several sellers according to 
the price advantages they offer. In a similar manner, the oligopsonistic buyer 
negotiates in the knowledge that the seller has alternative outlets for his exports, 
i.e. other buyers will step in to pick up some of the imports if he fails to secure 
them first. 
Apart from the relative bargaining power of the partners, there are also transport 
and quality issues. Iron ore is a relatively cheap commodity and, as a result, 
transport costs make up a relatively high proportion of the landed cost of iron ore. 
On the world market, freight costs for iron ore over the period 1982-1991, for 
example, accounted for 15-25% of the landed costs (Rogers, 1992). The normally 
higher unit import costs from distant suppliers can be largely attributed to the cost 
of freight, but this may not be the only source of price differentials. As it was 
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discussed iron ore prices also differ due to quality specifications, with ores high in 
Fe content fetching overall better prices. However, it is also true that importers 
will often blend their ores as they have to rely on more than one sources providing 
diverse degrees of chemical, physical and metallurgical properties. As Rogers and 
Robertson (1987) note, technical considerations may affect the degree of reliance 
on a particular importer. 
True as this may be for the short run, however, this is not expected to last in the 
long run. Short run technological inflexibility may result in a sort of forced 
'loyalty' to a particular supplier. Ultimately - in the long run - however, the 
importer with the most competitive price structure has to prevail, if profit 
maximisation is still one of the importer's objectives (but not necessarily the sole 
objective). The important point of this argument is that it is not unreasonable to 
suggest that iron ores from different sources are close substitutes, although 
differentiable on both physical and perceived characteristics. The import share of 
an individual supplying country, therefore is likely to depend on the delivered 
prices of ores from competing sources. 
IV.S.l Methodology 
The approach suggested here is that of a partial adjustment model which captures 
the inter-temporal decision making of each of the 10 top world importers of iron 
ore, which collectively account for at least 90% of international imports over the 
last 35 years. The partial adjustment approach is not new, it is in fact borrowed 
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from consumption theory and has been transplanted in international trade in the 
past. This is the first time it is employed in the world iron ore trade for all major 
importers. The methodology uses volume shares of iron ore imports, rather than 
value. This is consistent with the suggestions of Tilton (1992), who postulates that 
volume shares provide a common measure of market share in assessing the degree 
of competitiveness. 
The partial adjustment methodology is consistent with the preceding discussion, 
which postulated that long-term changes in import shares do occur although they 
may be delayed by technological and institutional constraints. The model 
hypothesises that the current levels of iron ore import prices from various sources 
and the total volume of ore imports determine the current 'desired' level of the 
share of imports originating from a partiCUlar supplier. This relationship can be 
denoted as: 
s~, = a; + Lb;.j InPj " +c; InQ, +&;,1 
j 
Eq.IV-! 
where st, is the desired volume share of iron ore from source i in period t. Such an 
equation is constructed for each importing country; with i being all of its trading 
partners including the residual category 'rest of world' (ROW); Pj being the unit 
price of iron ore from source j, where i ~ j; Q being the total volume of iron ore 
imports for the particular importing country, used as a proxy of possible scale 
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effects of steel production on market shares.; and & being the error term which is 
assumed to be distributed normally with mean zero and constant variance. 
However, because of the inherent inflexibility of importers in changing quickly 
from one partner to another, the desired level of imports cannot be achieved 
immediately. As a result, only a fixed fraction r of the desired adjustment takes 
place in a single period. Therefore 
Eq.IV-2 
where Si,t is the market share for supplier i in period t, Si,t-] is the market share 
for supplier i in the preceding period, and ri (0 < ri < 1) is the coefficient of 
adjustment supplier i. The above equation simply states that in each period only a 
fixed fraction of the desired change actually takes place. The larger the value of r 
the faster the adjustment to the desired market share. Since all shares add up to 1, 
Eq. IV -2 implies that the coefficients of adjustment should be identical for all 
share equations for one particular importer. The imposition of this condition 
makes the use of the subscript on r unnecessary in any subsequent notation. 
Combining Eq. IV-l with Eq. IV-2 the market share of supplier i becomes 
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S;,t =a; *+(l-r)s;,t_1 + Lb;,J *lnPj,t +c; *lnQt +&;,t· 
j 
Eq.IV-3 
where ai* = rai, bi,j* = r bi,j' Ci* = r Ci, and &i,t· = r&i,t. The regression 
procedure should give estimates for r, which can then be used to estimate the 
long-run responses of suppliers' market shares to prices and volume of imports 
(ai, bi,j' Ci) from the short-run responses (ai*, bi,j*, Ci·). Theoretically, the 
estimated value of r should lie between zero and one, so that long-run responses 
can be expected to be greater than short-run ones. 
Now, the need to estimate a number of equations simultaneously poses 
methodological problems. There are numerous other examples where the same 
problem may occur. Demand equations for a number of commodities; investment 
functions for a number of firms; consumption functions for subsets of the 
population; the capital asset pricing model in finance; all are characteristic 
examples of cases where simultaneous equation estimation creates similar 
problems. In all cases, the disturbances in these different equations at a given time 
are likely to reflect some common immeasurable or omitted factors, and hence 
could be correlated. Such correlation between disturbances from different 
equations at a given time is called contemporaneous correlation. In such cases it is 
more efficient to estimate all equations jointly, using what is known as the 
seemingly unrelated regressions equation model. 
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In a general matrix form, the system of equations for each of the importing 
countries can be rewritten as 
Eq.IV-4 
Where n is the number of supplier that a specific country is procwing its iron ore 
from and the error terms have a zero mean and a constant variance over time. The 
generalised regression model can be applied to the following stacked regression: 
YI XI 0 0 PI &1 
Y2 0 X2 0 P2 &2 
= + ='XP+£ 
Yn 0 0 Xn Pn &n 
Eq.IV-5 
Greene (1993, p. 489) demonstrates that the efficient estimator is generalised least 
squares (GLS) and he adds that the greater the correlation of the disturbances, the 
greater the efficiency gain accruing to GLS, vias- -vis other simultaneous equation 
estimation techniques. 
Zellner (1962) and Zellner and Huang (1962) have proposed a feasible generalised 
least squares estimation methodology that takes into account the fact that the 
variance-covariance matrix is usually unknown a priori. Their procedures are used 
in order to increase the efficiency of the estimates. Moreover, since volume shares 
sum to one, the contemporaneous variance-covariance matrix is singular, and thus 
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the 'rest-of-world' equation has to be deleted before the remaining equations for 
each importer are jointly estimated. 
To estimate consistently all systems of equations by SUR, total imports and unit 
import costs have to be exogenous to the model. Total imports of iron ore can be 
considered exogenous because they generally bear a technical relationship with 
the amount of pig iron to be produced. So their changes are very much driven with 
the changes in steel demand. Price exogeneity is justified on the ground that 
contracted prices in a particular year are specified in annual negotiations before 
actual shipments take place. Although prices and volumes have some relationship 
they are not completely dependent on each other. This is particularly true in the 
relationship between prices and 'actual' - as opposed to 'contracted' - shipments, 
since actual shipments are almost invariably different to contracted volumes. 
An additional problem in the estimation process is the inclusion of a lagged 
variable in all equations. The possible existence of serial correlation creates 
biasedness and consistency problems to the estimators. Because of this, Durbin's 
h-statistic was used, in addition to the Durbin-Watson statistic produced by the 
econometric software. Test results are reported in the chapter V, together with the 
results from the estimation. 
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IV.3.2 Data 
Data used in the model include annual unit import values (in $Itonne) and 
volumes of iron ore imports (in metric tonnes) of a total of 10 importing countries 
which collectively account for at least 90% of world imports, throughout the 35 
years from 1962 to 1996. In some cases, some importers have emerged in the 
market at a later stage, so that the time series in these cases begin later than 1962. 
In the case of China, imports did not begin until the late 1980s. All value and 
volume data were extracted from the UN International Commodity Trade 
Statistics (Series D), with unit import values calculated from those data as well. 
Unit import values were then checked against comparable data obtained from the 
TEX ReportS and the Metal Prices Yearbook6 to ensure consistency. All prices and 
data are included in the appendix at the end of chapter 5. 
The advantage of using unit import values over quoted prices is that quoted prices 
are usually on an f.o.b. basis (with the exception of Australian ore to Europe 
which normally quoted on c.i.f. basis). There is no need for any currency or 
inflationary adjustment, because trade is conducted on the basis of US dollars 
among all trading partners and any inflationary effects are only relevant to the 
total number of imports, rather than the allocation of these imports among 
different suppliers. Ultimately, it is the tota1landed price in the importing country 
that determines the competitiveness of each supplier. If a supplier's prices are 
5 TEX Report Iron Ore Manual (annual issues from 1981 toI997). 
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uncompetitive in the long-term, importers will chose different trading partners 
instead. The speed of this change is of importance here and this is one of the 
parameters this model attempts to estimate. 
IV.4 Conclusion 
This chapter focused on the economic determination of a model for the behaviour 
of participants in the iron ore market. The simple model of bilateral monopoly has 
been suggested by several authors as an attractive analytical framework for many 
bargaining situations and it has indeed been proposed for the study of iron ore 
trade. 
I believe this model to be rather restrictive, as it assumes that only two 
participants exist in the market and they will have to agree a price and quantity 
that maximises their joint profit. Although, this may be true when two negotiating 
partners are looked at in isolation, this is not true for the market at large. I believe 
that even on bilateral negotiations, partners take into account the possibility of 
choosing alternative partners at a later stage, if necessary and they also realise that 
the opposing partner has similar options open to him as well. Bearing this in mind, 
I have proposed an alternative profit maximising behaviour which is demonstrated 
in Figure IV -2. In this case, the importer enters negotiations with complete 
knowledge of his own minimum acceptable price, a possible idea of his partner's 
6 The Metal Prices Yearbook is published by Metal Bulletin with prices on all ferrous and non-
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maximum acceptable price and also an idea (which can be held with varying 
degrees of certainty) of what alternative suppliers may be able to offer. This will 
restrict the range of prices over which negotiations take place and will mitigate the 
aggressiveness of the seller. 
A buyer is likely to act in a similar manner, knowing that the seller has alternative 
export outlets, but he can also use other bargaining tools to achieve a better deal. 
A quite common tool is the promise of long term commitment through the signing 
of contracts, acquisition of equity stakes in mines or provision of financing 
facilities. 
The behaviour of the trading partners in such an oligopoly/oligopsony (or bilateral 
oligopoly) environment can be studied with a relatively simple and tried 
econometric technique, borrowed from consumption and investment theory and 
applied for the first time for all top iron ore importers, who collectively have 
accounted for at least 90% of world trade in the last 3S years. Chapter V displays 
and discusses the results of this model. 
ferrous metals. 
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v. Results, Interpretation and Conclusions 
V.l General Remarks 
Following the discussion in chapter IV, this chapter discusses the practical some 
further considerations regarding the estimation of the partial adjustment model 
and then proceeds with the presentation of results and comments for nine of the 
ten top importers of iron ore. 
For each of the nine importing countries, I look at its five top suppliers, who 
usually account for approximately 90% of this country's imports. A system of 
equations is built as it was described in chapter IV. To give an illustrative 
example, one may look at the case of Japan whose partners include Australia, 
Brazil, India, South Africa and Chile. The general form of the equations is given 
in chapter IV and recreated below for convenience. 
S;,1 =a; *+(l-r)s;,I_l + Lb;,j *lnPj,1 +c; *lnQ, +61,1 * 
j 
Eq. V-I 
The set of seemingly unrelated regressions that is estimated consists of the 
following five equations: 
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SAu.r=llt +(l-r)·SAu.r +~t ·lnPAu.r +~,2 ·lnPBru +~3 ·I~nd+~. ·lnPs.A,s ·lnPclll+G ·lnQ,ap+hi 
SBra=~ +(l-r}SBra +~t ·ln~u.r +b2,2 ·lnPara +b2,3 ·l~nd+~. ·lnPsJ\s ·lnPcltl+~ ·lnQ,ap +62 
SInd =~ +(l-r}slnd+~1 ·lnPAu.r +~2 ·lnPBra +~3 ·I~nd+~. ·lnPsJ\s ·lnPclli+~ ·lnQ,ap +bJ 
sSa/=a. +(l-r) SSaf +b.,t ·lnPAu.r +b.,2 ·lnPBra +b •. 3 ·l~nd+b •.• ·lnPsJ1 •. s ·lnPCIII+c. ·lnQ,ap +&. 
SCIII = a, +(1-r) SCIII +bs., ·lnPAu.r +bS•2 ·lnPBra +bS•3 ·l~nd +bS•4 ·lnP sJ1s.s ·lnPclll +CS ·lnQ,ap +&s 
The subscripts for countries are: Aus for Australia; Bra for Brazil; Ind for India; 
Sa! for South Africa; Chi for Chile; and Jap for Japan. In short, the share for each 
supplier is regressed against the first-order lag for that share, the logarithms of the 
prices of all suppliers (including its own price) and the logarithm of the total 
volume of the iron ore imported by the buyer. 
In all cases, Zellner's feasible generalised least square estimation (FGLS) 
procedure is used. Given that the main problem is that the variance-covariance 
matrix (l:) of the disturbance terms is unknown, Zellner proposes the following: 
1. Apply OLS separately to each of the above equations, obtaining the vectors of 
2. The diagonal elements of the unknown matrix 1: are estimated and the 
estimated 1: matrix is substituted to produce a feasible estimator. 
V.I.I Estimation Results 
Overall, the partial adjustment model is found to represent quite well the market 
share determination by the majority of importers. The goodness of fit tests 
(measured by R2 adjusted for degrees of freedom) are reported in detail on a 
country-by-country basis, but overall they varied between 65-980/0 with very few 
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cases where the results were quite low. In all cases the estimates for the 
adjustment factor r were found to be statistically significant and a summary of the 
results is given in Table V-I, below. 
Table V-I 
Partial Adjustment Factors for all Estimated Import Equations 
Importer Estimated 1-, Calculated, 
Japan 0.57 0.43 
Germany 0.73 0.27 
Belgium 0.78 0.22 
France 0.81 0.l9 
Italy 0.32 0.68 
UK 0.69 0.31 
Netherlands 0.48 0.52 
USA 0.60 0.40 
S. Korea 0.45 0.55 
The actual regressions yielded an estimated for J-r, from which r can be trivially 
computed. The r factor in the partial adjustment process is interpreted as the part 
of desired changes effectuated by actual changes in import shares. As a resul4 the 
higher r is, the more flexible the importer is and, hence, more capable (and 
willing) to switch quickly between different suppliers. 
It is quite interesting to observe the diversity in the partial adjustment factors 
among different importers. Japan, for example, is estimated to be able to realise 
43% of its desired changes of import shares from one period to the next. Taking 
into consideration Japan's inherent weakness due to its lack of domestic natural 
resources, its flexibility can be attributed to its very wise procuring policy that was 
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discussed in chapter III. Revisiting the bilateral oligopoly exposition of chapter 
IV, I could argue that Japan has two major credible 'threats': frrstly, its recourse to 
third buyers when it negotiates with each individual supplier, so that each 
negotiation is not done in isolation, as it would in a bilateral monopoly situation; 
and secondly, its use of long-term contracts as a negotiating tool in order to 
extract better price terms from its suppliers. 
Germany, in comparison, seems rather inflexible with the r factor only at 27%. 
Although published information on German long-term contracts is largely 
unavailable, the country does have several equity stakes in Brazilian mines, which 
may restrict its flexibility. A similar situation seems to prevail for most West 
European importers, with the exception of Italy. France seems to be the least 
flexible, possibly owed to the fact that its own iron ore industry is still 
'artificially' kept alive, and also because of its substantial equity investment in 
iron ore mines Liberia and Mauritania. 
The United States' flexibility is not surprising, given its close relationships with 
Canadian mines. South Korea, on the other hand, seems to be following the 
Japanese model. It, too, depends on 3-4 suppliers, which it can 'play' against one 
another and thus improve its relatively weak bargaining position (no domestic ore 
reserves). 
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V.2 Japan 
Table V-2 
Australia Brazil India S. Africa Chile 
Import share (1996) 49.94% 22.35% 13.33% 3.88% 2.96% 
Data sample 1962-1996 1962-1996 1962-1996 1962-1996 1962-1996 
Lagged own import 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 
share (14.20) (14.20) (14.20) (14.20) (14.20) 
In P - Australia -0.02 0.01 0.16 0.03 -0.01 
(-0.38) (0.70) (4.09) (2.27) (-0.48) 
In P - Brazil -0.23 -0.0006 0.09 -0.01 0.03 
(-2.46) (0.01) (1.23) (-0.58) (0.54) 
In P - India 0.09 0.08 -0.07 -0.04 0.03 
(1.26) (2.52) (-1.32) (-1.82) (0.64) 
In P - S. Africa 0.09 -0.02 -0.07 0.02 -0.006 
(0.97) (-0.48) (-0.93) (0.66) (-0.12) 
InP-Chile 0.07 -0.003 -0.08 0.007 -0.04 
(1.26) (-0.12) (-1. 92) (0.41) (-1.10) 
In P - Total imports 0.09 0.02 -0.05 -0.013 -0.03 
(5.11) (3.54) (-4.32) (-2.56) (-3.56) 
Constant -1.56 -0.60 1.04 0.24 0.68 
(-5.60) (-5.U) (5.73) (3.") ('.n) 
Adjusted Rl 0.97 0.98 O.BO 0.67 0.95 
Durbin's h-statistic 1.36 0.24 1.56 n.a. -2.17 
Breusch-Godfrey (P) p-0.1334 
Notes: 
1. Numbers is brackets indicate calculated I-statistics. 
2. The estimated coefficients reported here were based on Zellner's SUR methodology, run on RATS. 
The goodness of fit and Durbin's h-statistics were obtained from the single equation OLS 
regressions. 
3. Durbin's h-statistic is used to test for first-order autocorrelation in the presence of a lagged 
dependent variable. The h-statistics are asymptotically normally distributed as N(O,l). The 95% 
critical value is 1.96. Any calculated h-statistic below this value (in absolute terms) indicates that 
there is no autocorrelation problem in the equation. Where the h-statistic cannot be calculated the 
Breusch-Godfrey test is used instead. P-values in excess of 0.05 indicates that there is no 
autocorrelation problem. 
The biggest and most influential player in the iron ore market is Japan. The 
reasons for its dominance of the Pacific and - indirectly - the world market have 
already been given in earlier discussion. The results from the partial adjustment 
model are given in the table below. All r's estimated are statistically significant 
and the model performs quite well for four out of the five suppliers. Japan's 
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relative flexibility (r = 0.43) was discussed earlier in this chapter and the estimate 
is somewhat larger that that reported by Chang (1994), where r is estimated at 
0.29. 
Interesting to note are also the coefficients for some of the price variables. 
Australia's share, for example, has a negative elasticity of -0.23 to changes in 
Brazilian prices, implying that Australia benefits from decreases (rather than 
increases) in Brazilian prices. The sign of the coefficient is not the expected one, 
but similar results on this issue are also reported by Chang. Brazil's share is more 
sensitive on India's prices, while India's share is dependent on Australia's. Also 
significant are the coefficients of the variable Q, representing total Japanese 
imports. The results show a tendency for Japan to resort directly to Australia and 
Japan for any increased needs in imports, at the expense of other countries. This is 
not surprising as these two countries have the largest capacity and flexibility to 
swiftly satisfy increased demand. 
v.a Germany 
As discussed earlier, Gennany shows a relative inflexibility in switching between 
suppliers, as it is estimated to realise some 27% (= 1 - 0.73) of its desired changed 
every year. Reasons for this relative inflexibility were discussed at the beginning 
of this chapter. Of the other coefficients, it is only Brazilian shares that seem to be 
affected by price changes in Sweden and the total imports. The coefficient for 
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total imports is negative, implying that swift increases in import demand are 
satisfied by shorter-haul sources, like Canada and Sweden. 
Overall, with the exception of Norway, there is a reasonably good fit to the model, 
with adjusted R2's for Brazil and Sweden at 97% and 90%, respectively. The case 
of Norway has more problems (presence serial correlation) and overall it does not 
perform well. This may be partly due to the fact that Norway has few own 
resources and some of its exports actually come from Sweden (through the port of 
Narvik, near the Arctic circle). 
Table V-3 
Brazil Canada Sweden Australia Norway 
Import share (1996) 55.22% 14.0U 13.11% 9.06% 2.69% 
Data sample 1962-1996 1962-1996 1962-1996 1962-1996 1962-1996 
Lagged own import 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 
share (17 .35) (17.35) (17.35) (17.35) (17.35) 
InP-Brazil -0.03 -0.17 0.06 0.03 -0.02 
(-0.32) (-1.59) (0.58) (0.32) (-0.37) 
InP-Canada 0.03 0.56 0.08 -0.01 -0.0006 
(0.4l) (0.70) (1.00) (-0.14) (-0.02) 
InP-Sweden 0.18 0.05 0.06 -0.02 -0.0001 
(3.51) (1.00) (1.12) (-0.41) (-0.003) 
In P - Australia -0.06 0.10 -0.08 -0.07 0.02 
(-0.59) (1.05) (-0.81) (-0.77) (0.40) 
InP-Norway -0.05 -0.006 -0.14 0.06 0.0002 
(-1.32) (-0.15) (-3.47) (1.49) (0.009) 
In P - Total imports -0.10 0.03 0.009 0.013 -0.014 
(-'.<12) (1.12) (0.35) (0.60) (-1.06) 
Constant 1.68 -0.56 -0.06 -0.19 0.26 
(' .12) (-1.28) (-0.13) (-0.47) (1.12) 
Adjusted RZ 0.97 0.64 0.90 0.77 0.20 
Durbin's h-statistic -0.31 -1.28 0.92 0.37 5.15 
Notes: 
1. Numbers is brackets indicate calculated t-statistics. 
2. The estimated coefficients reported here were based on Zellner's SUR methodology, run on RATS. 
3. The goodness of fit and Durbin's h-statistics were obtained from the single equation OLS 
regressions. Durbin's h-statistic is used to test for first-order autocorrelation in the presence of a 
lagged dependent variable. The h-statistics are asymptotically normally distributed as N(O, 1). The 
95% critical value is 1.96. Any calculated h-statistic below this value (in absolute terms) indicates 
that there is no autocorrelation problem in the equation. 
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V.4 Belgium 
Belgium's case is quite similar to that of Germany's. It also seems to be able to 
realise only a small part of its desired changes every year. The implied r of 0.22 is 
relatively. Of the price coefficients, that of French import shares and Mauritanian 
prices, as well as Brazilian import shares and Swedish prices. Still, however. the 
coefficients are quite low and. hence, inelastic. Overall. the model achieves good 
fit results of between 82-98% in terms of adjusted R2. 
Table V-4 
Brazil Mauritania Franee Canada Sweden 
Import share (1996) 48.47% 11.97% 10.94% 10.43% 6.01% 
Data sample 1962-1996 1962-1996 1962-1996 1962-1996 1962-1996 
Lagged own import 0.7B 0.7B 0.7B 0.78 0.7B 
share (17 .54) (17.54) (17.54) (17.54) (17.54) 
In P-Brazil O.OB 0.006 -O.lB 0.003 0.07 
(2.61) (0.31) (-3.13) (0.20) (1.52) 
In P - Mauritania -0.13 0.003 0.21 -0.04 -0.09 
(-3.09) (0.11) (2.B3) (-1.41) (-1.59) 
In P-France -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 0.06 0.05 
(-0.56) (-1.04) (-0.99) (3.73) (1.29) 
InP-Canada 0.05 0.005 -0.04 0.02 -0.02 
(2.53) (0.48) (-1.15) (1.54) (-0.72) 
InP-Sweden 0.08 0.01 -0.0001 -0.03 -0.05 
(2.79) (0.55) (-0.003) (-2.00) (-1.25) 
In P - Total imports -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.04 
(-0.55) (-2.75) (-1.21) (1.53) (1. 63) 
Constant 0.03 0.51 O.Bl -0.24 -0.48 
(0.11) (2.55) (1.48) (-1.24) (-1.09) 
Adjusted RZ 0.98 0.89 0.96 0.85 0.82 
Durbin's h-statistic -1.16 -1. 69 -1. 67 -3.33 0.55 
Notes: 
1. Numbers is brackets indicate calculated t-statistics. 
2. The estimated coefficients reported here were based on Zellner's SUR methodology, run on RATS. 
3. The goodness of fit and Durbin's h-statistics were obtained from the single equation OLS 
regressions. Durbin's h-statistic is used to test for first-order autocorrelation in the presence of a 
lagged dependent variable. The h-statistics are asymptotically nonnally distributed as N(O, 1). The 
95% critical value is 1.96. Any calculated h-statistic below this value (in absolute tenns) indicates 
that there is no autocorrelation problem in the equation. 
192 
V.s France 
Table V-5 
Brazil Australia Mauritania Canada S. Africa 
Import share (1996) 35.89% 27.63% 15.83% 10.27% 2.50% 
Data sample 1962-1996 1962-1996 1962-1996 1962-1996 1962-1996 
Lagged own import 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 
share (15.97) (15.97) (15.97) (15.97) (15.97) 
In P - Brazil -0.16 0.003 0.04 0.08 -0.09* 
(-2.13) (0.03) (0.50) (1.43) (-1.81) 
In P - Australia 0.09 -0.03 0.05 -0.05 0.05 
(1.06) (-0.22) (0.65) (-0.78) (0.77) 
In P - Mauritania 0.03 0.04 -0.14* -0.04 0.08 
(0.39) (0.33) (-1.90) (-0.68) (1.45) 
InP-Canada 0.04 0.007 0.03 -0.008 -0.01 
(2.13) (0.06) (1.51) (-0.49) (-1.00) 
In P - S. Africa -0.04 0.004 0.06 0.02 -0.05* 
(-0.91) (0.06) (1.40) (0.57) (-1. 75) 
In P - Total imports 0.06 -0.009 0.04* 0.01 0.000 
(2.82) (-0.28) (1.82) (0.60) (0.003) 
Constant -0.83 0.11 -0.68 -0.15 0.12 
(-2.60) (0.23) (-2.27) (-0.62) (0.56) 
Adjusted Rl 0.82 0.73 0.77 0.74 0.31 
Durbin's h-statistic -2.52 -2.27 n.a. -2.06 n.a. 
Breusch-Godfrey (P) 0.065 0.000 
• significant at 90% 
Notes: 
1. Numbers is brackets indicate calculated t-statistics. 
2. The estimated coefficients reported here were based on Zellner's SUR methodology, run on RATS. 
3. The goodness of fit and Durbin's h-statistics were obtained from the single equation OLS 
regressions. Durbin's h-statistic is used to test for first-order autocorrelation in the presence of a 
lagged dependent variable. The h-statistics are asymptotically normally distributed as N(O, 1). The 
95% critical value is 1.96. Any calculated h-statistic below this value (in absolute terms) indicates 
that there is no autocorrelation problem in the equation. Where the h-statistic cannot be calculated 
the Breusch-Godfrey test is used instead. P-values in excess of 0.05 indicates that there is no 
autocorrelation problem. 
V.6 Italy 
Italy seems to be quite different from its European counterparts. It has the highest 
implies r, estimated at 68%, which can be interpreted as a wish of the country's 
steel producers to pursue more actively the diversification f their procurement 
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portfolio. The highest elasticity is observed as the coefficient of Canadian prices 
and Brazilian shares (0.21), which indicates that it is Canada that takes up any 
'slack' in the Italy-Brazil negotiations. A similar relationship exists between 
Mauritanian shares and Canadian prices. 
Table V-6 
Brazil Mauritania Australia Canada Venezuela 
Import share (1996) 50.50% 19.13% 7.94% 7.75% 4.60 
Data sample 1962-1996 1962-1996 1962-1996 1962-1996 1962-1996 
Lagged own import 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 
share (3.95) (3.95) (3.95) (3.95) (3.95) 
InP-Brazil 0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.05 
(0.53) (1.03) (-0.B8) (0.62) (-2.19) 
In P - Mauritania -0.11 -0.02 0.08 0.05 0.08 
(-1.38) (-0.48) (1.34) (0.98) (2.28) 
In P - Australia -0.08 0.07 0.02 -0.13 -0.02 
(-0.85) (1.15) (0.26) (-2.28) (-0.35) 
InP-Canada 0.21 0.07 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 
(4.02) (2.47) (-0.39) (-0.76) (-1.46) 
In P - Venezuela 0.12 -0.07 -0.02 0.04 0.01 
(1.44) (-1.44) (-0.32) (0.82) (0.31) 
In P - Total imports 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 
(0.38) (-1.39) (0.76) (-1.32) (-1. 64) 
Constant -0.55 0.32 -0.33 0.68 0.51 
(-0.95) (0.96) (-0.82) (1.99) (2.04) 
Adjusted RZ 0.90 0.64 0.26 0.50 0.64 
Durbin's h-statistic n.a. -4.21 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Breusch-Godfrey (P) 0.001 0.023 0.09 0.03 
Notes: 
1. Numbers is brackets indicate calculated I-statistics. 
2. The estimated coefficients reported here were based on Zellner's SUR methodology, run on RATS. 
3. The goodness of fit and Durbin's h-statistics were obtained from the single equation OLS 
regressions. Durbin's h-statistic is used to test for first-order autocorrelation in the presence of a 
lagged dependent variable. The h-statistics are asymptotically normally distributed as N(O, 1). The 
95% critical value is 1.96. Any calculated h-statistic below this value (in absolute terms) indicates 
that there is no autocorrelation problem in the equation. Where the h-statistic cannot be calculated 
the Breusch-Godfrey test is used instead. P-values in excess of 0.05 indicates that there is no 
autocorrelation problem. 
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V.7 UK 
The United Kingdom's situation is similar to that of other West EW'Opean 
countries, i.e. it seems to have relative inflexibility in changing its import 
allocation swiftly, as it is implies by its partial adjustment ratio of 0.31. The model 
does not perform as well as in previous cases, with goodness of fit results ranging 
between 59-88% and one very poor fit in the case of Venezuela. 
Table V-7 
Australia Canada Brazil Venezuela Mauritania 
Import share (1996) 37.88% 21. 68% 11.53% 7.49% 4.20% 
Data sample 1962-1996 1962-1996 1962-1996 1962-1996 1962-1996 
Lagged own import 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 
share (11.70) (11.70) (11.70) (11.70) (11.70) 
In P - Australia 0.03 -0.07 -0.10 -0.03 -0.10 
(0.48) (-0.90) (-1. 99) (-1.11) (-1. 99) 
InP-Canada 0.10* 0.12* -0.01 0.02 -0.01 
(1.88) (1.82) (-0.31) (0.86) (-0.31) 
In P-Brazil 0.02 0.06 -0.008 0.007 -0.008 
(0.30) (0.74) (-0.14) (0.30) (-0.14) 
In P - Venezuela -0.02 -0.04 0.08* -0.01 -0.08* 
(-0.33) (-0.50) (1. 73) (-0.46) (1. 73) 
In P - Mauritania -0.06 -0.09* 0.06* 0.006 0.05* 
(1.33) (-1. 73) (1. 66) (0.30) (1. 66) 
In P - Total imports 0.09 -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 
(2.64) (-0.78) (0.40) (1.34) (0.40) 
Constant -1.76 0.61 -0.16 -0.28 -0.16 
(-2.84) (0.91) (-0.36) (-1.08) (-0.36) 
Adjusted Rl 0.88 0.59 0.62 0.22 0.62 
Durbin's h-statistic -2.08 -1.61 n.a. 0.75 -0.53 
Breusch-Godfrey (P) 0.03 
• Significant at 90%. 
Notes: 
1. Numbers is brackets indicate calculated t-statistics. 
2. The estimated coefficients reported here were based on Zellner's SUR methodology, run on RATS. 
3. The goodness of fit and Durbin's h-statistics were obtained from the single equation OLS 
regressions. Durbin's h-statistic is used to test for first-order autocorrelation in the presence of a 
lagged dependent variable. The h-statistics are asymptotically normally distributed as N(O, 1). The 
95% critical value is 1.96. Any calculated h-statistic below this value (in absolute terms) indicates 
that there is no autocorrelation problem in the equation. Where the h-statistic cannot be calculated 
the Breusch-Godfrey test is used instead. P-values in excess of 0.05 indicates that there is no 
autocorrelation problem. 
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V.8 Netherlands 
Results for Netherlands were initially erratic due to the relatively larger spread 
across several suppliers. For some meaningful results to be produced, the number 
of simultaneous regression was limited to just three partners: Brazil, Norway and 
Venezuela. The estimates for the partial adjustment ration were statistically 
significant and the implied r is set at 0.52, revealing a relatively flexibility in 
switching between partners. 
Table V-8 
Brazil Norway Venezuela 
Import share (1996) 33.63% 21.41% 12.62% 
Data sample 1962-1996 1962-1996 1962-1996 
Lagged own import 0.48 0.48 0.48 
share (4.27) (4.27) (4.27) 
InP-Brazil -0.02 -0.17 -0.08 
(-0.14) (-1.09) (-1.05) 
InP-Norway 0.29 0.23* 0.04 
(2.50) (1. 65) (0.61) 
In P - Venezuela -0.25 -0.10 -0.01 
(-2.71) (-0.86) (-0.23) 
In P - Total imports 0.05 0.07* 0.03* 
(1.99) (1. 77) (1. 71) 
Constant -0.79 -0.91 -0.32 
(-2.27) (-2.07) (-1.50) 
Adjusted RZ 0.76 0.71 0.50 
Durbin's h-statistic 0.94 n.a. n.a. 
Breusch-Godfrey (P) 0.03 0.43 
• Significant at 90%. 
Noles: 
1. Numbers is brackets indicate calculated I-statistics. 
2. The estimated coefficients reported here were based on Zellner's SUR methodology, run on 
RATS. 
3. The goodness of fit and Durbin's h-statistics were obtained from the single equation OLS 
regressions. Durbin's h-statistic is used to test for ftrst-order autocorrelation in the presence of a 
lagged dependent variable. The h-statistics are asymptotically nonnaUy distributed as N(O, 1). 
The 95% critical value is 1.96. Any calculated h-statistic below this value (in absolute tenns) 
indicates that there is no autocorrelation problem in the equation. Where the h-statistic cannot 
be calculated the Breusch-Godfrey test is used instead. P-values in excess of 0.05 indicates that 
there is no autocorrelation problem. 
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Results in the case of Netherlands might be further distorted by the fact that the 
country (through the port of Rotterdam, which has excellent reception facilities for 
large ore carriers) acts as a trans-shipment hub for several other West European 
countries, especially Germany. Because trans-shipped goods are not reported 
separately in UN commodity statistics, it is not unlikely that some of the volumes 
of ore appearing as Dutch imports may actually end up in a different country 
altogether. 
V.9 USA 
Table V-9 
Canada Brazil Venezuela 
Import share (1996) 53.29% 28.12% 11. 63% 
Data sample 1963-1996 1963-1996 1963-1996 
Lagged own import 0.60 0.60 0.60 
share (7.39) (7.39) (7.39) 
InP-Canada 
-0.15 0.11* 0.05 
(-1.58) (1.80) (0.77) 
In P - Brazil 0.17 -0.16 -0.06 
(2.16) (-3.08) (-1.26) 
In P - Venezuela 0.02 0.08 -0.04 
(0.23) (1. 64) (-0.78) 
In P - Total imports 0.02 0.02 -0.01 
(0.42) (0.79) (-0.40) 
Constant -0.20 -0.45 0.43 
(-0.24) (-0.85) (0.80) 
Adjusted Rl 0.50 0.85 0.77 
Durbin's h-statistic -0.95 0.52 -2.71 
• Significant at 90%. 
Notes: 
1. Numbers is brackets indicate calculated t-statistics. 
2. The estimated coefficients reported here were based on Zellner's SUR methodology, run on 
RATS. 
3. The goodness of fit and Durbin's h-statistics were obtained from the single equation OLS 
regressions. Durbin's h-statistic is used to test for first-order autocorrelation in the presence of a 
lagged dependent variable. The h-statistics are asymptotically nonnally distributed as N(O,l). 
The 95% critical value is 1.96. Any calculated h-statistic below this value (in absolute terms) 
indicates that there is no autocorrelation problem in the equation. 
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The overall model performance in the case of the USA can be deemed as 
satisfactory, with quite good fitness statistics of 85% in the case of Brazil and 
77% in the case of Venezuela. In the of Canada the reported R2 is only 50%, but 
the result is not unexpected in view of the close cross-ownership ties between US 
steel mills and Canadian mines. The use of just three countries is perfectly 
justified as between them they supply 93% of USA's needs. Brazil's own demand 
elasticity has the expected sign and is statistically significant. So is the cross 
elasticity of Canadian import shares with Brazilian prices. Finally, the implied r of 
0.40 reveals relative flexibility on the part of the US, again not an unexpected 
occurrence, due to USA's bargaining strength, expressed through its ability to 
gmdually depend less on iron orel and the availability of domestic ore production.2 
V.lO South Korea 
The main drawback of the estimation methodology in the case of South Korea is 
the lack of a long enough time series of data. The data series in the previous cases 
is not as long anyway Gust 35 annual observations), but in the case of South Korea 
the total number of observations is just 24, starting in 1973. This is simply 
because it was around that time that South Korea emerged as a potent steel 
producer, imitating the Japanese growth model which promoted heavy industries 
1 This is due to the introduction or more flexible steel production techniques, like the increased use 
of electric arc furnaces in mini-mills, which make use of steel scrap of direct reduced iron 
instead of iron ore. 
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for export purposes. Suffering from a similar lack of domestic raw materials, 
South Korea also had to rely on long-term import deals to secure the much needed 
procurement of raw materials for its industry. 
Regressions were run for just two suppliers (Australia and Brazil), as other smaller 
suppliers came in the picture much later and their inclusion in the model creates 
estimation problems. From the estimation the implied estimated r is 55%, 
revealing a degree of flexibility similar to that of Japan. 
Table V-tO 
Australia Brazil 
Import share (1996) 49.07% 27.74% 
Data sample 1973-1996 1973-1996 
Lagged own import 0.4S 0.45 
share (3.77) (3.77) 
In P - Australia -0.36 O.li 
(-3.73) (2.65) 
InP-Brazil 0.29 -0.14* 
(3.27) (-1.91) 
In P - Total imports 0.01 0.04 
(0.95) (2.87) 
Constant 0.23 -0.67 
(1. 61) (-3.15) 
AdjustedRZ 0.68 0.88 
Durbin's h-statistic 1. 32 -1.43 
• Significant at 90%. 
Notes: 
1. Numbers is brackets indicate calculated t-statistics. 
2. The estimated coefficients reported here were based on Zellner's SUR methodology, run on 
RATS. 
3. The goodness of fit and Durbin's h-statistics were obtained from the single equation OLS 
regressions. Durbin's h-statistic is used to test for first-order autocorrelation in the presence of a 
lagged dependent variable. The h-statistics are asymptotically normally distributed as N(O, 1). 
The 95% critical value is 1.96. Any calculated h-statistic below this value (in absolute terms) 
indicates that there is no autocorrelation problem in the equation. 
2 Indigenous resources of iron are available in the US, but often of rather low quality and 
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Own elasticities for both Australia and Brazil have the correct signs and are 
statistically significant. There also seems to be considerable cross price elasticity 
both between Australian shares and Brazilian prices (0.29) and between Brazilian 
shares and Australian prices (0.19), with both coefficients being statistically 
significant. Finally, the overall fit of the model can be deemed satisfactory (66% 
and 88% for Australia and Brazil, respectively) given the length of the data series. 
V.ll China 
The case of China was not formally studied using the partial adjustment model. 
The data series in China's case is even shorter, starting only in 1987. At best there 
are only ten observations (imports from Australia, Brazil and India) with two 
more series having only 4 observations (imports from Peru and South Africa). 
Despite this inability to perform any meaningful econometric testing, however, the 
case of China as an iron ore importer will certainly attract more attention. China 
entered the international steel producing community only recently, and this after 
substantial foreign direct investment by countries such as Japan. In recent years 
Chinese steel mills, through their government agencies, have sought secure iron 
ore supplies from a variety of exporters. The first obvious targets were Australia 
and Brazil, and they have acquired small equity stakes in one or two Australian 
mine. The Chinese have also looked for additional procurement sources 
elsewhere, most notably in Peru and South Africa. In the case of Peru they have 
apparently not in large enough volumes, since the country still has to rely on imports. 
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acquired an equity stake in Hierro Peru, with exports being channelled through the 
port of St. Nicholas on the Pacific. In the last year with complete UN commodity 
statistics (1996), China had crept up to third place in the world league of iron ore 
exporters and has certainly become a force difficult to ignore. 
V.12 Conclusions 
Iron ore is among the biggest, non-energy extractive industry in the world in terms 
of value, and the biggest in terms of the volumes of cargo it channels in 
international trade. On an annual basis it generates close to 400 million metric 
tonnes of trade and provides employment for an important part of the world's bulk 
carrier fleet. Iron ore is - and has been in the past - in abundant supply and 
current production comfortably covers supply needs. However, this supply tends 
to be concentrated in only a few countries which dominate the world market. Only 
10 of these of these countries supply at least 90% of world exports, with just the 
two market leaders - Australia and Brazil - providing some 60% of them, and 
dominating the Pacific and Atlantic markets, respectively. Following these two are 
Canada, South Africa and Sweden, with a few more smaller producers each of 
which does not control more that 1-2% of world supplies. 
Almost in its entirety, iron ore is the input of a single industry: steel 
manufacturing. Iron ore - whether in the form of sinter, pellets or directly reduced 
- enters the steel making procedure primarily as feedstock in the basic oxygen 
converters or in electric arc furnaces. It is not, therefore, surprising that on the 
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demand side, a handful of industrialised countries, which lead the world steel 
production, absorb most of the world's iron ore imports. Leading force among 
these countries are Japan, the United States, the EU (led by Germany), and more 
recently South Korea and China. 
Two key characteristics of the iron ore market are central to its study: firstly, there 
is only a small number of buyers and sellers; and secondly, there is a great degree 
of interdependence among buyers and sellers and both groups are aware of this 
interdependence. For buyers, security of supplies is crucial. Although iron ore 
accounts for only a small portion of the cost of finished steel, its availability is 
indispensable. For sellers, long-term commitment from importers is essential in 
order to maintain the long-run viability of mining projects, which are usually very 
costly both in terms of time and capital terms. 
Since the 1960s, long-term contracts have been, and still are, the main vehicle 
used in international iron ore trade. They have been used extensively by all the 
major importers and exporters of the commodity, the former wishing to secure 
continuous supplies of raw material and the latter striving to earn long-term 
commitment (and revenue) from their customers. Initially used by the Japanese as 
the most viable solution to procure raw materials for their booming economy, 
L rcs became popular with other developed economies, especially after the 
restrictions on foreign participation imposed by host countries and their 
nationalisation programmes. 
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In the 1960s and 1970s L TCs served well the international iron ore trade and 
brought a relative stability in prices, thus maintaining the impetus of world 
economic growth. In the 1980s, however, many importers found themselves over-
committed to L TCs and sought, and achieved, massive renegotiations in contract 
terms. The main outcome of this readjustment to world economic conditions, has 
been a tendency towards relatively shorter contracts (5-8 years instead of 15-20 
years) with more flexible quantity requirements and annual price renegotiations 
standard in all markets. 
Long-term contracts have evolved over the years, and I believe them to be more of 
a bargaining tool, rather than a mechanism that determines the optimal quantity of 
ore that must be traded between partners in order to maximise their joint profits. 
The experience of the 1980s was one of successive failures on the part of 
importers to take delivery of their contracted quantities. Increasingly, the reasons 
for the existence of such contracts remain thin on the ground. Their persistence 
could be attributable to their qualities as bargaining tools during the annual price 
negotiations. 
I focused on the L rcs Japan has negotiated over the years, due to the -
uncharacteristic - availability of relevant data. Most of the general observations 
made earlier are also valid in the case of Japan, which in fact pioneered the 
widespread use of LTCs. For a considerable amount of time Japan enjoyed an 
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almost oligopsonistic advantage over its suppliers, especially over Australia, 
which has been for a long time largely dependent on Japanese imports. This state 
of affairs, however, has shown evidence of changing towards a more competitive 
market structure as more prominent steel producers have appeared in the Pacific 
market and Australia has been systematically trying to diversify its export 
markets. 
Under the light of the above peculiarities of the iron market, the economic 
analysis within a competitive framework is not an option. Instead, I focused on 
that part of economic theory that focuses on non-competitive structures - namely, 
the theory of industrial organisation. Three such non-competitive market 
structures were discussed: oligopoly, bilateral monopoly and bilateral oligopoly. 
All structures have partial applications to the case of the iron ore market, but the 
one that seems to be closest to the international order in the sector is bilateral 
oligopoly. 
Oligopoly itself could be applicable on the production side, especially as just two 
countries supply 60% of world exports. The existence of relatively few dominant 
buyers, however, renders the use of this analytical framework problematic. 
Several authors have tried to look at individual bargaining situations as cases of 
bilateral monopoly, whereby a single buyer has to deal with a single seller. In 
most cases, theory predicts that the two parties will prefer to trade the quantity of 
the commodity that maximises their joint profits. In all but one case, however, 
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does a final price get determined as well. Instead, an indeterminate price range is -
rather vaguely - indicated. 
I believe this model to also be rather restrictive, as it assumes that only two 
participants exist in the market and they will have to agree a price and quantity 
that maximises their joint profit. Although, this may be true when two negotiating 
partners are looked at in isolation, this is not trues for the market at large. I believe 
that even on bilateral negotiations, partners take into account the possibility of 
choosing alternative partners at a later stage, if necessary and they also realise that 
the opposing partner has similar options open to him as well. 
Bearing this in mind, the contribution of this thesis lies in my proposal for an 
alternative profit maximising behaviour which is demonstrated in chapter IV. In 
this case, the importer enters negotiations with complete knowledge of his own 
maximum acceptable price, a possible idea of his partner's minimum acceptable 
price and also an idea (which can be held with varying degrees of certainty) of 
what alternative suppliers may be able to offer. This will restrict the range of 
prices over which negotiations take place and will mitigate the aggressiveness of 
the seller. A buyer is likely to act in a similar manner, knowing that the seller has 
alternative export outlets, but he can also use other bargaining tools to achieve a 
better deal. A quite common tool is the promise of long term commitment through 
the signing of contracts, acquisition of equity stakes in mines or provision of 
financing facilities. 
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Building on the theoretical framework proposed in chapter IV, the behaviour of 
the trading partners in such an oligopoly/oligopsony (or bilateral oligopoly) 
environment was studied with a relatively simple and tried econometric technique, 
borrowed from consumption and investment theory and applied for the first time 
for all top iron ore importers, who collectively have accounted for approximately 
90% of world trade in the last 35 years. The model has performed well in most 
cases and has revealed substantial differences in the way Far East and West 
European importers behave. 
Japan and South Korea have developed important flexibility in changing their 
procurement arrangement in relatively shorter time. This flexibility is measured 
by the r, the ratio of partial adjustment, which represents the actual changes in 
import allocation that an importer achieves in a year as a percentage of his desired 
change. In the case of Japan this ration was 0.43 or 43%, while for South Korea it 
was estimated at 0.55 or 55%. Although such a ratio indicates market conditions 
still far away from perfect competition, it is interesting to contrast it with the 
estimates for West European countries. Leading these importing countries is 
Germany with an estimated r of 0.27, with all other countries having similar 
partial adjustment factors, except Italy. 
Although not explicitly a demand model for international trade, the partial 
adjustment models makes a significant contribution to the discussion about the 
206 
economic structure of the iron ore industry. The cases of Japan and South Korea, 
in particular, firmly points towards the conclusions of the discussion on the 
bilateral oligopoly structure of the market. In chapter III it was hypothesised that 
Japan is largely using long-term contracts as a bargaining tool rather than a 
mechanism to determine the quantity maximising joint profits with its partners. Its 
failure to receive contracted quantities of iron ore in the 1990s has contributed to 
this flexibility and it is not unreasonable to say that it uses the signing (or non-
signing) of new contracts as a credible threat in its annual negotiations with -
especially - Australia and Brazil. 
Germany and its European partners, on the other hand, have demonstrated a 
relative inflexibility in their ability to reallocate import shares quickly. Although 
published information on European long-term contracts is not available, some of 
their inflexibility might be attributed to the fact that several of these countries 
have considerable equity stakes in several iron ore mining projects in Latin 
America and Africa. 
The most challenging and exciting prospects, both from a commercial and a 
research point of view, currently is the case of China. A relative new comer in the 
market, it appears as an iron ore importer only since 1987. Within the space of the 
last 10 years, China has entered the league of top iron ore importers and the most 
recent statistics place it in third position. The length of available data series is still 
restrictive for any meaningful quantitative research to be carried out right now. 
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The iron ore market is still relatively slow moving and does not benefit from the 
existence of a fairly transparent pricing mechanism for its finished product (like, 
for example, copper ore and bauxite). For any quantitative analysis to be 
meaningful a few decades worth of data are necessary. 
Having said this, however, recent trends towards shorter contracts and more 
frequent use of the spot market may herald a slow but firm move towards a more 
competitive market structure and a more transparent pricing mechanism . 
•••••••••••••••••••• **.*.** 
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V.la Appendix to Chapter V 
Data used for the partial adjustment model 
• Imports from partners (in metric tonnes) 
• Import shares of partners (%) 
• Unit import prices (US$/metric tonne) 
The following countries are covered 
• Table V-II: Japan (1962-1996) 
• Table V-12: Germany (1962-1996) 
• Table V-13: Belgium (1962-1996) 
• Table V-14: France (1962-1996) 
• Table V-IS: Italy (1962-1996) 
• Table V-16: UK (1962-1996) 
• Table V -17 : Netherlands (1962-1996) 
• Table V-IS: USA (1963-1996) 
• Table V -19: South Korea (1973-1996) 
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Table V-11(a): JAPAN -Imports by Origin (Metric tonnes) 
tWear~ ,~USTRAtIA :h~RAZlC ;CANADA ~CHItE ii~"$).INDIA ~ _ ERU ~P.Hru~NES $AF~ICA i\lENEZUELA ~OW~ORLO 
1962 135739 463781 1574297 3010688 2199932 0 2495242 1481905 627301 0 1265968 13254853 
1963 179729 497749 1885535 3317901 2886447 0 2915184 1429455 591131 17324 2436011 16156466 
1964 101539 438648 1764701 5417108 3547908 0 3493886 1500729 1025425 0 3256088 20546032 
1965 230912 915163 1950468 6929097 7912866 0 4532179 1482003 1651617 128898 4675752 30408955 
1966 2043491 1704461 1818358 7628578 10194503 0 5062617 1605420 2792834 0 5928925 38779187 
1967 8313833 2430664 1680117 8098830 10828547 0 6823164 1452516 4348548 0 6122874 50099093 
1968 13813940 2198482 1977228 8706909 12771756 0 7363401 1535932 4897523 0 7234975 60500146 
1969 23234523 4185450 2044304 7768902 13633377 4368 8622915 1614361 4669665 0 8528148 74306013 
1970 36596955 6779361 2301011 7986398 16522345 52514 7753413 1871929 4817660 92491 9092328 93866405 
1971 46287396 8996651 2684807 9036158 16795451 354633 7415340 2333955 6125183 0 9068063 109097637 
1972 48294755 9334542 2074721 6683831 17901020 1080210 6939935 2473449 4578779 0 7377752 106738994 
1973 64238641 12821283 3357038 8492829 19112277 1988305 6132755 2312305 4769330 0 6836440 130061203 
1974 67880987 19522809 4503522 8571156 17369020 2408926 5959933 1636426 4238602 0 5656453 137747834 
1975 63253080 23459583 3899669 8056814 16812324 2503256 2732028 1516817 3427271 0 3293629 128954471 
1976 64094316 25380371 5635573 7604065 17593276 2335727 2477181 893450 3932043 0 3458745 133404747 
1977 63103364 23742697 3638923 6717755 17877999 2545735 2975767 2052825 6595258 0 2820048 132070371 
1978 52626268 20815439 2475924 6105614 14355153 3331510 2610413 3622575 6609331 0 1803792 114356019 
1979 55297480 26136093 4649023 6711754 17088183 3485820 2949954 4044543 8153954 0 1665951 130182755 
1980 60040060 28522932 3428674 7071442 16506568 3008840 2549191 4060454 6832650 0 1614443 133635254 
1981 54860965 27164735 4409286 6172637 15635813 2732642 1978113 3639374 5764929 0 1003352 123361846 
1982 54139956 27346237 2930706 5628020 15738754 2563506 2074540 3860964 6528120 0 914107 121724910 
1983 49772804 23509201 3225341 5040447 14653314 2422873 1548414 3060712 5142615 0 777231 109152952 
1984 58357452 29017413 3107327 4976730 15839987 2438071 1539258 3990428 5471859 0 633974 125372499 
1985 54321348 29064068 2790899 4750156 18854936 2347332 1469010 3918467 6586285 0 410200 124512701 
1986 46893889 26633279 2261862 4574391 20750506 2321056 1403918 3596554 5507801 123268 1167309 115233833 
1987 43413754 26831270 2255126 4526926 20255127 1960508 1128518 4201748 5583602 339850 1537987 112034416 
1988 52415696 27931730 2081978 4925306 21761645 1542445 1048549 4764452 4900424 443502 1561364 123377091 
1989 56275433 29520127 2146843 4652456 21219380 1387042 961025 4507224 4852591 540492 1646624 127709237 
1990 53852628 30198492 1923104 3950169 20752612 1274758 863581 4849456 4804779 1798060 1001764 125269403 
1991 58353791 28470416 1680710 4128662 20972731 1292745 540871 4864255 4993303 1407405 386665 127091554 
1992 104137622 53514070 2461418 7994576 16573064 3096340 1567430 7784918 9689162 3366806 17281478 227466884 
1993 106946248 55644356 2317666 7114934 16617477 2464536 1144660 8262038 8272864 3007682 17174543 228967004 
1994 55409205 27873986 1374528 3402279 15714024 1226188 686529 4328930 4579463 1090837 403668 116089637 
1995 58727456 27627593 1063578 2418369 18324992 1317973 397372 4744337 4700331 981434 131460 120434895 
1996 59527894 26645608 978612 3523113 15891856 1382136 751639 4546109 4628261 1066201 263538 119204967 
Table V-11(b): JAPAN - Shares by Origin 
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Table V-11: JAPAN -Import Prices (US$ltonne) 
~eai8 W1S1RAl=fA ~lBRA2lE ~A ~'LE ~::t'ND'! . if. ' ~v :etffl!1eeJ~ES !S!Fm~ ~EZQ~t!6 
1962 9.098 18.459 15.068 16.004 17.004 #N/A 13.714 11.788 18.176 #N/A 
1963 7.194 16.804 14.409 15.573 15.796 #N/A 13.104 11 .558 16.206 15.412 
1964 8.883 16.070 14.248 15.200 15.154 #N/A 13.033 11.390 16.106 #N/A 
1965 12.962 15.932 14.224 14.890 13.195 #N/A 12.995 11 .823 15.785 14.306 
1966 12.101 13.537 13.621 14.511 12.775 #N/A 12.597 12.103 15.073 #N/A 
1967 11.753 12.357 12.968 13.860 12.165 #N/A 13.132 12.193 14.222 #N/A 
1968 11 .863 11.681 12.475 13.368 11.716 #N/A 12.489 13.316 14.031 #N/A 
1969 11 .770 11.016 12.078 12.973 11 .703 7.784 10.894 12.770 13.084 #N/A 
1970 11.522 11.266 13.355 13.061 12.041 10.683 11 .941 12.305 12.764 18.737 
1971 11 .139 11.044 11.951 12.456 12.227 7.518 10.945 11.246 13.368 #N/A 
1972 11 .106 10.716 12.159 12.456 12.223 8.302 11 .390 11 .091 13.058 #N/A 
1973 12.133 11.623 13.580 13.064 13.137 9.034 11 .974 11 .761 14.501 #N/A 
1974 14.359 13.644 15.147 15.233 16.919 10.006 15.444 13.222 16.623 #N/A 
1975 15.839 16.791 17.714 16.845 19.583 11.697 18.263 13.589 19.846 #N/A 
1976 16.670 17.606 18.542 18.183 19.347 11.468 18.565 14.886 21.089 #N/A 
1977 18.254 19.654 22.123 20.716 19.742 11 .894 20.688 33.625 21.266 #N/A 
1978 20.250 21.313 24.448 25.621 20.569 14.023 25.320 35.681 22.622 #N/A 
1979 21 .1 36 24.303 24.769 30.327 21 .200 16.141 26.717 38.093 23.148 #N/A 
1980 22.891 28.053 26.752 34.956 25.717 19.304 29.910 39.793 25.745 #N/A 
1981 25.114 31.004 28.26939.090 27.604 20.65533.455 45.836 29.750 #N/A 
1982 27.268 31.631 30.403 41.784 27.781 21.544 35.200 43.560 31.288 #N/A 
1983 26.574 30.544 27.951 38.579 27.599 21 .007 31.696 43.661 31.372 #N/A 
1984 23.236 27.082 25.654 34.450 24.276 18.972 28.279 40.026 28.559 #N/A 
1985 22.610 25.871 24.599 31 .213 22.728 18.548 26.352 38.455 26.763 #N/A 
1986 22.696 25.264 25.188 29.903 21 .606 17.107 23.209 38.457 25.349 19.024 
1987 21.862 24.400 24.619 31 .309 21.050 16.163 24.770 36.607 24.401 16.969 
1988 21 .332 24.554 24.140 28.509 21.719 16.451 23.038 36.692 23.724 18.595 
1989 22.462 26.670 27.133 28.825 23.542 17.966 29.203 38.828 24.974 19.847 
1990 24.424 29.554 27.93332.126 25.610 20.44931 .501 39.911 26.599 27.279 
1991 26.135 31.601 32.031 34.196 27.238 21.209 29.763 41.676 29.248 28.339 
1992 25.261 31.085 29.749 33.744 26.569 20.511 29.310 43.268 30.866 29.034 
1993 23.798 29.420 28.283 32.727 24.688 18.818 24.683 42.273 29.712 25.539 
1994 22.187 28.270 28.697 29.367 22.902 17.935 23.344 41.716 28.072 22.753 
1995 23.096 29.255 28.101 33.399 24.094 18.981 25.208 43.137 30.178 24.102 
1996 23.240 29.296 28.865 31 .899 24.962 20.457 24.798 41.940 30.782 25.528 
TabJe V-12(a): GERMANY -Imports by Origin (Metric tonnes) 
~W~~ ~lJSJ'BA[~ .~RQIli' fGANADA lSW'lCE ·UBeRlA .~ . " .. OBWAY ?SAlffiICA _ SP.t\lN :swePEN ~~~ .• 80W ~WORI!Q 
1962 0 2834141 1019257 9339475 1065656 0 869768 20288 1148977 8098774 1101576 4110351 29608263 
1963 0 2586628 930731 7022218 1655009 254231 788099 18988 1110409 8147695 1069587 4231599 27815194 
1964 0 3280057 758380 6619839 4294448 1145222 886635 20477 1291464 9706705 2043420 5215490 35262137 
1965 0 3357817 1000555 6133863 5776369 1239921 690255 44719 1111237 10146565 1944151 4724049 36169501 
1966 0 2891594 800161 5052830 6251153 1177291 598245 4651 808984 9588860 1606032 3328279 32108080 
1967 182882 4404162 1017897 4456291 6160078 1252687 1100563 0 813169 10265446 1328211 1742500 32723886 
1968 562321 4730084 2199071 4644619 6980121 1304520 1596852 58207 1217919 12916652 1664370 1700607 39575343 
1969 823794 6382369 2124738 5364869 6665958 1236752 1457251 8490 1465569 13618395 1734369 1447783 42330337 
1970 1010104 6365440 3710166 5220243 8190810 1342251 1675803 586525 1486184 11517322 3010118 2718018 46832984 
1971 1785508 6912955 2126936 4356859 6880503 1093937 2218327 115940 1324785 9632481 2301779 1073439 39823449 
1972 1662446 8329745 2222352 4012028 6757762 724758 2760080 192 1517388 8714995 2604785 982270 40288801 
1973 2777261 11042760 3885710 3515608 8543179 1007578 1884933 155776 1042702 10893676 2550656 1690966 48990805 
1974 4779826 11980395 3975956 3676723 9744582 1515820 1462619 659491 1571257 10586306 2711170 3761525 56425670 
1975 6412092 11023422 4065132 2623412 6196186 603476 1160921 297083 1465805 5761749 1873163 2465512 43947953 
1976 7004641 12075097 6354941 2807170 6600373 960534 1139946 523818 1344355 5267299 2111855 1420627 47610656 
I\,) 
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I 1977 5225471 10184084 4452068 1603456 6805208 914387 1404992 2265854 1065267 4322913 1250413 1015206 40509319 
I 1978 5581137 11132384 3451926 1545423 7044638 555499 1371150 3524356 893354 5759267 801746 1004702 42665582 
1979 6131731 11984614 6802034 1860724 7591093 769424 2449525 4431039 924201 6854006 1714576 816062 52329029 
1980 4663726 13284306 7932065 1851804 6818232 549656 1912700 4410194 956914 5902714 1748578 363818 50394707 
1981 3441548 14543398 5951722 1229227 7414275 560772 1525696 4155231 828453 3555796 1394516 227904 44828538 
1982 3543160 13870163 6104167 352535 6104589 466941 1331046 3087729 673005 2696026 911583 198951 39339895 
1983 4206712 13219804 4078248 4066 6530129 349018 2100713 2329236 537316 1606938 317450 123851 35403481 
1984 5620208 15206316 5837420 2909 6272613 406643 3000491 3188472 404888 2044511 484627 183099 42652197 
1985 6959341 16500158 6670100 8868 6475637 599336 1667195 999241 243630 4157947 557868 244228 45083549 
1986 5416639 15639539 6414624 149 5929649 532421 1122806 861074 159291 4517216 665679 451364 41710451 
1987 5617324 17102680 3810138 617 5355812 425851 522293 452711 48126 4982093 924986 390367 39632998 
1988 7453828 19512384 4113108 0 5441239 195806 548442 879175 0 5682219 618581 827018 45271800 
1989 6409640 19997476 4894747 0 5301712 26175 669088 1845197 0 6310242 638341 1190277 47282895 
1990 5255604 19676675 6011406 0 3157532 126030 543295 1166260 42 5734830 743291 1474239 43889204 
1991 5668701 20009527 8057450 0 11763 408008 967414 493986 0 5718044 667425 1437319 43439637 
1992 11428620 36597016 13804050 0 448366 691230 2749444 1317942 6 12003706 1124428 2562682 82727490 
1993 3234353 17561058 5418910 0 36438 280402 1594210 331511 0 5983976 73089 990828 35504775 
1994 4727177 22839389 5976930 0 0 475757 1529761 475034 0 5205587 0 1543219 42772854 
1995 5358534 22754371 6418738 0 0 802645 1448240 480119 0 4881954 0 975684 43120285 
1996 3566870 21741914 5515379 0 0 734207 1060797 691536 0 5160768 0 904826 39376297 
Table V-12(b): GERMANY - Shares by Origin 
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I 1962 0.00% 9.57% 3.44% 31.54% 3.60% 0.00% 2.94% 0.07% 3.88% 27.35% 3.72% 13.88% 
1963 0.00% 9.30% 3.35% 25.25% 5.95% 0.91% 2.83% 0.07% 3.99% 29.29% 3.85% 15.21% 
1964 0.00% 9.30% 2.15% 18.77% 12.18% 3.25% 2.51% 0.06% 3.66% 27.53% 5.79% 14.79% 
1965 0.00% 9.28% 2.77% 16.96% 15.97% 3.43% 1.91% 0.12% 3.07% 28.05% 5.38% 13.06% 
1966 0.00% 9.01% 2.49% 15.74% 19.47% 3.67% 1.86% 0.01% 2.52% 29.86% 5.00% 10.37% 
1967 0.56% 13.46% 3.11% 13.62% 18.82% 3.83% 3.36% 0.00% 2.48% 31.37% 4.06% 5.32% 
1968 1.42% 11.95% 5.56% 11 .74% 17.64% 3.30% 4.03% 0.15% 3.08% 32.64% 4.21% 4.30% 
1969 1.95% 15.08% 5.02% 12.67% 15.75% 2.92% 3.44% 0.02% 3.46% 32.17% 4.10% 3.42% 
-- -- . ---. - . _-1970 2.16% 1 13.59%1 7.92%1 11.15%1 17.4~% 1 l .I:Sf'ro l 3.5H'ro 1.25% 1 3.17%1 24.5~"10 6.43% I 5.80% 
1971 4.48% 1 17.36%/ 5.34% / 10.94%1 17.28%1 2.75%1 5.57%1 0.29% 1 3.33%1 24.19% / 5.78% 1 2.70% 
1972 4.13% / 20.68%1 5.52%1 9.96% 1 16.77%1 1.80%1 6.85%1 0.00% 1 3.77% 1 21.63% / 6.47% 1 2.44% 
1973 1 5.67% / 22.54% 1 7.93%1 7.18% 1 17.44%1 2.06%1 3.85%1 0.32% 1 2.13%1 22.24% 1 5.21% 1 3.45% 
1974 / 8.47%1 21 .23%1 7.05%1 6.52% 1 17.27%1 2.69%1 2.59%1 1.17%1 2.78% 1 18.76% 1 4.80% 1 6.67% 
1975 / 14.59% 1 25.08%1 9.25%1 5.97% 1 14.10%1 1.37%1 2.64%1 0.68% 1 3.34%1 13.11%1 4.26% 1 5.61% 
1976 I 14.71% / 25.36%1 13.35%1 5.90% 1 13.86%1 2.02%1 2.39%1 1.10%1 2.82% 1 11.06%1 4.44% 1 2.98% 
~ 1977 12.90% 2.26% 3.09% 2.51% 
~ 1978 13.08% 1.30% 1.88% 2.35% 
1979 11 .72% 1 22.90%1 13.00%1 3.56% 1 14.51%1 1.47%1 4.68% / 8.47% 1 1.77% 1 13.10%1 3.28% 1 1.56% 
1980 9.25% 1 26.36%1 15.74%1 3.67%1 13.53%1 1.09%1 3.80%1 8.75% 1 1.90%1 11.71%1 3.47% 1 0.72% 
1981 7.68%1 32.44%1 13.28%1 2.74%1 16.54%1 1.25%1 3.40%1 9.27% 1 1.85%/ 7.93%1 3.11% / 0.51% 
1982 9.01% 35.26% 15.52% 0.90% 15.52% 1.19% 3.38% 7.85% 1.71% 6.85% 2.32% 0.51% 
1983 11.88% 37.34% 11.52% 0.01% 18.44% 0.99% 5.93% 6.58% 1.52% 4.54% 0.90% 0.35% 
1984 13.18% 35.65% 13.69% 0.01% 14.71% 0.95% 7.03% 7.48% 0.95% 4.79% 1.14% 0.43% 
1985 I 15.44%1 36.60%1 14.79%1 0.02%1 14.36%1 1.33%1 3.70% 1 2.22% 1 0.54% 1 9.22%1 1.24%1 0.54% 
1986 I 12.99%1 37.50%1 15.38%1 0.00%1 14.22%1 1.28%1 2.69% 1 2.06% 1 0.38% 1 10.83%1 1.60%1 1.08% 
1987 I 14.17%1 43.15%1 9.61%1 0.00%1 13.51%1 1.07%1 1.32%1 1.14%1 0.12% 1 12.57%1 2.33%1 0.98% 
1988 I 16.46%1 43.10%1 9.09%1 0.00%1 12.02%1 0.43%1 1.21%1 1.94%1 0.00%1 12.55%1 1.37% 1 1.83% 
1989 I 13.56%1 42.29% / 10.35%/ 0.00% / 11 .21%1 0.06%1 1.42%1 3.90%1 0.00%1 13.35%1 1.35%1 2.52% 
1990 11 .97%1 44.83%1 13.70%1 0.00%1 7.19%1 0.29%1 1.24%1 2.66%1 0.00%1 13.07%1 1.69% 1 3.36% 
1991 13.05%1 46.06%1 18.55%/ 0.00%1 0.03%1 0.94% 1 2.23%1 1.14%1 0.00%1 13.16%/ 1.54%1 3.31% 
1992 I 13.81%1 44.24%1 16.69%1 0.00% 1 0.54%1 0.84% 1 3.32%1 1.59%1 0.00%1 14.51%1 1.36% 1 3.10% 
1993 I 9.11%/ 49.46%1 15.26%1 0.00%1 0.10%1 0.79% 1 4.49%1 0.93%1 0.00%1 16.85%/ 0.21% 1 2.79% 
1994 I 11.05%/ 53.40% / 13.97%/ 0.00%1 0.00%1 1.11%1 3.58%1 1.11%1 0.00%1 12.17%/ 0.00%1 3.61% 
1995 I 12.43%/ 52.77% 1 14.89%/ 0.00%1 0.00%1 1.86%1 3.36%1 1.11%1 0.00%1 11 .32%1 0.00%1 2.26% 
1996 1 9.06%1 55.22%1 14.01%1 0.00%1 0.00%1 1.86%1 2.69%1 1.76%1 0.00%1 13.11%1 0.00% 1 2.30% 
Table V-12(c): GERMANY - Import Prices 
N 
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Tebla V-13(a): BELGIUM - Imports by Origin (Metric tonnes) 
'~k<:~'lYear~J~Us.FRAlv'\li~:BRAZlI.$CANt,D.ftrjFRe.Nr.C' .•• 
1962 01 809941 253060/ 16503180 
Itt.6k1lAltNOa.WAl~j:swEDENJltENEZUEJ9\J.RaWlfiWQRl!O 
01 467271 41913351 01 127940/ 21203236 
1963 01 62931 1 1586731 14312030 307041 498331 49016041 01 244880119760655 
1964 01 4660451 1967201 15251193 1056471 621101 57423281 011157819122981862 
1965 01 5620581 506118114868742 623161 1 470631 57215461 011528670123857358 
1966 24961 4593881 487241 13120417 7874271 817021 52072371 01 18112671 21518658 
1967 2039231 1953711 01 12417365 10236171 623591 63365951 011741637121980867 
1969 
1968 3539891 5618021 1615551 13917009 12081471 313821 80590661 011991002126283952 
5793981 1344324 73001 13378328 10929731 794271 90439701 4921211989374127564306 
1970 5126131 1653426 511386113731364 11290501 224521 84918601 80841512368189129228755 
1971 10875321 1455171 01 13950714 12912441 984161 80173941 42478811843985128169244 
1972 8548461 1476584 526361 14525279 12105361 87171 76913271 4276701 1914459128162054 
1973 17648541 1295627 2762771 14645101 11029781 11242481 87995001 128894112250578132548104 
1974 22116721 1661647 3873881 14892537 13160171 636891 89070561 8731871 3576209133889402 
1975 22790691 1974360 116863113166570 9206841 1141471 49675541 28494811863664125687859 
1976 22762551 2261063 2718581 12656090 9416751 1652441 44513321 61809613570443127212056 
1977 15852221 1388815 2317031 10380769 10470061 4788501 40717501 51268912075874121772678 
1978 10252421 2443012 7132501 9276545 5609441 912791 1 58263451 108417512615308124457612 
1979 7831101 36642681 8660361 8028571 11437691 1398631 6950681 1 120803113542435126326764 
1980 8305401 33199231 6684951 6843130 8824451 2328541 58656591 94997312690463122283482 
1981 12872081 37859041 8370541 4661112 14713471 1386831 43969291 169679412968997121244028 
1982 13786891 35832161 6810621 5082696 14319671 700491 25813271 13416691 25224351 18673110 
1983 15411941 30833091 3567061 4990173 15035591 1806641 2758671 1 94993012195939117560145 
1984 12603441 39089501 3997011 4386710 18283301 2320881 37043231 166561312305303119691362 
1985 11811721 48476491 3739481 4615076 22825381 3686631 31109331 207358011718538120572097 
1986 7891821 42517471 5797401 4236898 2079881 1 295321 1 27743691 147185611581734118060728 
1987 13075661 46875521 6100691 3748714 23028081-2992-8-t r 23468241 168425011458214118445279 
1988 18249561 4852431 1 6678281 3424556 28969381 476501 1 28248491 178662811946395120701082 
1989 14160891 56194871 7605331 3180067 25547691 3683731 28735221 152715211470603119770595 
1990 14858601 64462571 6163101 3337088 25632771 6125821 29405161 15414261 805146120348462 
1991 15110881 67501971 8388751 2862356 21111891 4895161 25273051 16326501 765953119489129 
1992 22927761 134063081 26769621 5736104 30175261 8764381 46056541 202873011343442135983940 
1993 8809931 59860821 11002621 2993620 10235731 5336691 20977981 7037761 4462701 15766043 
1994 932131 / 6274231 1 21611031 2042187 15656821 432061 1 25483151 4862491 5689231 17010882 
1995 8689631 70281791 17925501 1471801 16417881 3823361 10357651 4704961 638844115330722 
1996 5531511 62992581 13555351 1421345 15558781 1380131 7812421 4971481 3945281 12996098 
N 
~ 
..... 
Table V-13(b): BELGIUM - Shares by Ori 
~~~!.~u~~~*~~'~E-AAN~~l1t{a~~~l~_t11~~_%f~~~' 
N 
....A 
Q) 
Table V-13(c):BELGIUM - Import Prices (US$/tonne) 
'~aYea~~I{AUS1WUlAI.BRAZlL1!cANADAI~FRQlet:Iil4QBBMAhN.Q~ 
1962 #N/A I 14.1621 8.4331 3.4251 #N/A I 11.107 
1963 #N/A I 12.6961 8.2371 3.4081 10.8451 9.311 
1964 #N/A I 11.9991 8.0421 3.3371 10.6581 9.741 
1965 #N/A I 10.3051 8.3041 3.335/ 11.0571 10.263 
1966 10.4171 10.1921 8.1271 3.2681 10.5721 10.306 
1967 12.8771 9.6791 #N/A I 2.9961 9.9661 8.948 
1968 13.3681 9.421 1 11 .5441 2.8121 10.1021 8.954 
1969 12.3891 9.6961 15.3421 2.6041 9.7271 12.452 
1970 12.1181 9.8501 14.4081 2.558/ 9.9461 10.823 
1971 12.7671 11.181 1 #N/A I 2.7591 11.2951 13.463 
1972 12.3411 9.0841 18.3331 3.0441 11.0331 16.061 
1973 10.6121 9.8331 13.7511 3.7071 12.0361 11.431 
1974 12.6911 12.5301 13.6191 4.3261 15.0951 19.061 
1975 16.7761 14.6161 20.2891 5.321 1 19.6131 26.851 
1976 20.0181 17.8981 22.1881 5.6021 20.8881 18.917 
1977 19.1601 15.4461 19.5081 5.8701 19.8771 16.178 
1978 18.0511 19.2451 17.9101 6.5341 18.8741 16.383 
1979 17.2081 26.2491 25.6341 6.7851 21 .5401 19.998 
1980 24.641 1 30.3221 27.4651 6.9741 27.1441 26.390 
1981 24.9421 27.0871 25.4421 5.9451 24.7521 27.718 
1982 24.6051 25.2461 25.1111 5.9951 23.0821 28.394 
1983 20.5221 23.5741 21.2641 4.9771 21.7201 20.425 
1984 18.8811 21.1371 20.0101 4.4601 20.1991 19.057 
1985 19.4261 22.241 / 23.4021 4.706/ 21.7551 21 .955 
1986 22.0251 23.9661 25.6961 6.248/ 22.161 / 22.372 
1987 20.0681 22.4441 24.6711 7.303/ 20.7531 21 .348 
1988 18.752/ 22.422/ 23.5761 8.086/ 19.9401 15.891 
1989 20.9141 24.9701 26.6661 7.849/ 23.1381 13.250 
1990 24.5411 28.104/ 34.3301 9.421 1 26.9881 16.603 
1991 24.6151 28.9531 36.513/ 10.295/ 27.6071 18.580 
1992 26.2081 28.960/ 36.6431 9.969/ 28.591 1 23.034 
1993 22.5441 23.8931 31.0851 9.3381 23.0121 22.439 
1994 23.368/ 23.556/ 33.275/ 11.2301 23.4881 23.314 
1995 21.8121 26.2091 37.2441 10.9481 24.2691 19.773 
1996 21.1711 25.9371 38.0741 10.6721 23.8551 16.151 
"'~09I'1E1!4  
10.7781 #N/A 
9.6351 #N/A 
9.5661 #N/A 
9.7651 #N/A 
9.6581 #N/A 
8.4341 #N/A 
8.031 1 #N/A 
8.0571 9.876 
8.7921 10.210 
10.6511 10.568 
11 .364 9.245 
11 .555 9.800 
14.980 13.376 
18.022 18.744 
17.540 18.997 
15.537 17.551 
17.158 16.793 
17.953 19.718 
17.655 25.470 
16.212 24.458 
14.124 22.614 
17.015 20.729 
16.908 18.334 
16.667 19.748 
19.843 21.664 
22.177 19.660 
22.924 19.106 
21.686 22.727 
26.019 25.684 
29.827 27.167 
30.368 27.256 
23.780 24.960 
22.978 20.891 
34.523 22.330 
39.437 23.144 
to.) 
...A. 
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Table V-14(a): FRANCE -Imports by Origin (Metric tonnes) 
';:2 WeariJJ 1'A tJSl'RAUAf ,";:;~;.~ aRAZlI!I~~rCAM~m~l~ 5!'.c;:,; UBERlAI:U-'\URJTANrAl;'';;f'~SAi:RI~ 
> ~ ... ftt..."p ' '"'':! ".. ~ , ,". . --II!II,~ .. . ......... :r.- {""V,  ~--_ . ~ .. ' ~ . . -" . .~.,. 
1962 I 01 210840/ 833521 01 01 30351 
1963 1 01 6742901 35741 7507251 4336461 15741 
1964 I 01 3938351 254001 8147451 9963551 473 
1965 1 01 6325581 302981 9579491 11339851 78270 
1966 ! 01 7164721 647701 9455871 14222221 63930 
1967 1 1631141 10393581 1271 9537991 16435341 643 
1968 1 2440651 13131391 22981 11735281 13461201 0 
1969 1 4430401 14648291 32431 1 12219101 17573671 0 
1970 I 7556391 21948971 2643181 16165471 19507031 33009 
1971 8033461 22212791 84541 1 12968691 19365131 0 
1972 1 7004991 31811711 745331 16132571 2363861 1 0 
1973 8310761 31091751 3199891 17072451 1880951 1 114671 
1974 1 16130401 4089771 1 655371 1 20774891 24519091 19909 
1975 1 16760031 3490781 1 5290961 1994006/ 21630291 528 
1976 1 16865971 42062941 872147/ 1885501 1 22454251 1392 
1977 1 21727341 42711961 9158291 21021311 25430201 573015 
1978 1 2197431 1 43013941 4398921 18868351 21399691 1087631 
1979 I 16786301 43977821 12705781 18217691 28683771 992134 
1980 I 20855491 46395651 11863951 22979401 29341901 1092905 
1981 22328631 40807991 10337491 20990081 25113051 791767 
1982 1 17914851 38891471 955141 1 15956221 21927581 777973 
1983 I 17767291 32804651 9806621 10419421 16710841 382911 
1984 ! 27515981 36009451 13252801 13408631 20323251 410074 
1985 1 17984021 39745621 19870991 11192651 2306361 1 159604 
1986 1 23558931 40315081 22095171 5894831 22939921 564 
1987 I 33739561 36562751 22631001 991759/ 18456871 1052 
1988 1 46845421 54954231 28301981 11132021 16941851 151491 
1989 1 40386631 55897401 22943971 9992231 28531071 986743 
1990 1 40419351 60532081 2070008/ 5043891 24929051 778166 
1991 41510071 57919421 19185411 7098021 17213721 501119 
1992 ! 75948121 134048681 43442621 4011981 34431721 667166 
1993 1 62926061 130482661 34668761 2203801 51382941 890704 
1994 I 46891341 82174301 24521521 01 30260451 325168 
1995 I 57610451 76526601 21466781 01 28588841 581820 
1996 1 50630761 65760781 18825731 01 29006971 458376 
~.4JN~~EDE~I:~ROWI;Jw()Rl!D 
1647791 6119931 7398671 1841182 
1505701 6266841 7685171 3423747 
1417051 4780121 755821 1 3606346 
754581 4934951 5786301 3980643 
858561 3957121 580841 1 4275390 
125878 3556131 5280761 4810142 
175274 2840851 4629741 5001483 
254654 1082911 1 4451201 6702262 
481856 14378971 5611121 9295978 
470643 13223791 5552781 8690848 
511384 17325241 6178461 10795075 
437224 1965781 1 905281 111271393 
491689 266374011314116115377034 
315278 16457701 10192871 12833778 
617738 18033331 8124521 14130879 
85874 17248191 10288751 15417493 
97743 18705881 5735491 14595032 
216573 300010411186844117432791 
242968 31752781 10616941 18716484 
212827 2751431 1 8599971 16573746 
226539 26888701 8771791 14994714 
325704 23528141 7373541 12549665 
660133 277946211125539116026219 
406289 28914091 16261311 16269122 
553419 24702661 17173061 16221948 
632128 8100671 15023841 15076408 
428912 6457041 16968641 18740521 
334125 62595512330983120052936 
274677 471871 12216999118904158 
448245 59888012401811 118242719 
373920 8278701 3746071 1 34803339 
348200 115252612539422133097274 
93620 5664351 736799f20106783 
210165 5691091 455679120236040 
210325 1697601 10624301 18323315 
N 
N 
o 
Table V-14(b): FRANCE - Shares by Origin 
[,;,'Wear$~ ']A(J$~II\ ~"~~:~~I:l<~;~ A ·,~.y~t(eERt9: '~l!J~1TJ(N~ J~FSAliRICA ~~~:ttSP..A1·N l:'l"'$J:D'E~ ~4;!1'l:.ReW1 
r 1962 0.00% 11.45% 4.53% 0.00% 0.00% 1,65% 8.95% 33.24% 40.18% 
1963 0.00% 19.69% 0.10% 21 .93% 12.67% 0.46% 4.40% 18.30% 22.45% 
1964 0.00% 10.92% 0.70% 22.59% 27.63% 0.01% 3.93% 13.25% 20.96% 
1965 0.00% 15.89% 0.76% 24.07% 28.49% 1.97% 1.90% 12.40% 14.54% 
""n~~ ",n",nl .. ,..._"nl ... _ .. n' > --_ ... 16.76% 1.51% 22.12% 0.00% 33.27% 1.50% 2.01% 9.26% 1 13.59% 
1967 3.39% 21 .61% 0.00% 19.83% 34.17% 0.01% 2.62% 7.39% 1 10.98% 
1968 4.88% 26.25% 0.05% 23.46% 26.91% 0.00% 3.50% 5.68%1 9.26% 
6.61% 21.86% 0.48% 18.23% 26.22% 0.00% 3.80% 16.16%1 6.64% 1969 
1970 8.13% 23.61% 2.84% 17.39% 20.98% 0.36% 5.18% 15.47%1 6.04% 
1971 9.24% 25.56% 0.97% 14.92% 22.28% 0.00% 5.42% 15.22% 1 6.39% 
29.47% 0.69% 14.94% 21 .90% 0.00% 4.74% 16.05% 1 5.72% 1972 
1973 
6.49% 
7.37% 27.58% 2.84% 15.15% 16.69% 1.02% 3.88% 17.44%1 8.03% 
1974 10.49% 26.60% 4.26% 13.51% 15.95% 0.13% 3.20% 17.32% 1 8.55% 
1975 13.06% 27.20% 4.12% 15.54% 16.85% 0.00% 2.46% 12.82% 1 7.94% 
1976 11 .94% 29.77% 6.17% 13.34% 15.89% 0.01% 4.37% 12.76%1 5.75% 
1977 14.09% 27.70% 5.94% 13.63% 16.49% 3.72% 0.56% 11 .19%1 6.67% 
1978 15.06% 29.47% 3.01% 12.93% 14.66% 7.45% 0.67% 12.82% 1 3.93% 
1979 9.63% 25.23% 7.29% 10.45% 16.45% 5.69% 1.24% 17.21% 1 6.81% 
11 .14% 24.79% 6.34% 12.28% 15.68% 5.84% 1.30% 
16.97% 1 5.67% 
1980 
1981 13.47% 24.62% 6.24% 12.66% 15.15% 4.78% 1.28% 
16.60% 1 5.19% 
11.95% 25.94% 6.37% 10.64% 14.62% 5.19% 1.51% 
17.93% 1 5.85% 
1982 
14.16% 26.14% 7.81% 8.30% 13.32% 3.05% 2.60% 
18.75%1 5.88% 
1983 
22.47% 8.27% 8.37% 12.68% 2.56% 4.12% 
17.34% 1 7.02% 
1984 17.17% 
24.43% 12.21% 6.88% 14.18% 0.98% 2.50% 
17.77% 1 10.00% 
1985 11.05% 
24.85% 13.62% 3.63% 14.14% 0.00% 3.41% 
15.23% 1 10.59% 
1986 14.52% 
24.25% 15.01% 6.58% 12.24% 0.01% 4.19% 
5.37% 1 9.97% 
1987 22.38% 
15.10% 5.94% 9.04% 0.81% 2.29% 3.45% 1 9.05% 1988 25.00% 29.32% 
27.87% 11.44% 4.98% 14.23% 4.92% 1.67% 
3.12%1 11 .62% 
1989 20.14% 
10.95% 2.67% 13.19% 4.12% 1.45% 2.50% 1 11.73% 1990 21 .38% 32.02% 
10.52% 3.89% 9.44% 2.75% 2.46% 
3.28% 1 13.17% 
1991 22.75% 31.75% 
12.48% 1.15% 9.89% 1.92% 1.07% 2.38% 1 10.76% 1992 21.82% 38.52% 
10.47% 0.67% 15.52% 2.69% 1.05% 
3.48% 1 7.67% 
1993 19.01% 39.42% 
12.20% 0.00% 15.05% 1.62% 0.47% 
2.82% I 3.66% 
1994 
1995 
23.32% 
28.47% 
40.87% 
37.82% 10.61% 
10.27% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
14.13% 
15.83% 
2.88% 
2.50% 
1.04% 
1.15% 
2.81% 1 2.25% 
0.93% 1 5.80% 
1996 27.63% 35.89% 
N 
N 
...a. 
r 
N 
N 
N 
Table V-15(a): ITALY -Imports by Origin (Metric tonnes) 
[t~~y~.;:~ .if~U~~!~~~J3RAZ1t i~ ~ ~]::~It.fQlA~<j1fO=l.ER~ !AAll~lT~~ l~EZQI;4\ ·.RO~ ;:tweRUll 
I 1962 0 607049 111400 434959 536423 0 637933 1487387 . 3815151 
1963 0 757286 68873 562516 554691 236498 650576 2340724 5171164 
1964 0 918975 31148 300187 644122 739553 764285 1587602 4985872 
1965 0 1276614 278001 292525 1836580 1074861 814556 2095539 7668676 
1966 0 1022018 1241496 66260 1618067 1236156 931541 1675228 7790766 
1967 169299 943890 1472047 17260 2553927 1197137 1063598 2272505 9689663 
1968 420004 1247810 1272469 52422 2153649 937500 967951 2813318 9865123 
1969 733568 1255030 1185322 1049 2196715 1157240 1210901 3028187 10768012 
1970 740390 1145539 1360886 16010 2816814 1131943 1111661 2367898 10691141 
1971 1519147 1024857 1256893 35953 2780821 949828 1385169 2162987 111156551 
1972 1315967 2076794 951022 657 4130227 1182164 1492978 2158042 13307851 
1973 1779818 1932937 1942958 0 3764004 1192918 1525751 1884580 140229661 
1974 2269188 3259516 1998170 0 3811716 1197882 1836329 3759840 18132641 
1975 2083909 3093899 1991508 0 2830679 1313447 2160715 2117286 15591443 
1976 2547920 3195522 2097989 199482 2879519 1133933 1997434 2881078 16932877 
1977 1522423 3157019 1807063 0 3100200 1223497 1758250 2693001 15261453 
1978 1533351 3790344 1496326 563538 3317584 1253091 1667769 2674444 16296447 
1979 1196046 4005599 2731395 183743 3154935 1790842 1606037 2652016 17320613 
1980 1793264 4989185 1790929 125692 3116336 1957997 1526460 1613082 16912945 
1981 1045600 4683689 1679516 0 3224258 1738497 1472953 1255438 15099951 
1982 1523487 4596868 1648183 338008 3416034 1822306 1832928 802018 15979832 
1983 1825150 3542183 1070947 403362 3304933 2038139 928410 345675 13458799 
1984 1835242 6746279 1634007 590462 3558625 2779064 1151870 948516 19244065 
1985 2180642 5280492 1391205 1046516 3231085 2906541 989020 1268753 18294254 
1986 1879039 5938934 1555945 960132 3322070 2252628 1060429 631418 17600595 
1987 1665284 5221892 1600240 1023189 3701794 1594560 946953 768919 16522831 
1988 1604871 5407521 1381034 908698 2778072 2211860 1003023 1118111 16413190 
1989 1626444 5905126 1246328 968097 1950833 2293422 1058548 1639767 16688566 
1990 1648018 6402731 1111622 1027497 1123594 2374984 1114073 2161423 16963942 
1991 1928438 6887738 922676 1004635 61010 3170424 1662979 2040400 17678300 
1992 4403112 12956588 1924212 859816 1152576 3077070 1477332 4109399 29960105 
1993 3561528 12833708 1783080 2257115 0 4884036 2107832 5966633 33393932 
1994 1911958 7161925 535955 1525746 0 2715815 950166 1601468 16403033 
1995 1927718 7854139 975858 1216365 120850 3460644 994798 1755239 18305611 
1996 1274147 8103970 1244136 630283 0 3069554 737465 988138 16047693] 
N 
N 
W 
N 
N 
~ 
Table V-15(c): ITALY -Import Prices (US$/tonne) 
't;::.year:t'& ~AUS1RAttAl1t:f.;'~B~L ~1?.e~A ~~.;~NDfA 1~~t~UBER~ 'MAUliffANIA tJENgQ~ 
1962 #N/A 12.442 8.806 #N/A 13.167 #N/A 12.360 
1963 #N/A 12.739 8.900 #N/A 9.982 11.146 11.433 
1964 #N/A 12.919 8.251 #N/A 9.706 10.327 10.093 
1965 #N/A 11.639 7.838 #N/A 8.983 10.496 9.784 
1966 #N/A 9.159 11 .545 #N/A 8.991 10.619 9.901 
1967 11.831 9.698 13.089 #N/A 8.889 9.927 9.131 
1968 11.809 9.754 13.002 #N/A 9.224 9.986 8.892 
1969 11.998 9.530 13.729 #N/A 8.526 9.862 8.261 
1970 11.249 10.284 14.806 #N/A 10.151 11 .071 8.772 
1971 11.945 11 .638 16.803 #N/A 11 .166 12.260 9.966 
1972 11 .686 9.066 12,970 #N/A 11 .235 12.398 9.539 
1973 11.131 12.695 16.118 #N/A 13.148 12.008 9.606 
1974 14.699 15.573 17.877 #N/A 15.665 14.118 14.977 
1975 19.245 15.206 21 .515 #N/A 19.400 19.932 20.633 
1976 18.010 16.652 18.214 #N/A 20.337 19.524 18.282 
1977 17.491 18.886 21 .331 #N/A 20.529 17.781 17.244 
1978 15.915 18.474 20.731 #N/A 17.886 16.847 16.187 
1979 15.179 20.671 20.282 #N/A 22.610 19.836 15.800 
1980 19.379 26.265 23.201 #N/A 26.782 21.860 20.181 
1981 22.721 28.776 25.797 #N/A 25.213 22.212 23.734 
1982 24.632 29.004 25.113 #N/A 24.995 22.050 24.012 
1983 24.885 28.266 25.700 #N/A 25.993 21 .763 22.320 
1984 19.803 24.156 24.266 #N/A 24.793 18.894 20.918 
1985 20.148 24.596 26.191 #N/A 23.427 19.771 20.244 
1986 20.010 22.997 24.140 #N/A 23.481 18.945 25.855 
1987 19.313 23.033 24.778 #N/A 23.151 17.712 18.273 
1988 19.929 23.617 24.647 #N/A 23.562 16.805 18.615 
1989 26.870 26.893 31.463 #N/A 35.825 23.458 26.689 
1990 23.620 30.334 33.914 #N/A 29.096 24.665 25.779 
1991 26.074 31.642 36.365 #N/A 21 .964 25.814 26.599 
1992 26.114 30.400 37.779 27.092 24.070 26.839 28.178 
1993 23.013 26.996 32.695 20.469 #N/A 22.700 23.737 
1994 21.166 25.504 28.064 19.506 #N/A 20.933 21.620 
1995 23.956 29.195 42.189 20.167 19.876 23.095 23.557 
1996 23.497 30.041 44.488 20.676 #N/A 22.721 23.551 
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Table V-16{c): UK - Import Prices (US$/tonne) 
1.Y,ear~7.~ 1\USTRALIA 11JBaAZlI! I,GANADA rMAURITANIA SWEDEN IN ENEZUEeA 
1962 #N/A 16.677 13.895 #N/A 13.792 15.167 
1963 #N/A 15.089 13.942 11 .355 12.345 14.074 
1964 #N/A 14.906 14.660 11 .584 12.094 13.243 
1965 13.337 13.335 14.994 11 .996 12.154 13.831 
1966 #N/A 13.186 13.889 11.683 12.539 13.338 
1967 13.381 11 .760 14.408 11 .519 11 .908 11 .829 
1968 13.184 11 .896 14.355 11.450 10.702 11.040 
1969 14.200 11.435 14.145 11 .259 10.580 11 .153 
1970 13.319 14.917 14.055 11 .880 12.371 11 .159 
1971 13.575 17.225 15.947 14.520 15.323 14.040 
1972 12.776 16.748 16.086 16.082 16.326 11 .894 
1973 15.848 16.701 16.172 15.492 17.538 12.576 
1974 17.809 19.013 19.705 17.440 21.008 19.179 
1975 18.781 22.339 20.599 20.092 28.478 24.085 
1976 22.618 20.459 19.705 18.383 30.694 21 .567 
1977 19.740 24.295 21.406 17.872 28.650 22.444 
1978 16.437 21 .837 22.567 17.126 22.120 19.921 
1979 19.286 25.309 31 .745 15.930 19.067 21 .111 
1980 23.524 29.513 38.371 20.205 34.178 26.925 
1981 20.106 23.508 30.422 19.840 12.839 21.973 
1982 19.297 22.787 34.146 21.146 25.582 23.380 
1983 20.209 21 .839 33.122 19.153 18.182 21 .010 
1984 18.622 21 .155 24.237 15.679 16.382 18.742 
1985 20.181 24.290 27.717 18.883 16.436 21 .662 
1986 20.641 23.860 25.628 17.851 20.056 20.253 
1987 19.803 22.940 27.302 17.812 23.202 19.556 
1988 23.143 27.655 30.272 17.333 20.990 21 .303 
1989 21 .578 23.723 30.594 31.446 19.524 20.661 
1990 42.777 43.599 42.355 37.601 25.203 32.227 
1991 39.826 41 .203 40.395 29.430 27.347 48.830 
1992 29.381 35.220 32.137 22.690 34.723 28.415 
1993 27.066 32.328 26.352 24.305 37.022 25.528 
1994 16.969 14.849 16.963 9.262 31.430 16.938 
1995 23.289 22.615 21 .029 21 .089 48.617 20.066 
1996 24.107 23.575 26.294 20.995 51 .587 21 .694 
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· Table V-17{a}: NETHERLANDS -Imports by Ori in (Met. tennes) 
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Table V-17(b): NETHERLANDS - Shares by Origin 
~jj:tXeaF~:', ,l\tlS"FRAfiIA &BR8lIl: CANADA NQRWAY SWEDEN, 1 ,~ENezUECA g ROW 
1962 0.00% 3.97% 7.92% 1.12% 49.36% 0.00% 37.64% 
1963 0.00% 1.15% 3.45% 0.20% 39.20% 0.00% 56.00% 
1964 0.00% 9.03% 4.02% 0.26% 30.78% 1.53% 54.38% 
1965 0.00% 9.46% 12.08% 0.25% 20.09% 1.87% 56.25% 
1966 0.00% 5.70% 20.91% 0.11% 11.97% 0.00% 61 .32% 
1967 0.00% 34.70% 22.91% 0.07% 2.54% 0.00% 39.78% 
1968 0.00% 20.62% 12.49% 11.74% 14.50% 0.00% 40.65% 
1969 3.65% 11 .76% 23.06% 11 .95% 12.82% 0.00% 36.76% 
1970 3.66% 6.32% 32.18% 9.59% 12.90% 0.00% 35.35% 
1971 1.39% 11 .08% 22.06% 12.46% 17.65% 0.00% 35.36% 
1972 0.00% 21 .27% 9.08% 13.94% 17.66% 0.00% 38.05% 
1973 3.48% 19.23% 2.67% 5.76% 24.79% 0.00% 44.08% 
1974 0.00% 24.94% 9.27% 0.00% 28.69% 3.05% 34.04% 
1975 9.47% 24.38% 12.81% 0.00% 21 .18% 4.46% 27.69% 
1976 8.25% 25.60% 18.12% 0.00% 26.18% 0.88% 20.96% 
1977 8.68% 16.04% 30.84% 0.00% 21 .56% 0.00% 22.87% 
1978 9.68% 31.69% 13.86% 0.27% 12.94% 0.00% 31 .55% 
1979 5.57% 32.56% 16.07% 0.00% 23.31% 0.00% 22.49% 
1980 5.49% 33.82% 15.75% 0.00% 25.04% 2.58% 17.32% 
1981 4.90% 32.75% 12.86% 0.00% 25.30% 2.03% 22.17% 
1982 7.49% 22.42% 19.02% 1.64% 25.42% 2.83% 21 .17% 
1983 4.00% 22.21% 11 .90% 7.97% 17.87% 2.33% 33.72% 
1984 7.49% 32.54% 10.13% 1.25% 20.04% 5.39% 23.16% 
1985 16.21% 23.66% 17.45% 0.00% 18.14% 4.55% 19.99% 
1986 14.51% 28.30% 12.16% 1.58% 19.00% 4.04% 20.40% 
1987 14.65% 38.89% 9.74% 16.94% 5.20% 1.83% 12.75% 
1988 20.25% 33.34% 9.53% 14.36% 5.00% 2.46% 15.08% 
1989 16.73% 29.13% 9.94% 14.85% 3.69% 5.65% 20.01% 
1990 16.78% 29.39% 9.98% 17.57% 0.00% 5.14% 21.14% 
1991 20.95% 29.44% 10.12% 18.42% 0.00% 5.46% 15.60% 
1992 18.29% 32.73% 7.46% 20.92% 0.00% 8.04% 12.57% 
1993 11.43% 33.51% 6.25% 25.19% 0.00% 6.79% 16.84% 
1994 16.15% 32.82% 11 .26% 24.14% 0.00% 7.18% 8.44% 
1995 14.27% 36.60% 8.81% 18.16% 0.15% 12.95% 9.06% 
1996 10.96% 33.63% 7.28% 21.41% 3.45% 12.62% 10.65% 
229 
Table V-17(c): NETHERLANDS -Import Prices (US$ltonne) 
I~Neartf~\ ;J~t9ST1RAl!I~ It"BaAZll! I ~CANAE>~ i.! NO RWA¥ SWEDeN V,ENEZU'EI,;A 
1962 #N/A 16.918 8.242 12.352 11.961 #N/A 
1963 #N/A 12.791 8.162 13.115 10.515 #N/A 
1964 #N/A 11 .539 9.746 11.480 10.545 10.278 
1965 #N/A 12.626 11 .603 10.602 10.917 10.494 
1966 #N/A 11 .679 9.821 9.731 11 .223 #N/A 
1967 #N/A 9.179 8.402 9.331 11.177 #N/A 
1968 #N/A 11 .256 9.476 10.934 9.259 #N/A 
1969 8.719 10.972 14.051 10.542 9.417 #N/A 
1970 8.091 9.688 12.113 10.271 11 .204 #N/A 
1971 8.268 9.841 9.904 10.893 10.463 #N/A 
1972 #N/A 9.942 9.228 11 .264 10.840 #N/A 
1973 9.880 12.849 11.111 12.730 12.969 #N/A 
1974 #N/A 16.122 18.306 #N/A 15.226 11 .597 
1975 15.082 16.656 20.862 #N/A 19.912 19.811 
1976 13.621 19.037 21 .367 #N/A 20.569 24.512 
1977 13.831 20.255 24.334 #N/A 19.631 #N/A 
1978 14.185 17.716 27.461 24.481 18.096 #N/A 
1979 14.852 20.182 27.817 #N/A 19.201 #N/A 
1980 20.944 25.479 26.710 #N/A 24.060 23.725 
1981 22.290 26.768 27.305 #N/A 25.543 33.887 
1982 15.775 24.584 25.227 26.368 27.924 25.195 
1983 15.998 20.045 22.921 25.325 21.934 28.019 
1984 15.847 19.054 21.803 21 .949 21 .115 19.466 
1985 15.869 20.247 22.554 #N/A 23.384 19.779 
1986 18.057 22.009 26.490 20.027 24.133 19.681 
1987 15.704 21 .770 23.016 25.542 22.315 19.775 
1988 13.393 19.587 23.205 24.308 22.024 23.446 
1989 12.433 18.064 20.558 21.560 19.665 20.288 
1990 16.241 21 .549 25.717 25.100 #N/A 23.637 
1991 18.679 19.774 25.362 24.492 #N/A 24.129 
1992 18.983 23.067 25.901 24.562 #N/A 26.380 
1993 16.340 20.175 22.114 24.457 #N/A 22.009 
1994 17.231 19.449 24.217 23.199 #N/A 22.707 
1995 19.363 20.064 24.734 25.170 54.716 22.602 
1996 16.040 20.487 24.641 24.879 23.682 20.320 
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Table V-18(a): USA - Imports by Origin (Metric tonnes) 
It'm,i'(,~ari:·~ /~tBmll~ '1 I\A'i,CANADA R ;""" CHILE ~ VENI;ZUELA' l ~ii;i!HiOW_ ~WOR~D~ I 
1963 793734 19197954 2722374 9378996 1707099 33800157 
1964 1071650 25261698 2755667 10113419 3891192 43093626 
1965 2315452 24138592 2702852 12470018 4081650 45708564 
1966 2766465 24318970 2304219 12793780 4793194 46976628 
1967 1665872 24645954 1387061 13025220 4661706 45385813 
1968 1277180 26761182 1464268 10478111 4664840 44645581 
1969 1252489 192uv ... vu 1811462 13971910 4975776 41295573 
1970 2023392 24317399 1606225 13234459 4275688 45457163 
1971 1801237 20668408 891956 13161367 4244929 40767897 
1972 1132341 18459726 312789 11101395 5327651 36333902 
1973 3267622 21974760 207887 13322981 5174884 43948134 
1974 6677498 20018340 300888 15624606 5761365 48382697 
1975 7638355 19418160 946261 13347446 5804444 47154666 
1976 5474584 25362234 617428 9145752 4501819 45101817 
1977 2229692 25688837 575030 6277857 3692539 38463955 
1978 4043126 19544593 396735 6180475 3990720 34155649 
1979 3139058 23031274 249414 4637103 3255462 34312311 
1980 2027462 17589099 326728 3660252 1856767 25460308 
1981 1771916 19147381 347734 5151873 2369770 28788674 
1982 987875 9431296 47993 1848640 2598369 14914173 
1983 1296471 8973584 0 1437036 1834672 13541763 
1984 2582469 11339931 0 1613259 1899680 17435339 
1985 2580455 8693874 166612 2289906 2435116 16165963 
1986 3752512 8789750 94561 2386460 1924083 16947366 
1987 3698082 7952031 581461 2639892 1996093 16867559 
1988 4836055 9155456 138907 3568487 2416947 20115852 
1989 5168955 8537959 60796 4232015 1597595 19597320 
1990 4275578 9371338 138346 3502946 793419 18081627 
1991 2480248 7336602 102570 2762155 670956 13352531 
1992 2442320 6833624 107356 2540097 580751 12504148 
1993 2872063 7329011 67532 3189335 526491 13984432 
1994 3609745 10073221 134465 2874066 87006 9 17561566 
1995 4814005 9047852 56502 2466124 113646 6 17520949 
1996 5172538 9800179 163980 2139613 111562 8 18391938 
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Table V-18(b): USA - Shares by Origin 
h~'::;:..Year ;'J ~BRAZIl: ~": I~';" CANADA "~' -fi CHILE ' "~ I'VENEZUEUA ~~{ROW~ 
1963 2.35% 56.80% 8.05% 27.75% 5.05% 
1964 2.49% 58.62% 6.39% 23.47% 9.03% 
1965 5.07% 52.81% 5.91% 27.28% 8.93% 
1966 5.89% 51 .77% 4.91% 27.23% 10.20% 
1967 3.67% 54.30% 3.06% 28.70% 10.27% 
1968 2.86% 59.94% 3.28% 23.47% 10.45% 
1969 3.03% 46.70% 4.39% 33.83% 12.05% 
1970 4.45% 53.50% 3.53% 29.11% 9.41% 
1971 4.42% 50.70% 2.19% 32.28% 10.41% 
1972 3.12% 50.81% 0.86% 30.55% 14.66% 
1973 7.44% 50.00% 0.47% 30.32% 11.77% 
1974 13.80% 41 .37% 0.62% 32.29% 11.91 % 
1975 16.20% 41.18% 2.01% 28.31% 12.31% 
1976 12.14% 56.23% 1.37% 20.28% 9.98% 
1977 5.80% 66.79% 1.49% 16.32% 9.60% 
1978 11 .84% 57.22% 1.16% 18.10% 11 .68% 
1979 9.15% 67.12% 0.73% 13.51% 9.49% 
1980 7.96% 69.08% 1.28% 14.38% 7.29% 
1981 6.15% 66.51% 1.21% 17.90% 8.23% 
1982 6.62% 63.24% 0.32% 12.40% 17.42% 
1983 9.57% 66.27% 0.00% 10.61% 13.55% 
1984 14.81% 65.04% 0.00% 9.25% 10.90% 
1985 15.96% 53.78% 1.03% 14.16% 15.06% 
1986 22.14% 51 .86% 0.56% 14.08% 11.35% 
1987 21.92% 47.14% 3.45% 15.65% 11 .83% 
1988 24.04% 45.51% 0.69% 17.74% 12.02% 
1989 26.38% 43.57% 0.31% 21.59% 8.15% 
1990 23.65% 51.83% 0.77% 19.37% 4.39% 
1991 18.58% 54.95% 0.77% 20.69% 5.02% 
1992 19.53% 54.65% 0.86% 20.31% 4.64% 
1993 20.54% 52.41% 0.48% 22.81% 3.76% 
1994 20.55% 57.36% 0.77% 16.37% 4.95% 
1995 27.48% 51 .64% 0.32% 14.08% 6.49% 
1996 28.12% 53.29% 0.89% 11.63% 6.07% 
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Table V-18{c): USA - Import Prices (US$/tonne) 
1/ Year '" ~ BRAZIl:. 1 I~t CANAeA' 1"" GHILE , I~VENEZUELA' I 
1963 9.740 10.390 9.305 8.203 
1964 10.880 10.870 8.789 7.832 
1965 10.097 10.953 8.603 7.853 
1966 9.649 11 .235 8.597 7.976 
1967 8.947 11.238 8.137 7,963 
1968 9.100 11 .510 7.864 7.936 
1969 9.022 11 .375 7.933 7.926 
1970 8.829 12.222 7.972 8.198 
1971 9.186 12.939 8.018 8.675 
1972 10.589 13.421 9.198 9.003 
1973 11 .217 14.193 8.235 9.594 
1974 12.768 17.063 9.582 12.108 
1975 15.816 21 .635 12.863 15.381 
1976 20.421 24.666 12.895 16.580 
1977 23.435 26.992 14.514 18.9681 
1978 29.114 32.079 17.785 22.347 
1979 32.490 33.658 23.792 23.976 
1980 39.104 38.249 36.902 27.680 
1981 40.146 42.636 26.851 32.940 
1982 35.619 44.001 20.107 38.600 
1983 29.447 43.528 #N/A 41 .376 
1984 28.254 41 .350 #N/A 29.304 
1985 25.401 42.574 19.656 29.423 
1986 24.831 39.166 34.930 24.635 
1987 22.871 34.460 21 .725 23.174 
1988 20.518 34.887 24.844 25.043 
1989 22.628 38.447 21.547 29.720 
1990 26.992 40.679 24.330 35.297 
1991 28.327 40.805 24.539 36.579 
1992 28.198 39.290 26.612 35.299 
1993 27.384 36.103 27.291 34.242 
1994 25.835 35.354 28.111 39.609 
1995 26.780 35.595 27 .716 37.449 
1996 29.754 37.204 31 .766 39.389 
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Table V-19(a): S. KOREA -Imports by Origin (Met. tonnes) 
l ~p;. X'Elar.11 ~A\:JSTRAL:IP( .BJ~:AZlb I'tGANAD~ 1~~CHl l,!E I".INDIA 1~:eERU r" Rew IlWQBUD 
1973 205311 0 0 0 241057 0 21200 467568 
1974 768107 0 0 0 411936 174678 40070 1394791 
1975 608687 0 0 0 609988 244626 30405 1493706 
1976 936355 95556 0 0 737481 141370 237021 2147783 
1977 1992253 204183 0 0 948374 499033 78578 3722421 
1978 1678278 104064 50599 0 987554 445855 356695 3623045 
1979 3192340 599145 10604 o 2025562 1347590 341857 7517098 
1980 3882786 1166019 0 o 2160238 1680304 252146 9141493 
1981 3973512 1599986 0 o 2605894 2057718 361588 10598698 
1982 4233561 2248801 0 o 2807481 1971194 248903 11509940 
1983 3949272 2195252 0 o 2512854 1463782 49394 10170554 
1984 4464534 2000405 107173 o 2137072 1578208 104 10287496 
1985 4751803 2859786 0 o 3201931 1604724 o 12418244 
1986 4512602 2295348 130440 o 2581869 2057305 363643 11941207 
1987 6527407 4884392 133565 o 3578078 2624981 272511 18020934 
1988 7502675 5524945 374798 33148 3742717 2538529 136260 19853072 
1989 8477943 6165499 616032 66297 3907356 2452077 10 21685214 
1990 8223856 6547265 612949 550451 3289801 1771744 163541 21159607 
1991 12878589 8246363 1009611 970455 3782761 1686802 374684 28949265 
1992 30420770 15540894 1897544 2005364 4120940 3908152 5673745 63567409 
1993 17364164 9430951 916838 703227 4799416 1544162 790359 35549117 
1994 18538481 8112450 1093858 995547 3695714 977540 836419 34250009 
1995 18997122 8481426 527121 1567473 3228660 1208821 1064669 35075292 
1996 17088745 9659545 939056 1983042 3580931 561257 1011388 34823964 
Table V-19(b): S.KOREA - Shares by Origin 
I Jif';Yeal\ l~ il1\USTRAl!IA ~.;# BRAZIL! IjOANADA li: QHILE .INDIA I'f ~ERU i~~ROW 
1973 43.91% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 51.56% 0.00% 4.53% 
1974 55.07% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.53% 12.52% 2.87% 
1975 40.75% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 40.84% 16.38% 2.04% 
1976 43.60% 4.45% 0.00% 0.00% 34.34% 6.58% 11.04% 
1977 53.52% 5.49% 0.00% 0.00% 25.48% 13.41% 2.11% 
1978 46.32% 2.87% 1.40% 0.00% 27.26% 12.31% 9.85% 
1979 42.47% 7.97% 0.14% 0.00% 26.95% 17.93% 4.55% 
1980 42.47% 12.76% 0.00% 0.00% 23.63% 18.38% 2.76% 
1981 37.49% 15.10% 0.00% 0.00% 24.59% 19.41% 3.41% 
1982 36.78% 19.54% 0.00% 0.00% 24.39% 17.13% 2.16% 
1983 38.83% 21 .58% 0.00% 0.00% 24.71% 14.39% 0.49% 
1984 43.40% 19.45% 1.04% 0.00% 20.77% 15.34% 0.00% 
1985 38.26% 23.03% 0.00% 0.00% 25.78% 12.92% 0.00% 
1986 37.79% 19.22% 1.09% 0.00% 21 .62% 17.23% 3.05% 
1987 36.22% 27.10% 0.74% 0.00% 19.86% 14.57% 1.51% 
1988 37.79% 27.83% 1.89% 0.17% 18.85% 12.79% 0.69% 
1989 39.10% 28.43% 2.84% 0.31% 18.02% 11.31% 0.00% 
1990 38.87% 30.94% 2.90% 2.60% 15.55% 8.37% 0.77% 
1991 44.49% 28.49% 3.49% 3.35% 13.07% 5.83% 1.29% 
1992 47.86% 24.45% 2.99% 3.15% 6.48% 6.15% 8.93% 
1993 48.85% 26.53% 2.58% 1.98% 13.50% 4.34% 2.22% 
1994 54.13% 23.69% 3.19% 2.91% 10.79% 2.85% 2.44% 
1995 54.16% 24.18% 1.50% 4.47% 9.20% 3.45% 3.04% 
1996 49.07% 27.74% 2.70% 5.69% 10.28% 1.61% 2.90% 
~"'I 
Table V-19(c): S.KOREA - Import Prices (US$/tonne) 
Wear I;7-AUSTRALIA BRAZIL I.CANADA CHILE INDIA I ~ PERU 
1973 14.237 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A 
1974 14.775 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A 21.491 
1975 15.162 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A 19.843 
1976 15.642 14.295 #N/A #N/A #N/A 19.523 
1977 14.431 18.958 #N/A #N/A #N/A 15.588 
1978 15.957 17.701 13.143 #N/A #N/A 13.287 
1979 16.010 17.542 43.003 #N/A #N/A 15.891 
1980 18.768 19.481 #N/A #N/A #N/A 18.216 
1981 21 .566 21 .242 #N/A #N/A #N/A 22.570 
1982 24.052 23.012 #N/A #N/A #N/A 28.567 
1983 25.417 24.995 #N/A #N/A #N/A 24.744 
1984 26.964 30.141 25.893 #N/A #N/A 25.644 
1985 25.263 26.932 #N/A #N/A #N/A 24.492 
1986 24.683 25.709 23.321 #N/A #N/A 23.973 
1987 22.131 21 .599 21 .765 #N/A #N/A 21 .205 
1988 21 .693 20.281 35.987 25.703 #N/A 24.966 
1989 22.259 23.369 23.765 29.187 #N/A 22.946 
1990 25.356 28.001 26.707 29.187 #N/A 25.518 
1991 27.468 29.735 31 .197 33.914 #N/A 28.962 
1992 26.686 29.764 29.581 31 .082 26.503 26.792 
1993 23.899 26.685 26.707 28.142 24.251 24.828 
1994 21 .817 25.487 25.637 26.465 22.885 25.977 
1995 22.554 26.752 27.003 29.802 22.805 25.984 
1996 23.868 28.770 32.700 33.421 24.929 28.630 
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